500.A15A4 General Committee/617: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 7—1:12 a.m.]
727. 1. Weizsacker, German Minister at Berne, called on me this afternoon and told me confidentially that he had received a telegram by which he was instructed to call on Aloisi and Simon and acquaint them with answers which the German Government was making to certain questions which had been put to them by these two gentlemen. Weizsacker had duly conveyed this communication to Aloisi last night but not to Simon who was in London. I have learned that the German Ambassador47 called on Sir John in London today and presented a communication, presumably identical, which Simon characterized as “unsatisfactory”. Weizsacker had also been instructed to convey this message to me and at the same time the German Ambassador in Washington48 was instructed to call on you for the same purpose.
2. Weizsacker did not give me a verbatim statement of his instructions but gave me their gist article by article. In order that you may check with any message delivered you by the German Ambassador I forward the information as follows:
(a) General observations. The German Government maintains the attitude which it has adopted since the agreement of December 193249 in which equality of rights within the framework of security was granted. The German Government regards the British plan as the basis of the future convention. The period foreseen therein, namely, 5 years, appears to the German Government reasonable though Weizsacker intimated that the duration might be negotiated. The German Government cannot accept the provision for a period in which to determine the “good conduct” of Germany. The German Government has no objection to separating the treaty into two periods in the treatment of material but on practical grounds only. For example, there might be a division in the treaty. The first period of 2 years and the second of 3. The German Government claims even in the first period equality of status.
(b) The German Government agrees upon ratification of the treaty immediately to undertake the transformation of the Reichswehr. The [Page 239] armaments of the short term transformed army must depend upon the armament of other similar armies and the German Government will be interested in hearing the ideas of the other powers as to what these armaments shall be.
(c) The British plan provides:
- (a)
- A category of arms of which the use or possession is forbidden by the treaty.
- (b)
- The category of arms permitted under the treaty but limited by number.
- (c)
- A category of arms permitted under the treaty on which there is no limitation by number.
In respect to (a), the German Government will go gladly as far as the other powers. It will renounce claim to all weapons which the other powers will agree to scrap in not too great a delay and certainly before the expiration of the treaty. What will these weapons be?
In respect to (b), the German Government does not know exactly what arms will be limited by number. In view of their claim of equality of status they will desire a limited number of all arms thus limited. They also desire these arms in the first period. As to the number that will be subject for further discussion. In respect to (c), the German Government desires unqualified right to the unlimited acquisition of all arms on which there is no numerical limitation for other powers.
3. I informed Weizsacker that if the German position is to be as indicated in this communication it was not very promising and was more irreconcilable than the position which Neurath had taken in his talks with me; that Neurath had stated that he would not object in principle to a 3- or 4-year period of transition or to supervision and control provided there were a definite commitment for real disarmament at the end of the transition period and that the only serious question was to what extent if any Germany would be entitled to specimen weapons during the period of transition. Weizsacker stated that this was not a formal communication, did not represent an immovable point of view on the part of the Germans nor their last word.
4. Nevertheless, the reply and its tone are not encouraging. It opens up such a wide scope for discussion that it is difficult to see the real meaning or how far it forms a basis for negotiation.
5. The Germans have not informed the French delegation or the French Foreign Office of this communication but I suggested to Weizsacker that it would be wise to do so and avoid unnecessary resentment from the French.
6. Aloisi had informed me of the tone and purport which he described as intransigent before Weizsacker called. Aloisi told me he was most despondent and was leaving for Italy tonight to confer with Mussolini. Furthermore, now that Italy’s effort to act as a mediator [Page 240] had failed it was necessary to decide what Italy’s future course would be under the changed circumstances and what steps could now be taken to deal with the question of disarmament. In discussing what the next steps might be I asked him if they were still considering the possibility of proceeding under the Four Power Pact. He said that they had definitely dismissed this idea because it did not seem practicable and also because it was not possible to get a disarmament agreement with such a limited number of powers and particularly without the cooperation of the United States.
7. As I stated above the French have not yet received this communication and in the absence of Simon and Eden I am unable to report how the British feel about it.
- Leopold von Hoesch.↩
- Hans Luther.↩
- Five Power Declaration of December 11, Foreign Relations, 1932, vol. i, p. 527.↩