500.A15A4 General Committee/310: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
614. Your 322, April 25, 7 p.m. Please deliver following message to the President:
“I appreciate your message outlining the broad policy to be followed in respect of disarmament. It is indeed encouraging to have our Government adopt such a wise, courageous policy and it will be extremely helpful. I thoroughly concur with the main objectives which you have in view. I infer from your message and also one from the Secretary of State that you are inclined to favor integral acceptance of the British plan with the exception of part I dealing with security which will be dealt with in part in another way and the section on control which should be strengthened. Although this plan does not go far enough and is in certain respects defective I agree that it furnishes an excellent basis for our work and that we should not miss the opportunity this gives for real achievement nor should we discourage the project by the introduction of amendments which would weaken it.
Certain of the technical details of the plan however somewhat disturb me.
The proposal on aviation is in effect an effort to solve one aspect of the problem which chiefly concerns the British, namely, to reduce the French air force which is now considerably superior to the British to a parity with them rather than to deal comprehensively and constructively with the whole problem of military aviation. This proposal has certain real disadvantages for us. For example the maximum unladen weight of airplanes fixed at 3 tons is too high to be really effective in doing away with bombers but is too low for us if we are to maintain any substantial military aviation because of the different topographical conditions prevailing in the United States as contrasted with those of Europe. Further the proposal provides for [Page 113] parity between the United States and Japan which under existing conditions might prove to be a serious political difficulty to acceptance of the treaty in the United States. There are other provisions in the British plan which are intended to meet the special situation in Europe such as that of army formations and which do not properly apply to us and were not intended primarily for us. I should therefore like to know if you think it inadvisable for me even to offer such amendments as may seem desirable from our standpoint—provided this can be done without arousing serious opposition or weakening our general support of the British plan.
I assume of course that you are aware of the fact that the Army seriously objects to a good many features of the British plan and their detailed views have been sent to me.59 I fully agree, however, that we must cut through many of these technical objections as it is essential that we take the lead in a broad gauge view of the subject.
With regard to a statement by you I think this would be most helpful and if you feel it would be of any assistance I would be glad to submit suggestions as to certain points which might be usefully covered. I feel that the most appropriate time for a statement would be a little later on after MacDonald and Herriot have arrived home and the four western European powers are ready really to come to grips with the question and help put it over. Now that we are ready to join in effective negotiations for disarmament measures and to give a substantial measure of satisfaction in the so-called question of security we can add a real impetus to the work. But if we are to get disarmament it will be necessary for England, France, Italy and Germany to get together with us joining them in an impartial search and reconcile enough of their differences to pave the way for final agreement; that is to say, some political understanding between them is vital as the basis for agreement for the more technical phases of disarmament.”