Roosevelt Papers
The Secretary of
State to the President
Washington,
December 31,
1941.
Memorandum for the
President:
Since our conversation this afternoon1 in regard to the St. Pierre-Miquelon
seizure by the Free French and its possible consequence, I have
carefully reviewed the record, including some despatches that
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came in during the
afternoon. It is a mess beyond question and one for which this
Government was in no remote sense responsible.
Hereto attached is a somewhat detailed memorandum covering the entire
matter as prepared and agreed to by all of the appropriate members
of the European Division. I think it very important that you read
this so as to get an up-to-date perspective clearly set forth.
The repercussions, in my opinion, are going to be much greater than
one would ordinarily suppose. For example, the following is a
quotation from a cable giving the conversation between Darlan and
the Marshal with Admiral Leahy:
“Darlan then referred to the St. Pierre-Miquelon incident and
said that Germany has already used the seizure of those
islands by de Gaulle as an argument for the entry of Axis
troops into Africa in order that it may be protected against
a similar invasion.”2
This is just the beginning of ominous and serious developments which,
in my opinion, will occur. Our British friends seem to believe that
the body of the entire people of France is strongly behind de
Gaulle,3 whereas according to all of my information and that of my
associates, some 95 percent of the entire French people are
anti-Hitler whereas more than 95 percent of this latter number are
not de Gaullists and would not follow him. This fact leads straight
to our plans about North Africa and our omission of de Gaulle’s
cooperation in that connection. The developments revolving around
the Vichy-North African situation and those revolving around the
South American and Rio Conference situation are calculated to be
very materially affected to our disadvantage if the fact goes out to
the world that the British Government was really behind this
movement and we abandon our own policies without serious protest, et
cetera, et cetera. This may also seriously affect the question of
the French naval units in Martinique by giving Robert a chance to
pronounce our agreement null and void.
While, of course, I do not know yet just how agreeable the French
will be in working this matter out in an amicable manner, provided
Churchill would be disposed to talk with you, or rather to let you
talk with him, about the necessity from our standpoint to work out
the matter and announce to the general public that nobody is
censurable and that the matter came up on account of confusions and
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misunderstanding as to
the complications in this Hemisphere with respect to such
action.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum Prepared in the Department of
State
Memorandum
The first suggestion that the Free French forces were interested
in St. Pierre-Miquelon was communicated to this Government on
December 15, 1941. On that day the American Minister to Canada
received, at the request of the Chief of the Canadian Naval
Staff, Admiral Muselier of the Free French naval forces.4 Admiral
Muselier said that he had in his possession orders from General
De Gaulle which would enable him to land forces in St.
Pierre-Miquelon and take over the islands. Admiral Muselier
added, however, that he was not going to act until he was sure
that this proposed action was agreeable to the Governments of
Canada, Newfoundland and the United States. The Admiral
intimated that his proposed action in the islands had the
approval of the British Government. The Admiral requested an
expression of the American Government’s views in the matter. In
the same conversation he discussed the French islands in the
West Indies without, however, asking for an indication of our
views. After referring to the admitted difficulties which
existed there and granting that from the standpoint of the
United States some action might have to be taken, he stated that
both General De Gaulle and he feel that it would have a most
unfortunate effect upon public opinion in France, in both
occupied and unoccupied, if the United States Government had to
take over these islands.
On the night of December 15 a member of the British Embassy
informed the Department in strict confidence of a telegram from
the Foreign Office. This telegram referred to conversations
which had been in progress at various times since November 3
between the American and the Canadian Governments concerning the
radio station at St. Pierre and a proposal of the Canadian
Government to send civilian personnel to the island to control
all outward messages from the radio station to prevent
information from being sent out concerning ship movements. The
telegram from the Foreign Office stated in effect that Prime
Minister Churchill felt that it would be desirable for Free
French forces to land and control this radio station rather than
for
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the Canadian
Government to take action in what might be an embarrassing
political situation. The telegram continued that no action
would, however, be taken unless the consent of the American and
Canadian Governments were obtained.
After consultation with the President the Canadian Counselor and
the American Minister in Ottawa were informed as follows: The
President did not favor a policy whereby the Free French would
be permitted to take action in the St. Pierre-Miquelon
situation. In this specific instance this was the issue at stake
but if subsequently the question should arise as to Free French
action as regards other French territorial posessions in this
Hemisphere, the attitude of this Government would undoubtedly be
the same, particularly in view of the recent exchanges between
Washington and Vichy and the commitments of this Government with
respect to the other American Republics.
The American Minister was further informed by the Department that
the President entirely approved the general tenor of the
original Canadian idea which had been that persuasion should in
the first instance be used but that if such means failed to
establish Canadian control of the radio station, recourse might
then be had to force. It was made clear in these conversations
that it was the understanding of this Government that control of
the radio station was the objective of the Canadian
authorities.
This question was also discussed in the same sense with the
British Embassy and it was added that since the British
Government as well as the American Government is interested in
the maintenance of relations with the Vichy Government certainly
any action by the Free French in moving into French possessions
in this continent with the approval of the British and the
American Governments would be bound to be detrimental.
On December 16 Admiral Muselier was orally informed of the views
of this Government. Admiral Muselier expressed bitter
disappointment and said that he felt that the American
Government was making a mistake but that he would accept this
decision.
On December 22 the Counselor of the Canadian Legation in
Washington telephoned to inform the Department under
instructions from his Government that the British Government did
not “go along” with the policy suggested in the
American-Canadian discussions for action by Canada to supervise
the radio station of St. Pierre; consequently the Canadian
Government due to Empire policy as laid down by the British
Government was not going ahead with the proposed action in that
regard. Mr. Wrong added that he could state, however, that any
action by the Free French forces had been “called off”.
On December 22 the Canadian Under Secretary of State of External
Affairs referred to the decisions to do nothing for the present.
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Mr. Robertson,
however, placed more emphasis on the temporary nature of this
decision than had Mr. Wrong and intimated that the whole
question was on a twenty-four hour basis. Subsequently the Prime
Minister, Mr. Mackenzie King informed Mr. Moffat that he agreed
with the decision of the United States Government in regard to
St. Pierre-Miquelon and felt that any slight advantages of
action by the Free French there were outweighed by the bigger
issue involved which he said he understood.
On December 24 the Canadian Legation informed the Department of
the landing of Admiral Muselier’s forces in St. Pierre-Miquelon
and that this action had been taken without the prior knowledge
or consent of the Canadian Government.
On December 25 Mr. Moffat reported from Ottawa that he had been
told at the Department of External Affairs that the Canadian
Government was “shocked and embarrassed by the action of Admiral
Muselier in occupying St. Pierre-Miquelon”. Mr. Moffat’s
telegram continued that when Muselier was recalled from Ottawa
to London on December 18 he had, despite a natural
disappointment, accepted the veto against occupying the islands
and had asked for air transportation across the Atlantic; he was
on his way to Newfoundland to take a bomber when the incident
occurred. Mr. Moffat continued that the Canadians feel that
Muselier’s action “was so close to a breach of faith that it
cannot fail to embarrass their future relations with the Free
French”. It was stated that Mr. Mackenzie King plans to discuss
the subject in Washington upon his arrival around noon
today.
On Christmas morning the French Ambassador asked for an
appointment with the Secretary of State “to present an
expression of the gravity with which the situation in St. Pierre
would be viewed by his Government. He recalled that St. Pierre
was under the administration of Admiral Robert with whom a
re-affirmation of the agreement relating to the status quo of
French possessions had just been concluded”.
The Free French delegate in Washington telephoned Christmas
afternoon to say that he had learned of Muselier’s action only
by radio and that he had been completely without any previous
information that this step was contemplated by Admiral
Muselier.
Christmas night Mr. Moffat telephoned to say that the Canadian
Prime Minister was very embarrassed and had said that Canada was
not responsible.5 Mr. Mackenzie King added that it had
been decided that Canada would act to restore the status quo of
the islands only upon specific request of the British and
American Governments. He said Canada would prefer United States
action rather than acting
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alone. Mr. Moffat had been further
informed that Admiral Muselier had said he was acting under
direct instructions from General De Gaulle.
The British Ambassador likewise told the Secretary of State that
General De Gaulle had withdrawn the assurances he had given the
British Government to the effect that no action would be taken
when he had received reports from Admiral Muselier in Canada
that the radio station was the object of concern to the Canadian
Government.
