500.A15A4 General Committee/312: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
615. Your 321, April 25, 6 p.m. I am glad you have decided upon the policy to be adopted in respect of neutral rights. The announcement at the appropriate time of our willingness to adopt such a policy [Page 114] will be a welcome stimulus to the work here. The immediate problem which confronts us is as to the form which this declaration of policy shall take in connection with our present negotiations. It was in order to gain time for the exact formulation of our policy, both with respect to consultation and neutral rights, that I confined my declaration of yesterday afternoon (my 609, April 26, 6 p.m.) to a general statement and asked temporary adjournment of further consideration of part I.
This afternoon Eden, British representative here, showed me a long cable from Vansittart which stated it had been shown to the President before its despatch and was also to be shown to me and to Boncour. It gave further details as to the British understanding of our policy, namely, that we were prepared to accept article 1 to 3 of the British plan with the following slight changes:
Inserting “Kellogg-Briand Pact” in bracket only after “Pact of Paris” in article 1 and providing in article 3 that meeting of the powers should be called by the Secretary of the Disarmament Commission instead of the Secretary General of the League and should take place not necessarily in Geneva but where the parties might agree.
While British cable was not entirely clear it gave the impression that we are prepared with the above modifications to accept articles 1 to 3 as a part of the convention, while articles 4 and 5 were to be deleted and instead thereof we will make the unilateral declaratory statement quoted in your 321, April 25, 6 p.m.
Please advise whether foregoing correctly sets forth our position.
Before I saw British cable I had prepared detailed comments and suggestions and while this cable somewhat changes situation I deem best to submit my views fully as they represent results of my mature consideration and consultation with my associates here.
Article 3 in part I of the British plan provides a cumbersome method of consultation which might duplicate that already provided for under the Covenant. This was designed in order to avoid the possible objection we might have to mentioning the League. It is difficult to see how, as a practical matter, a conference to be attended by all the parties to a disarmament treaty could be summoned in sufficient time and could act with sufficient despatch to be of any real use in a time of crisis. By experience we have found it advisable to consult with the members of the Council as the most effective existing body to deal with any threat to the peace. The Senate of the United States has already ratified treaties set up under League auspices containing reference to the League and providing for the use of League organs. I have, therefore, assumed that the time is past when the idea of cooperation with the League of Nations is tabooed in the United States provided that we retain our full freedom of judgment and make no engagements as to future action.
[Page 115]Since we are adopting the advanced position which the cables from the
President and you envisage I suggest for your consideration the
advisability of agreeing to consult in the way that would be the most
direct and effective. Consultation outside the League might offer more
unknown risks than consultation where precedent and procedure are
established and where as a non-member we would have no direct or implied
obligations. Hence I submit for your consideration the possibility of
replacing articles 1, 2 and 3 of part I of the British plan by the
following two articles:
Article 2 above is drafted with the purpose of limiting the participation of non-member states to common consultation for the maintenance of peace but implies no obligation whatever to pass judgment or to join in the collective action of member states in punishing an aggressor. This we conceive is in the line of our established policy and your recent instructions.
You will note that we have referred rather to states members of the Council than to the Council itself in order to follow the established precedent of consulting with Council’s committees rather than with that body directly.
I appreciate fully the political difficulties which may exist in adopting the above suggestion and wish you to realize that the acceptance of articles 1 to 3 substantially as they now exist in the British plan would be an effective step and would greatly aid in achieving real disarmament. I submit the alternative because I feel that it is a more effective way of dealing with the problem if you consider it politically practicable. The proposed unilateral declaration respecting neutral rights will be most helpful in our efforts here. I fully understand your reasons for desiring to handle the matter through a declaration but I venture to point out that there are real advantages to ourselves both in putting this engagement into contractual form if it is politically possible to do so, and in limiting the scope of this engagement to a situation arising on the continent of Europe. If we commit ourselves by unilateral declaration we alone of non-member states would be bound and Russia, for example, would not be bound. Further a [Page 116] unilateral declaration however it may be hedged about, would tend to constitute an immediate moral commitment to the policy indicated. A treaty obligation of this character for any effectiveness would be contingent upon general ratification of the treaty as a whole and we would have no moral commitment in the event of failure to secure a satisfactory disarmament treaty.
If we included the neutral rights policy in a treaty I should be disposed to limit its effectiveness only to the case of an aggressor determined among the continental states of Europe with which decision we independently concurred. If we contemplate the possibility of collective punitive action being directed against a state in the American Hemisphere we can well conceive of situations in which we would prefer to be free of contractual or moral obligations which would allow us to take such action as the Monroe Doctrine or our American continental policy might dictate. In the Far East as well situations might arise in which we would find it disadvantageous to be bound by any such obligation. Complete independence of action and of judgment would thus seem desirable as regards the American Continents, the Far East or our relations with England. In order to make my ideas on the subject concrete I submit herewith a draft article 3 embodying the neutral rights idea in treaty form.
“Article 3. In the event that, pursuant to a decision by conference of the Powers in consultation a state of continental Europe shall have been found guilty of aggression against another state of continental Europe, the High Contracting Parties non-members of the League of Nations if they concur in the said decision on the basis of their own independent judgment undertake to refrain from any action and to withhold protection from their citizens if engaged in activities which would tend to defeat the collective effort which the states in consultation have decided upon against the aggressor.”
In conclusion I wish the President and yourself to realize that I appreciate the political problems involved in the decision of this question. The declaration proposed in any form would be an invaluable contribution to the cause of peace. If, however, it is made entirely apart from, and independent of a treaty, it will not be so effective as a lever to bring about disarmament. If, on the other hand, it is made contingent on securing a satisfactory disarmament treaty it will thus be tied to that treaty and it is likely to be subjected to scrutiny by our Senate in connection with the ratification of the treaty, a scrutiny that may tend to be the less friendly because of a possible feeling that an effort was made to commit the United States to a major decision in foreign policy without the consent of the Senate.
- Telegram in four sections.↩