Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943

Roosevelt Papers

The British Minister of Supply (Beaverbrook) to President Roosevelt

Washington, December 27, 1941.

Dear Mr. President: I am so anxious to step up the production of war weapons in the United States and Britain that I take the liberty of sending you this letter to support the arguments I put forward yesterday.¹

You will see in the accompanying document that the combined output of the United States and Britain planned for 1942 is utterly inadequate when you take into account the necessities of the nations.

It is my hope that you will permit Mr. Hopkins to take charge of a committee of production with full powers and entire authority.

Such a committee would not only dispose of the production requirements but would also be responsible for mobilising and distributing the necessary raw materials.

There is no question of a soldier’s programme.² The soldiers’ demand in the United States and Britain can be fully satisfied.

But, thereafter, the need for an arsenal of tanks and anti-tank guns, aircraft and anti-aircraft guns is so very pressing that there should not be any limitation in the production of these four weapons.

And I would ask you to lay down the simple rule that military programmes should be fulfilled and thereafter the weapons I have mentioned should be produced in an increasing degree for the arming and supplying of all the nations fighting on the side of democracy.

I am, Mr. President,

Yours sincerely,

Beaverbrook

[Enclosure]

secret

December 27, 1941.

The American-British Production Programme 1942

The production of weapons in the United States, Britain and Canada is entirely inadequate.

The deficits are so considerable that immediate steps must be taken to increase the production programme in all directions.

There can be no delay, as the production of our enemies may, before the year 1942 is over, leave us in a difficult and dangerous situation.

To take one instance. We are told that the Russian tank production is in excess of 25,000 a year. Only a few days ago, Stalin declared that it had now reached a peak since the outbreak of war.

Yet Stalin considers that his output is 16,000 below his requirement. We have every right to suppose, therefore, that enemy tank production must be in excess of the Russian output.

It is reported, with authority, that the Germans have more than 100,000 guns of 40 mm and over.

Already we know only too well the immense naval resources of the three chief powers confronting us.

In the tables below, I make a brief and rough examination of Britain’s total requirements for the major weapons, and of Russia’s requirements for these weapons from the United States and the British Empire.

These requirements represent the quantities demanded by the constituted authority in each country.

We have no means of knowing the requirements of the United States. It would be reasonable to suppose that these exceed the requirements of Britain or Russia. Indeed, the United States might be expected to require as many arms as Britain and Russia together.

But it has been assumed in the tables which follow that the United States requirements will be no higher than those of Britain. This assumption is manifestly absurd.

Even so, it will be seen that when the external requirements of Russia, the total requirements of Britain and this purely arbitrary figure for United States requirements are set against the total planned production of the United States, Canada and Britain, the deficits are considerable.

It would be convenient to supply a list of the actual requirements of the United States, then it would be shown that the deficits are, in fact, overwhelming.

Tanks
	1942 Requirements:
		British	19,000
		Russian	16,500
		United States—assumed figure	19,000
			54,500
	1942 Production:
		U.S., U.K., & Canada	44,000
		Deficit	10,500
Aircraft (Bombers, Fighters, etc.)
	1942 Requirements:
		British	34,700
		Russian	6,000
		United States—assumed figure	34,700
			75,400
	1942 Production:
		U.S., U.K., & Canada	48,670
		Deficit	26,730
Artillery (Anti-Aircraft, Field & Anti-Tank)
	1942 Requirements:
		British	31,300
		Russian	9,000*
		United States—assumed figure	31,300
			71,600
	1942 Production:
		U.S., U.K., & Canada	49,000
		Deficit	22,600
Rifles
	1942 Requirements:
		British	1,700,000
		United States—assumed figure	1,700,000
			3,400,000
	1942 Production:
		U.S., U.K., & Canada	1,800,000
		Deficit	1,600,000

1. The reference is to the meeting at the White House at 3:30 p.m., December 26, 1941, ante, p. 98.
2. Beaverbrook expressed this idea more explicitly in his letter of December 30 to the Vice President (post, p. 339): “It seems to me the plan of production should be founded on supplying the soldier with everything he asks.”
3. The Russian requirements are confined entirely to anti-aircraft and antitank guns, as they have 35,000 field guns and require no more. [Footnote in the source text.]