Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943

Defense Files

Report by the Planning Committee of the United States and British Chiefs of Staff¹

secret
United States: ABC–4/9
British: WW–10

January 10, 1942.

Immediate Assistance to China

1. The United States War Department has been exploring methods of increasing assistance to China so that better effect might be realized from utilization of that country’s resources against Japan. Information, currently available, seems to indicate a definite and progressive weakening, morally and materially, in China’s war effort. The War Department regards it as of profound importance that such steps as may be practicable and are consistent with other commitments be promptly taken to reverse this trend.

2. The chief obstacle to producing a better military result in China, aside from a general scarcity of munitions, is that country’s almost complete isolation. Communication with the Generalissimo is difficult and subject to delay and possible interception. The long, poorly maintained, and insecure Burma Road can, at the best, support only a limited truck tonnage,—while air raids, confusion and lack of coordination at Rangoon further limit the amounts of supplies possible to deliver to the Chinese. Several things are indicated as necessary:

a. Closer and more effective liaison with the Generalissimo.

b. Increased security for Rangoon and the Burma Road, by air and ground.

c. Improvement in the control, maintenance, and management of the Burma Road.

d. Increase in base facilities and technical services.

e. Increase in Chinese combat strength resulting from above measures.

f. Close and effective liaison between China and the Commanding General, ABDA Area.

3. The War Department is considering initiation of the following steps to meet the requirements listed in Paragraph 2:

a. Arrange with the Generalissimo to accept a United States Army officer of high rank as the United States Representative in China, and to agree to the following as his functions:

(1) Supervise and control all United States Defense Aid affairs for China.

(2) Under the Generalissimo, to command all United States forces in China, and such Chinese forces as may be assigned. Should it be necessary for any of these forces to engage in joint operations in Burma, they will come under the command of the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area, who will issue the necessary directions for the cooperation of the United States Representative’s forces with the forces under the British Commanders in Burma.

(3) Represent the United States Government on any international War Council in China.

(4) Control and maintain the Burma Road, in China.

(Note: The following are projected upon the condition that a is, in its entirety, previously accepted by the Generalissimo.)

b. Dispatch to the South China—Burma area additional aviation strength, initially raising and maintaining the American Volunteer Group at war strength in planes and personnel. In addition, it is considered possible that several Chinese divisions may be quickly equipped for effective combat service in this area, under command of the United States Representative.

c. Arrange (with the consent of the British) for auxiliary bases in support of the Chinese effort in Burma and India, and provide the technical equipment and troops to assure the efficiency of such Rangoon facilities as are allocated to China, and to assist in the maintenance of the Burma Road.

4. To make this project reasonably effective, British cooperation and agreement are required on the points set forth hereinafter. It is understood that British agreement and cooperation will become effective only in the event that the Generalissimo accords to the United States Representatives the authority implied and indicated in Paragraph 3 a above.

Points on Which British Agreement Is Sought, Under Conditions Stated in Paragraph 3 a

a. In cooperation with commanders of adjacent areas, the United States Representative to be permitted to establish and/or use bases, routes, and staging areas in India and Burma to support his operations in and north of Burma.

b. The United States Representative to be authorized to make every effort to increase the capacity of the Burma route, throughout its length from Rangoon to Chungking. To do this he will probably be given complete executive control of the China Section of the route. On the British Section, control will still be exercised by the British authorities, both military and civil. To achieve the general aim, these British authorities will be instructed to carry out every possible improvement to the route in accordance with the requirements of the United States Representative and will accept such American technicians and equipment as may be necessary for the improvement of facilities in the Port of Rangoon and along the route itself.

c. The United States Representative, by arrangement with the British Commanders in Burma, to be permitted to construct and/or use necessary airfields in Burma.

d. The United States Representative to be accepted as the principal liaison agency between the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

1. The source text is the report as amended and approved by the Chiefs of Staff on January 10, 1942; see ante, p. 174. As originally submitted by the Joint Planning Committee, the report was serialized as ABC–4/9, WW(JPC)9 (not printed).