Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943

Hopkins Papers: Telegram

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden) to Prime Minister Churchill ¹

most secret
important

[London,] January 4, 1942.

Taut 377. Following for Prime Minister from Foreign Secretary.

Washington telegrams No. 6147 and 6160 of December 31st: St. Pierre and Miquelon;² I am not surprised at Vichy’s reaction in view of Vichy Government’s published denial of the 29th December that they had entered into negotiations with Foreign Government concerning the occupation. They object, no doubt, to control of radio station by U.S. and Canadian technicians and perhaps, indeed, to any negotiations at all until Vichy’s sovereignty has been restored.

2. It was thus surely a mistake for the State Department to make an approach to Vichy. The Germans are no doubt following, and being kept informed of, these exchanges, and quite apart from the merits of the case in regard to which you know His Majesty’s Government’s views, there is therefore in my view, no possibility of a satisfactory settlement with Vichy. State Department have merely courted a rebuff.

3. I am not, however, convinced that failure to reach a settlement need bring contact[s] between U.S.A. Government and Vichy to an end. We ourselves would like to see them maintained. Russian successes and entry of U.S. into the war should have strengthened Pétain in his resistance German pressure and should make him cling more tenaciously to Fleet and North African bases and to his connection with United States.

A breach in relations with U.S. would deprive the Vichy Government of even the little respect which it enjoyed in France.

The Vichy Government have thus strong reasons to maintain relations with U.S., their sole remaining link with respectability, and their re-entry card for return to circle of Allies.

I hope therefore that U.S. Government will take no hasty decisions to sever relations with Vichy.

4. Mr. Hull’s delineating public statement³ has of course made it difficult for him. Since it was made the inhabitants of the islands have almost unanimously declared they do not wish to have anything more to do with Vichy.

There have been no disorders. The islands have ranged themselves in an orderly way on the side of the Allies and a hindrance to Allied war effort has been removed. A solution which did not recognise these facts and which enabled Vichy to victimise a population for its loyalty to the Allied cause would not be acceptable to public opinion here.

Value.⁴

1. The source text is marked “copy no. 1”.
2. Not found in American files.
3. See page 377, footnote 1.
4. A typewritten notation on the source text at this point reads as follows: “(Original had to be returned to Prime Minister before this copy could be finished.)”