740.0011 Four Power Pact/120
The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the
Acting Secretary of State
No. 39
Paris, June 16,
1933.
[Received June 24.]
Sir: I have the honor to enclose a copy of a
memorandum of a conversation which I had with Lord Tyrrell, the British
Ambassador, yesterday afternoon at the Embassy residence.
Lord Tyrrell was desirous that I should convey to the President his opinion
as to M. Daladier’s sincerity and intelligence, and in particular to the
moderating influence which he had exercised with respect to the conclusion
of the Four Power Pact.
Respectfully yours,
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Ambassador in France (Straus) of a Conversation With
the British Ambassador in France (Tyrrell), June 15, 1933
Lord Tyrrell called at the residence and in the course of conversation
mentioned that Daladier is a very honest courageous man, who is
responsible for the Four Power Pact; that the differences between
Italy’s and France’s views were so great that the pact almost fell
through and would have, had it not been for Daladier’s personal courage
and his desire to prove Germany’s good faith; that he wanted to put that
good faith to test; that he is entirely sympathetic to President
Roosevelt’s views as to the abandonment of offensive weapons, and was
willing to have France disarm gradually after five years, as soon as she
had evidence that German promises would be kept. He said that he wished
I would communicate his opinion of Daladier to President Roosevelt.
Furthermore, that Daladier is an unusually well informed and
intellectual man, who had travelled as have few other French
politicians, and has sympathy with, and knowledge of, the
[Page 421]
problems of other nations.
Lord Tyrrell also stated that the French Parliament was very much
opposed to the whole idea of the Four Power Pact and that Daladier had
won them over.
In so far as Germany and Hitler are concerned, Lord Tyrrell expressed
great fear of the future. He said that Hitler would have 12,000,000
people to feed next winter, and must lose out, unless he found means of
carrying out his many promises which were to result from an Organized
Germany; that then the great danger of a communistic uprising might
threaten the peace of Europe; that no more powerful a dictatorship
existed anywhere, and that in the long run dictatorships would prove
dangerous (without any specific reference to Italy), and that the only
stable form of government in these modern times was the democratic form,
and that the sort of mediaeval rule that Germany was now suffering from,
could not last. He expressed the opinion that, ever since the war, the
Allied nations had made mistakes insofar as Germany is concerned, and
that both England and the United States are responsible for the rise of
Hitlerism. He did not specify what, in his opinion, were the mistakes;
in other words, he made no reference to the Treaty of Versailles54 or war debts.
