500.A15A4 General Committee/612: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
Geneva, October 3,
1933—5 p.m.
[Received October 3—3:35 p.m.]
[Received October 3—3:35 p.m.]
726. Your 370, September 30, 1 p.m.
- 1.
- In saying “we should constantly maintain pressure on Japan” I
meant of course that the states in this Conference should maintain
such pressure. Indeed what I had in mind was that concerted effort
should be exercised to keep Japan in the Conference so that if she
thus participates in the elaboration of a treaty, which the other
states of the world could accept, the pressure of events through the
cumulative feeling of isolation would cause Japan to accept. I quite
agree with you and nothing was farther from my thoughts than to have
this delegation take the lead in bringing pressure on Japan. I feel
however that we cannot be indifferent as to what Japan does because
if all of the western powers should be able to agree upon a
disarmament convention it would be most unfortunate to have Japan
threaten its consummation or for us to be in a position alone of
making our acceptance conditional on the Japanese adherence. For
that reason I have felt that as a matter of policy and strategy we
should cooperate in so far as possible with all the other powers in
an endeavor to get a disarmament agreement and at least endeavor to
do so in such a way that if Japan should not adhere she would get
the onus of failure and not the United States. As I see it therefore
we must keep constantly in mind two essential points.
- (1)
- We must not allow ourselves to be put in the position of being the one to place the onus on Japan for an eventual failure of the treaty and,
- (2)
- More important, we must try to so shape events that we do not bring on ourselves the responsibility of a failure of the treaty in Europe because we are unable to accept such a treaty through Japan’s unwillingness to sign it. In view of the above and of the forthcoming naval conference in 1935 my feeling has been that we should maintain the closest relationship with the other principal western European powers and not be left alone vis-à-vis Japan especially in the event that the latter should by refusing to participate in disarmament render more acute its isolation and the resentment over its action in Manchuria. From both of the foregoing conceptions it seems clear to me that there should be every desire to have Japan remain an active participant of the Conference and to that end all of us should bend every effort.
- 2.
- I may add to make the situation entirely clear that my conversation with Sato referred to in our 72246 was of a most friendly [Page 238] tone and that Sato would be the last one to characterize anything I said as exerting pressure.
Davis