Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943

740.0011 PW/1576½

Memorandum of Conversations, by Mr. Stewart of the Division of European Affairs

strictly confidential

[Washington,] January 12, 1942.

Australia and the War in the Pacific

I have had several talks in recent days with Mr. Alan Watt of the Australian Legation concerning general developments in Australia and the Southwest Pacific. In this connection Mr. Watt showed me a confidential summary of recent developments which he prepared for the use of the Australian Minister, Mr. Casey, and which covers the main points discussed with me. I asked Mr. Watt if I might have a copy of this summary for my strictly confidential information and for very restricted distribution to certain other persons in the Department. Mr. Watt agreed that I might have a copy for these purposes. I assured him that it would be treated as strictly confidential. The text of his summary is as follows:

“January 9th, 1942

“1. The Australian Government is gravely concerned over the adequacy of the measures so far taken to maintain in Allied hands vital areas in the southwestern Pacific, including Australia, as a base of operations from which to attack Japan. It believes that Singapore is the key point in this area, and that the Philippines and the Netherlands Indies are also of vital importance. Yet, in its opinion the forces at present available in the southwestern Pacific, together with the additional reinforcements which have so far been allocated to that area, are insufficient to withhold Japanese attacks with any reasonable degree of certainty. If the Philippines, Malaya and the Netherlands Indies are lost to Japan, the consequences will be incalculable—not only directly to Australia itself, but also to Burma and India and to the United States, which may be compelled to fight Japan from Hawaiian bases at great disadvantage and cost in time, men and materials. In view of her own vital interests involved, the Australian Government feels strongly that Australia and also the Netherlands Indies should have a direct voice in policy decisions affecting the southwestern Pacific area so that their views may be given full weight before decisions on policy are reached.

“2. Australia has not been represented at the United Kingdom—United States discussions in Washington. The Government has been compelled, therefore, to put its views from time to time in writing and to address these to Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt jointly in the hope that they may be considered in time to affect decisions. These views have had to be formulated in the absence of precise information as to the progress of the discussions. Replies to the representations of the Australian Government have been received both from Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt. The difficulty of carrying on adequate discussions in this way, however, has been very well illustrated by certain major misunderstandings and difficulties which have arisen from some of these replies. The main points involved are referred to below.

“3. The Inter-Allied Conference held at Singapore from 18th to 20th December came to the conclusion that the situation was ‘serious’ but need not give rise to ‘undue pessimism’, provided necessary reinforcements were supplied within the time still available. It stressed the fact that time was the essential factor. The Conference agreed on a list of ‘minimum’ reinforcements necessary to withstand a Japanese attack on the then existing scale. If additional Japanese forces were thrown into the battle, the scale of Allied reinforcements would have to be increased.

“4. On 23rd December the Australian Prime Minister sent an urgent message to Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt¹ jointly expressing the opinion that British air reinforcements known to be earmarked for Singapore were quite inadequate and asking that urgent additional aid should be given.

“5. In his reply, dated 24th or 25th December, Mr. Churchill indicated that he and his advisers did not accept the view that there was danger of an early reduction of the Singapore fortress. He referred to reinforcements which were being sent and stated that commanders in the Middle East had been directed to concert a plan for sending fighters and tanks to Singapore ‘immediately the situation in Libya permits’. Mr. Churchill added that President Roosevelt and his advisers were not only impressed with the importance of maintaining Singapore but were ‘anxious to move a continuous flow of troops and aeroplanes through Australia for the relief of the Philippines’ if that were possible. Should the Philippines fall, the President was agreeable to troops and aeroplanes being diverted to Singapore and he was also ‘quite willing to send substantial United States forces to Australia’, where the United States was anxious to establish important bases.

“6. On 1st January, President Roosevelt informed the Australian Prime Minister that he and Mr. Churchill, with their Chiefs of Staff, had given the most urgent consideration to the despatch of reinforcements at the earliest possible moment. He added that the necessary steps were already under way ‘for the flight (sic) to Australia of effective air assistance’.

“7. From information subsequently supplied by the United States Army Air Corps it would appear that by the end of January between 200 and 250 American fighter planes will have arrived in Australia en route to the Philippines or Singapore or elsewhere. In addition, it is proposed that some 80 heavy bombers will be flown from the United States to the Far East via Africa, their probable dates of arrival being unknown at present.

“8. On 29th December Mr. Churchill informed the Australian Government that he and President Roosevelt had ‘agreed’, inter alia, on the following important matters:

(a) Unity of command in the southwestern Pacific (Mr. Churchill said the boundaries of the command were not yet finally settled but would presumably extend southward to the ‘necessary supply bases, principally Port Darwin and supply lines in Northern Australia’).

(b) Wavell would be Commander-in-Chief of all land, sea and air forces and ‘would receive his orders from an appropriate joint body’ responsible to Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt.

(c) The United States Navy would ‘remain responsible for the whole of the Pacific Ocean east of the Philippines and Australasia including the United States approaches to Australasia’. Mr. Churchill added that a Letter of Instructions to Wavell was being drafted.

On 30th or 31st December the Australian Prime Minister informed Mr. Churchill that the Australian Government assented to the ‘text agreement’. Mr. Curtin added that the Australian Government ‘expect that Australia will be included in the composition of the joint body’ from which Wavell was to receive his instructions.

“9. About 3rd January Mr. Churchill forwarded to the Australian Prime Minister Wavell’s Letter of Instructions ‘approved by the President and the Prime Minister’.

“10. On 7th January the Australian Minister in Washington was informed that the Australian Prime Minister had telegraphed Mr. Churchill regarding Wavell’s Letter of Instructions along the following lines:

(a) Australia was not included in the composition of the ‘joint body’ which was to direct Wavell.

(b) Dominion views on policy, reinforcements, etc. regarding the southwestern Pacific were (in accordance with the Letter of Instructions) to be conveyed merely to London, which would then inform Washington.

(c) Australia had been totally excluded from the southwestern Pacific area assigned to Wavell.

(d) There was nothing at all to indicate that the United States Navy would assume responsibility for the waters east of Australia.

“The Prime Minister expressed his dissatisfaction with the present position and stated that this dissatisfaction was shared by the Australian War Council and the Australian people. Mr. Curtin added that without adequate naval protection, the line of communication with Australia for American supply ships could not be maintained. The Japanese had only to ‘walk into’ New Caledonia, where they would be astride this line and in a position to launch air attacks on the most northern Australian ports which were being used by the United States for unloading aircraft and other supplies for transit to Darwin and the Netherlands Indies.

“11. In short, the views of the Australian Government can be summarised as follows:

(a) Singapore, the Philippines, the Netherlands Indies, Australia itself and points like New Caledonia and Fiji are in grave danger of falling under Japanese control because—

(i) insufficient forces are at present in the southwestern Pacific to repel Japanese attacks, and

(ii) insufficient reinforcements have been assigned to that area.

(b) In view of the fact that vital Australian and Dutch interests are involved, the machinery set up to control policy in this area is unsatisfactory because there is inadequate provision for Australian and Dutch participation at the appropriate time and places in policy decisions affecting the southwestern Pacific.

(c) For reasons not explained General Wavell’s area of command excludes the whole of Australia, although according to Mr. Churchill it had been agreed that this area would include Port Darwin and supply lines in Northern Australia.

(d) No adequate provision has been made to ensure the control of waters east of Australia on the supply line from the United States or for the defence of important points like New Caledonia. This is a matter of great urgency as Intelligence Reports show that it is quite possible a heavy Japanese attack on New Caledonia or Fiji might develop at any time after January 10th.”

1. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. v, p. 390.