500.A15A4 General Committee/610: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 1—10:15 a.m.]
725. For the President and the Secretary. The situation at the end of the week’s discussions remains substantially as outlined in my 722, September 28, 5 p.m.
The Italians have made no appreciable headway in getting France and Germany to modify their respective positions with regard to specimen defensive weapons for Germany during the transition period but some progress had been made in defining positions. Neurath and Goebbels44 have accordingly returned to Berlin for consultation; Suvich has gone to meet Mussolini, Simon is leaving for London and returning next Wednesday,45 Boncour will probably remain here.
Neurath, who now understands the very limited extent to which France and even England would now consent to any rearmament for Germany during the transition period, has promised to give an answer on Tuesday as to Germany’s attitude.
The crux of the problem at present is whether Germany will consent to the proposed program of a 4-year period of transition to be followed by 4 years in which real disarmament takes place with no rearmament for Germany during the first period except for the additional material of a type which would be permissible under the Treaty of Versailles and which would be required to equip the additional militia under the proposed standardization of the army or whether Germany will persist in her demand for a limited number of defensive weapons and particularly pursuit planes.
In a talk with Simon today he expressed doubt, which I also share, as to the success of the Italian efforts. He expressed the view that Italy is trying to remain too friendly with both France and Germany and that she does not carry enough weight to get them together. I also fear that Italy is really more interested in promoting certain political arrangements than in disarmament as an end in itself. Simon said that if we were going to succeed in getting agreement England and the United States would probably soon have to take the matter more in hand in which case we should together agree as to the modifications in the British plan which recent developments rendered necessary and then try to get both France and Germany to accept.