Office of the Historian

Hopkins Papers

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to Prime Minister Churchill 1

[Washington,] December 25, 1941.

Prime Minister

St. Pierre Miquelon

1. On December 16th we had a telegram from the Foreign Office2 in which, after setting out the prospects of successful action in the Islands, they say:

“We are therefore informing the Free French Headquarters that we see no objection to their undertaking this operation.”

In the same telegram they asked me to be sure that this action did not embarrass the United States Government and to give time for this said that they were asking de Gaulle to postpone the issue of orders for 36 hours.

[Page 379]

2. The matter was put to the State Department the same day who referred it to the President, who said that he was strongly opposed to the suggested action.3

3. On the 17th December, the Foreign Office telegraphed to say that the President’s view had been reported to de Gaulle who agreed that the proposed action should not now be undertaken.4

4. A telegram from the Foreign Office on December 19th4 said that in the view of the Chiefs of Staff nothing short of the occupation of the Islands “would be satisfactory from Military point of view. This course however now seems to be ruled out by United States attitude.”

5. We received this morning a message despatched from the Admiralty to the British Admiralty Delegation, Washington, as follows:

“Following has been received from Admiral Muselier. Begins:

‘I have the honour to inform you that in compliance with order quite recently received from General de Gaulle and request of inhabitants I have proceeded this morning to Island Saint Pierre and rallied people to Free France and Allied cause with enthusiastic reception.’ Ends.

“2. Please inform His Majesty’s Ambassador urgently. This action has come as a complete surprise to us.”

6. From this it appears quite clear:

(a)
that the Foreign Office knew and approved the general authority given to the Free French headquarters to try their luck with the Islands, but that
(b)
they held up the operation while the United States Government were being consulted, and that
(c)
on receipt of information about the President’s feeling they secured de Gaulle’s agreement that the operation should not now be undertaken, and that finally
(d)
Muselier has gone off on his own with or without de Gaulle’s knowledge and assent.

7. An alternative plan to ensure control of the wireless station at St. Pierre has been under discussion between the Canadian and the United States Governments for some weeks. On December 18th Mr. Welles said that he hoped the Canadian Government would give immediate effect to this plan, which involved the use of force if the Administrator of the islands did not agree to Canadian supervision of the station.3

Our Chiefs of Staff in London commented on this as set out in paragraph 4 above.

8. Since dictating the above I have just seen F.O. telegram 7243 (Flag “A”),5 which tells the complete story, and seems to place the [Page 380] blame very squarely on de Gaulle, who I see has issued a congratulatory telegram in London to Admiral Muselier and announced that a plebiscite is being held today.

9. I attach a note (Flag “B”)6 giving all the information in possession of the F.O. on the agreement between the United States Government and Admiral Robert.

10. I am seeing Hull at six o’clock, and will let you know if anything of importance emerges.7

As our information was complete on both points you raised I did did not think it necessary to telephone to the F.O.

H.
[Enclosure 1]

Copy of Telegram From the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden) to the British Ambassador (Halifax)

most immediate
[London,] December 25, 1941.

[No. 7243.] My telegram no. 7008.8

The Admiralty received a telegram from Admiral Muselier dated December 24th in which he stated that “in compliance with the order quite recently received from General de Gaulle and the request of the inhabitants” he had proceeded on the morning of December 24th to St. Pierre and rallied the people to Free France and the Allied cause with an enthusiastic reception.

2.
This was a complete surprise to us since General de Gaulle had authorized an assurance to be given to us on December 17th that no orders for the operation had been issued and that it would not be carried out by the Free French Naval forces. You were informed accordingly in my telegram under reference.
3.
Free French Commissioner for Foreign Affairs was at once summoned to the Foreign Office and asked for an explanation. He admitted General de Gaulle had in fact given orders for the operation to be effected. His reason for doing so had been that when he gave the assurance mentioned in the second paragraph above he did not know the Canadian Government intended with the approval of the United States Government to send certain personnel to St. Pierre in order to secure control of the wireless station by peaceful means and if this failed by force. On learning this General de Gaulle had addressed a letter to the Foreign Secretary in which he protested against such a decision being taken without consultation with him [Page 381] and had declared the National Committee would lose its reasons for existence if it agreed to forceful action being taken by the Allied forces on French Territory. General de Gaulle had asked that his views should be brought to the notice of the Canadian Government. This was done by telegram on December 24th. Free French Delegation in the United States had been already instructed to inform the State Department. A summary of this letter went to you in my telegram No. 7216.9
4.
It was pointed out to Mons. Dejean that General de Gaulle in his letter had not withdrawn his assurance of December 17th which His Majesty’s Government had conveyed to Washington and Ottawa. H.M. Government were now placed in an embarrassing position and they would have to inform the Canadian and United States Government[s] that General de Gaulle had without consulting them decided to cancel the assurance which he had given in a matter affecting American Defence Zone. Mons. Dejean admitted that this was correct.

Please inform the United States Government of above and also the Prime Minister.

[Enclosure 2]

Copy of Memorandum Prepared in the British Foreign Office

United States Government made an agreement with Admiral Robert in August 1940 under which Robert gave assurances about French warships, etc., in return for United States Government assurances about finance and essential supplies for Martinique and Guadeloupe.10

This agreement was renewed on December 15th, 1941,11 but we have never been shown the text. So far as we have been informed, the agreement was not concerned with St. Pierre and Miquelon.

  1. The memorandum was evidently prepared in response to a request from Churchill and it was presumably addressed to him in the first instance. The source text is a copy with the heading “The President”, which was presumably added when it was sent to Roosevelt by Churchill or by Halifax at Churchill’s suggestion.↩
  2. Not found in American files.↩
  3. See the memorandum of December 26 surveying these developments, post, p. 383.↩
  4. Not found in American files.↩
  5. Not found in American files.↩
  6. See the memorandum of December 26 surveying these developments, post, p. 383.↩
  7. Enclosure 1.↩
  8. Enclosure 2.↩
  9. No memorandum of a Hull-Halifax conversation at 6 p.m. has been found; see, however, the memorandum of Hull’s conversation with Halifax on December 26 in Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. ii, p. 557.↩
  10. Not found in American files.↩
  11. Not found in American files.↩
  12. See Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. ii, pp. 512–516.↩
  13. See ibid., 1941, vol. ii, pp. 499–500.↩