There were present, for France: M. Paul-Boncour, Minister for Foreign
Affairs; M. Alexis Léger, Secretary General of the Foreign Office; M.
René Massigli, Assistant Director of Political Affairs, and M. Jean
Paul-Boncour, Chief of the League of Nations section of the Foreign
Office;
for Great Britain: Sir John Simon, Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs; Lord Tyrrell, Ambassador in Paris, Captain Anthony Eden,
Parliamentary Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, and the Honorable
Alexander Cadogan, Chief of the League of Nations section of the British
Foreign Office;
and for the United States; Mr. Norman Davis, Chief of the American
Delegation to the Disarmament Conference; Mr. Hugh R. Wilson, Minister
to Berne; Mr. Theodore Marriner, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim in Paris,
and Mr. Allen Dulles, Legal Adviser to the delegation.
The atmosphere of the conversation was friendly and the French seem to
have made considerable progress since the conversations which took place
in April last,35 although the situation
in Germany has caused them to put renewed emphasis on the question of
sanctions, in case of a violation of the provisions of any Disarmament
Treaty, which, as pointed out in the memorandum, raises considerable
difficulties both for Great Britain and the United States.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum of Conversation at the Quai d’Orsay,
September 22, 193335a
M. Paul-Boncour explained that the purpose of the meeting was to
summarize the results of the various conversations which had taken
place during the last week and particularly to advise Mr. Davis of
what had transpired at the meeting earlier that day at the British
Embassy. He asked M. Massigli to summarize the position as it then
stood.
M. Massigli stated that the British and the American representatives
had been informed, on separate occasion, during their meetings of
the past week that France, despite the situation which developed in
Germany, was prepared to carry out the general program which had
been outlined in June, namely, after a period of transition, and
under the conditions which they had recently outlined, to proceed to
a radical reduction in aggressive weapons. In fact, they were
prepared to go somewhat farther than they had indicated in June. For
example, provided that the destruction of heavy artillery started by
taking the largest categories and worked down gradually, they would
be prepared to go as low as 155 mm.; with respect to tanks
[Page 228]
they were prepared to make
substantial reductions, three methods of approaching such reduction
having been considered; first, that of individual tonnage, second
that of global tonnage and third limitation according to the nature
of the arms carried. Various details had been given in the course of
the conversations as to the precise nature of the reductions which
they could accept which would be unnecessary to develop further at
this moment. Such reductions however could only be effected after a
trial period of at least four years during which there would be an
opportunity to test out the effectiveness of the system of
supervision and provided first that there was meanwhile no
rearmament by Germany and second that there should be an
understanding as to the measures to be taken if it was found that
any party was violating the treaty.
M. Massigli added that following an interchange of views with the
Italian Government the French Government had given further
consideration to the question as to whether any specimens of
particular types of arms, not now permitted to the disarmed powers,
should be accorded them. The French position was that under no
conditions and at no time should the so-called aggressive arms, even
in the most restricted quantities, be accorded Germany. M. Daladier
had however conceived of the possibility that after the test period
of four years it might be possible to accord to Germany, for
example, some specimens of the type of arms which would be retained
under the convention and on a permanent basis by the other powers.
That is to say, there was a certain intermediate zone above the
weapons now permitted to Germany under the Versailles Treaty but
below the weapons of the so-called aggressive character, heavy guns,
etc., which would eventually disappear from all armies. Possibly,
Germany could receive, after the four year period, a few specimens
of the weapons in such intermediate zone. (From the discussion it
appeared that the French had in mind the possibility of eventually
letting Germany have a few guns of 155 mm. and possibly a few
aircraft).
Mr. Davis remarked that M. Massigli’s presentation did not indicate
what steps France proposed to take with regard to aircraft. M.
Massigli replied that under the British Plan the French would be
forced to cut their aircraft strength approximately 75% whereas the
cut which other powers would take would be very much less. What the
French had in mind was a substantial cut of approximately 50% of
aircraft in service and in reserve on the basis of a corresponding
cut by others, subject to certain adjustments where the situation
required. M. Massigli pointed out that under the British Plan parity
was established, for example, between the British aircraft force and
that of the French but the British Dominions would also have their
separate air forces whereas the French Colonies, Dependencies, etc.,
were allocated
[Page 229]
no separate
air force. Such a solution did not seem entirely equitable. Mr.
Davis remarked that this would also raise certain difficulties for
the United States. While we would have no apprehension whatever with
regard to a Canadian air force it might create political problems in
connection with the acceptance of a disarmament convention if there
were separate quotas of this character.
In this connection M. Boncour pointed out that the existence of civil
aviation caused difficulties and that while the French were prepared
to do away with bombardment aviation and bombardment from the air,
it was subject to satisfactory control of civil aviation. On this
point they had had an exchange of views with the Italian Government
which had indicated that they were not disposed to accept the
complete abolition of air bombardment unless heavy naval units were
abolished. Presumably the Italians had in mind the abolition of
battleships.
Sir John Simon remarked that one of the questions which had been
uppermost in the British-French conversations had been that of
supervision and he wished to indicate the clarifications which they
had given on that point. He said that the British were primarily
interested in working out a convention which provided for an
adequate degree of disarmament. If the only obstacle to achieving
this result was that of supervision he did not feel that at that
stage of the work this would constitute an insuperable difficulty.
Certainly the British would give the matter, at that time, their
most sympathetic consideration.
M. Paul-Boncour thanked Sir John for his reaffirmation of their
present position with regard to supervision and said that he wished
to make it clear that the program which he had outlined was what he
would call a maximum program. It was one which he said would greatly
shock French public opinion. The public’s attitude was that there
should be no disarmament at the present time and under present
conditions in Germany, but they should wait and see how matters
develop. They were prepared to proceed but they could only proceed
if they knew in a definite way what would happen if the Disarmament
Convention was violated.
Mr. Davis remarked that as M. Boncour undoubtedly realized this
presented a particularly difficult question for the United States.
We had taken a long step forward in agreeing to automatic and
periodic control in connection with an agreement for effective
disarmament. If in addition to that we were asked to enter into some
agreement to punish a violator of the treaty, public opinion in the
United States would not stand for this and there would be no hope of
obtaining the acceptance of a treaty with such a provision. As he
saw it, there were two questions: first, to determine clearly what a
state would have the right to do in the event that a violation were
determined, and
[Page 230]
second,
whether any state would join in and help the state most immediately
affected by the violation. As to this latter point he wished to make
it entirely clear that they should not expect any commitment
whatever from the United States. Mr. Davis suggested that possibly
the verification by the Permanent Disarmament Commission that a
violation had taken place might be a ground for the consultation
which would be provided for under Part One of the Treaty. He added
that he was only throwing out this suggestion which he had not
analyzed and which of course was not based on any instructions or
authority from his Government. He added that, as they would recall,
the United States did not propose to sign Part One of the Treaty but
would handle this by separate declaration. Mr. Davis further
recalled to M. Paul-Boncour that last May at the Disarmament
Conference he had suggested36 that
the American Government, in the event of an aggression recognized as
such by that Government and followed by collective action on the
part of others, would not be disposed to protect its citizens in any
action to trade with or aid the aggressor. Certainly this
constituted a substantial step toward meeting the French position
and was the limit to which the United States could go.
Sir John Simon remarked that he felt Mr. Davis’ suggestion of
providing for consultation in the case of a disregard of the
Disarmament Convention was an extremely useful idea. For example,
you might put in the Disarmament Convention a provision that any
infraction of the Convention was a matter of vital concern to all of
the signatories and if established, the powers parties to the
Convention would meet to consult and to decide as to the measures to
be taken to support the provisions of the Convention and that the
consultation provided under Part One of the Convention should be
applicable to such a situation.
Mr. Davis said that the question with which they were faced
emphasized a difference in point of view between the Anglo-Saxons on
the one side and the French on the other in that the Anglo-Saxons
were not disposed to define in detail what they would do in future
contingencies whereas the French desired to attempt such a
definition.
M. Paul-Boncour stated that he obviously did not expect any definite
statement of points of view on this difficult subject at this time.
The French themselves had not yet prepared any formula which they
wish to suggest. He merely desired to make it quite clear that this
was a point which they would raise and which to France was of
primary importance. He was glad to be able to confirm a recollection
[Page 231]
which he had and which
he had mentioned to the British in one of the previous
conversations, namely, that Signor Mussolini appeared to be in
agreement with France, that this question of action to be taken in
case of violation of the Convention was a point which would have to
be considered and dealt with. Sir John Simon remarked that he had
really not come prepared to discuss this question as he had not
gathered from the report which Mr. Eden had made that this would be
raised. Mr. Eden then recalled to Sir John that the French had
raised this question in their conference with them and that he had
made report on it.
As the meeting broke up it was decided to resume discussions at
Geneva as Sir John and Captain Eden were leaving that evening to be
followed the next day by the French. Mr. Davis said he would reach
Geneva either Sunday or Monday.
M. Paul-Boncour said that it was important that the communiqué of
their meeting be very carefully worked out and also suggested that
they agree generally not to indicate in any way to the press that
there had been a discussion and a failure to agree on this question
of sanctions. He hoped that the fact that they had reached so large
a measure of agreement on most of the points under discussion would
not be nullified by alarming press reports as to possible divergence
of views regarding sanctions. It was generally agreed that there was
no point in discussing this question with the press as the matter
had only been gone into in a very preliminary way and the following
communiqué was then prepared to be issued simultaneously at the Quai
d’Orsay, British Embassy and by Mr. Davis:
“In the course of this afternoon various conversations took
place on the subject of disarmament between representatives
of the French, the United States and the United Kingdom
Governments. M. Daladier, M. Paul-Boncour lunched at the
British Embassy where they met Sir John Simon and Mr. Eden.
A conversation took place after lunch at which Mr. Baldwin
who was passing through Paris was also present.
Later, at the Quai d’Orsay M. Paul-Boncour received Sir John
Simon, Mr. Eden and Mr. Norman Davis and a discussion ensued
between the representatives of the three Governments.
All of these discussions resulted in the further elucidation
of the respective points of view of the three Governments
which had already been outlined in less detail at previous
conversations which Mr. Davis and Mr. Eden have recently had
with representatives of the French Government.
The object of this work of elucidation is to facilitate the
proceedings of the Disarmament Conference on its resumption
in the near future in Geneva. Substantial progress was made
with this task.”
As we were leaving the Quai d’Orsay M. Massigli remarked that he felt
it would help to give satisfaction to the French on the question
[Page 232]
of what action would be
taken in the event of violation of the Disarmament Convention if the
British would reaffirm their willingness to give full effect to the
provisions of the Locarno Treaty.37
