740.0011 Four Power Pact/130
The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Acting Secretary of State
[Received July 3.]
Sir: With reference to my despatch No. 32 of June 16, 1933,55 on the Four-Power Pact, I have the honor to transmit to the Department the following sidelights on the recent negotiations looking to the conclusion of the Four-Power Pact which have been gathered from conversations members of this Embassy have had in Foreign Office and diplomatic circles here.
When the French Ambassador, M. de Jouvenel, first arrived in Rome last January, he began to sound out the Italian government as to the possibility of solving the recognized outstanding problems between France and Italy, namely, colonies, the status of Italians in Tunisia, opportunities for Italian expansion in the Balkans, etc. M. de Jouvenel soon found, however, that Italian tactics in regard to Italo-French relations had changed and that Mussolini had become much more interested in the possibilities of elaborating a formula for the collaboration of the four great powers of Western Europe (the Duce had already [Page 422] publicly affirmed the necessity for such collaboration in his Turin speech on October [23,] 1932, reported in the Embassy’s despatch 1654 of October 27, 193257) than he was in the immediate solution of the classical Italo-French divergencies mentioned above. In the early stages of his mission here, the French Ambassador, during informal and inconclusive exchanges of views with Mussolini in regard to such a formula, let it be known that it was the French view that a pact should be negotiated and signed by England, France, and Italy, and that once this were done, Germany would then feel herself obliged to collaborate with the other three powers whether she wished to or not. Mussolini, on the other hand—and M. de Jouvenel was soon given to understand that the British concurred in this opinion—insisted that it would be more prudent to include Germany in the negotiations from the beginning, since such a courtesy would ensure a better spirit of collaboration on the part of that country. Apparently the informal discussions on the subject never emerged from the exploratory stage and, although M. de Jouvenel had impressed upon Mussolini the fact that his mission was to terminate in July and that if anything were to be done to better Italo-French relations it had to be done quickly, Mussolini’s project in concrete form looking to a Four-Power Pact came as a complete surprise to him just as it did to the other ambassadors involved.
According to well informed circles here, once Mussolini had made his proposal for the Four-Power Pact, he stepped aside and allowed the other three powers to come to an agreement without interference on his part. It will be recalled that while a British text, a French text, and a German text were submitted in turn for consideration as negotiations progressed, no Italian text other than Mussolini’s original one was ever advanced. Mussolini was agreeable, it is said, without exception to every modification of his original proposal suggested or made, his one idea being to get something done.
It is also pointed out here that M. de Jouvenel was able to help the negotiations along in a way that no career ambassador could have done. For instance, toward the end of the negotiations he left his post and made a trip to Paris without obtaining the authority of the Quai d’Orsay beforehand. Not only was he absent from his embassy without leave, but he assumed the responsibility while in Paris of exerting an influence wherever possible upon members of the French government and upon French politicians of all shades in favor of the pact. As no career ambassador could have done, he also gave out statements in explanation of the provisions of the Pact to the French press. It was M. de Jouvenel who, with Mussolini’s approval, first called attention publicly to the fact that since the four powers [Page 423] were already running things in the League of Nations anyway, the activities of the four powers within the framework of the Pact would not represent a dangerous innovation in the European set-up, as opponents of the Pact had argued.
On the other hand, M. de Jouvenel’s lack of experience as a diplomat almost got him into serious trouble. It appears that a final text as drafted here was telegraphed to Paris the same night that Paris telegraphed to Rome its version of the final text. M. de Jouvenel was under the impression that the two texts were identical and began final negotiations on the basis of the Rome text, only to find out later that it was not acceptable to Paris. The misunderstanding was the cause of a disconcerting and even alarming delay in the initialling of the Pact. A career diplomat, it is said, would have compared the two texts before going ahead.
In French circles in Rome it is believed that the bad impression that the progressive emasculation of the original Mussolini proposal created could have been avoided if the project had been submitted in secret to the interested governments beforehand for their advice and consent. In this way there could have been the appearance of a uniform agreement at the outset with the resultant good moral effect. Opponents of this view state that the sensational suddenness of the proposal fired the popular imagination and was not a small element in its success. Besides, it is argued, it is impossible for the Quai d’Orsay to keep important international negotiations secret. In support of this last theory it is pointed out that as soon as M. Paul-Boncour received the telegram with the text of the proposal (the afternoon of the same day that Mussolini handed the text to M. de Jouvenel), he immediately took it over to M. Daladier, who was talking at the time with a well known French journalist. The French Prime Minister read the document and in disgust handed it to the journalist to glance at, with the words: “That’s what you get when MacDonald travels around Europe.”
In concluding these sidelights on the negotiations on the Four-Power Pact, it may be of interest to state that it is generally understood here that in dealing with the Germans Mussolini rarely had recourse to regular diplomatic channels, that is, to the German Foreign Office and the German Embassy here. The Chief of Government time and again spoke directly with Herr Hitler or Captain Goering by telephone, and it appears to have been Herr Hitler’s wish that both Baron von Neurath of the German Foreign Office and Herr von Hassel, German Ambassador to the Quirinal, be excluded as far as possible from the negotiations.
There has been little comment in the Italian press recently regarding the Four-Power Pact, although yesterday the newspapers carried despatches [Page 424] from Paris to the effect that the French Prime Minister, Daladier, had apparently made up his mind to pay a visit to Mussolini. Although there has been much talk of such a meeting between the two statesmen (see my despatch No. 32 of June 16, 1933), no official announcements have been made as yet in regard thereto.
The Giornale d’Italia of June 14th publishes an editorial on the Russian reaction to the initialling of the Four-Power Pact and endeavors to put Soviet fears concerning the Pact at rest. Italy, says the newspapers, has always been the champion of Russia. In recognizing the Soviet government, Italy declined to follow the policies of other countries which looked forward to an early end of the regime in Russia and therefore refused their recognition. Italy, furthermore, took the initiative—against the advice of several countries—in suggesting that Russia be admitted as a member of the Committee on the European Union. Under these circumstances, concludes the Giornale d’Italia, the mere fact that Italy, who is a proven friend of Russia, is included in the Four-Power Pact should constitute a guarantee of peace for Russia as well as for other nations. These soothing words addressed to the Soviets by the authoritative Giornale d’Italia may be regarded as another indication of Italian solicitude for the maintenance of friendly relations between Italy and Russia.
Respectfully yours,