500.A15A4 General Committee/602: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Marriner) to the Secretary of State
425. From Norman Davis. The French have given me in the strictest confidence memorandum31 recently received from Mussolini setting [Page 225] forth his disarmament program together with their comments in reply32 which were delivered to Mussolini only a few days ago. The fact that we have this exchange of views should not be disclosed as neither the British nor the Italians know that the French have given it to us. I understand the French have also communicated the Italian views to the British. Mussolini’s program follows.
- “(1) A convention to abolish all chemical and bacteriological warfare and to provide for the destruction within 2 years of all factories destined for the preparation of these types of warfare and material in stock therefor.
- (2) A convention to prevent the bombardment of the civil population.
- (3) An engagement to proceed to a reduction of offensive arms after a test period of a duration of at least 4 years.
- (4) An agreement not to exceed during this test period the present standing of land and air armaments as well as the expenses relating thereto.
- (5) The reduction and standardization of land effectives along the lines of the British plan.
- (6) With regard to the preceding point the grant to the disarmed states of a quantity of defensive arms; this quantity to be worked out in stages by successive agreements.
- (7) The naval question to be taken up for examination at the termination of the Washington Treaty.33
- (8) The creation and the putting into operation of the permanent disarmament commission along the lines [of] the British plan.
- (9) The control should take the British plan as a basis of departure but should have a periodic, permanent and automatic character.
- (10) The conference will meet again on January 1, 1938 to determine the provisions applicable to the second period”.
The French reply noted with satisfaction that the French are in substantial agreement with the Italian position. As regards point 1, it expressed doubt as to the effectiveness of the proposal with regard to destruction of gas factories and gas material in stock. In this connection the French reassert their view as to the necessity for sanctions in the event of violation of the convention.
Point 2. The French indicate their willingness to agree to the total abolition of air bombardment and bombardment aviation upon the condition that effective control be exercised over civil aviation. In this connection at yesterday’s conference Boncour mentioned that a further expression of Italian views on air bombardment had been obtained, their position being that the Italians did not favor total abolition of air bombardment unless heavy naval units presumably battleships were also abolished.
[Page 226]The French reply expresses agreement with the Italian position on points 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9. With regard to point 3, however, the French state that the understanding with respect to the reduction of aggressive weapons after the trial period should immediately be set forth in detail because of the different conceptions which exist as to what constitutes such weapons. In this connection see point 10 which the French state calls for no observation at the present time.
As regards point 6, id est granting specimen types to Germany, the French reply categorically rejects this idea but holds out the possibility that in connection with the transformation of the German Reichswehr into a numerically larger short term service army such enlarged army might be granted an additional amount of the type of material now permitted but should in no case receive any of the so-called aggressive arms (the suggestion noted in my 424, September 23, noon,34 as to what might be accorded Germany after the transition period was developed by the French subject to this correspondence with Italy).
I consider the Italian memorandum extremely significant and somewhat unfortunate since it foresees the possibility of much less drastic measures of disarmament than formerly advocated by Italy, in fact Mussolini’s memorandum does not go as far on many points as the French are themselves prepared to go and in proposing that the definition of actual reduction be left to a subsequent conference rather than decided now is extremely unsatisfactory. This is all somewhat puzzling as normally one would not expect Mussolini to propose a disarmament plan unless he had some reason to believe that the Germans would accept. [Davis.]