500.A15A4 General Committee/606: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:45 p.m.]
722. 1. The disarmament conversations have been going on actively since our arrival here along the lines of the discussions in Paris and I have, therefore, not attempted to report the details. Nothing has occurred which has changed the guardedly hopeful attitude which I felt on reaching Geneva, and which, in spite of the obvious difficulties still in the way, is generally shared.
2. The Italian delegation, under the guidance of Suvich,38 has assumed a most active role as a friend of both France and Germany and is endeavoring to harmonize the views of these two countries. We, as well as the British, have been in constant touch with the French, German and Italian delegations with a view to assisting in preparing the groundwork for the formal resumption of the Conference. The Italian initiative while useful cannot, in my opinion, alone serve to bridge the gap between the French and the Germans, and I am keeping in particularly close touch with the British so that together we can at the appropriate time furnish the necessary impetus.
3. As regards procedure, we have had to meet on the one hand the desire of the Germans to delay action, apparently in the hope that their political situation vis-à-vis the United States, Great Britain and Italy would be improved 6 months hence, which would not force them to negotiate in their present position of semi-isolation, and on the other hand the apparent desire of the Italians to fit the disarmament work into the Four Power Pact39 with a view to increasing their own prestige. The British, French and ourselves are taking a strong position against any delay. With regard to the Four Power Pact, I have made our position clear in private conversations, namely, that while we welcome any improvement in political relations here in Europe resulting from such understandings as the Four Power Pact, the solution of the disarmament problem must be sought on a broader [Page 233] basis if our collaboration is to be expected. The French and British likewise appear to think along the same lines as we do.
4. The private discussions are being carried forward on the general basis outlined in our telegram of September 23 from Paris,40 that is to say, there would be a transition period of approximately 4 years during which there would be no increase in land war material and the gradual transformation of European continental armies to a uniform militia basis which would involve on the one hand the increase in the German army to 200,000 men and some decrease in the standing armies of the heavily-armed continental European powers. During this period the automatic supervision and control would start to function with a view to supervising the transformation of the continental armies and the carrying out of the covenant not to increase war material. The convention would provide that after this transition period the heavily-armed powers would proceed to definite and precise measures of reduction along the lines of the British plan, such reductions to be carried out within approximately 4 years after the end of the transition period. While this general scheme provides for the immediate setting up of the system of supervision prior to any drastic measures of disarmament, under present conditions this is the most we can hope for and I feel we should lend our cooperation. As to this idea of a transition period there seems to be no fundamental difference of opinion between the French and the Germans.
5. The chief difficulty arises in determining what should be the status of Germany’s armaments during this transition period. The French insist that Germany should only be permitted the arms allowed by the Treaty of Versailles while the Germans claim that they should be allowed at least specimens of the types of arms which would be eventually retained by other armies but which are not now permitted to Germany under the Treaty of Versailles. They would apparently be willing to forego the type of arms which the other powers would agree to abolish by the end of the convention, such as heavy guns, heavy tanks, et cetera. The French are apparently willing to consider allowing to Germany, after the Beichswehr is transformed into a larger militia force, additional numbers of the arms permitted by the Treaty of Versailles to permit them to equip their added forces during the transition period and possibly after the transition period some of the arms which will eventually be retained by all other armies. We have taken the position, as have the British, that there should be no rearmament by Germany but the question as to exactly what would or would not constitute rearmament in view of the transformation of the German army is a question on which neither we or the British have [Page 234] taken a definite position in the conversations. So far as the Germans are concerned the question of aircraft will present the most difficulty. They take the position that unless military aviation is to be completely abolished as being an aggressive weapon they should be allowed a modest number of observation and pursuit planes even during the transition period.
6. In the conversations I have had with Neurath41 and from reports of conversations he has had with others the Germans appear amenable to reason on all points with the exception of that of specimen weapons during the transition period. As indicated above they acquiesce in the automatic inspection and do not oppose the transition period.
7. The French demand for sanctions in the event of a violation of the disarmament convention constitutes another difficult hurdle. This we thought they had practically abandoned insofar as concerns the British and ourselves but they have been pressing it again, particularly with the British and Italians, on the ground that in the face of the present situation in Germany they must have something beyond mere control to reduce French apprehensions and to get approval for reductions in material. I feel that our position is entirely clear and that I have succeeded in getting the French to realize they can expect nothing from us on this point beyond the statement of our position made last May.42 The British tell me that they have been equally positive in refusing to commit themselves in advance as to the action they would take if the convention were violated.
8. In the background of all our discussions is the great unknown of the Conference, namely, Japan’s eventual attitude toward disarmament. Sato called yesterday and told me that his Government was reluctant to enter now into a general pact of non-aggression and that after its recent bitter experience could accept no further undertaking to consult nor agree to inspection and supervision. He raised other technical objections which showed that their conception on material was widely at variance with existing possibilities. I did not lose the occasion to point out to him that Matsuoka43 had declared when Japan was withdrawing from the League of Nations that Japan nevertheless intended to continue to cooperate sincerely in movements for world betterment. This I pointed out was the first test and it would be unfortunate if Japan were to give the impression now that she is unwilling to cooperate in securing a general disarmament agreement which would contribute so greatly to world peace and progress.
[Page 235]9. We feel that we should go ahead with every effort to write a treaty, a treaty providing for real and substantial disarmament; that we should constantly maintain pressure on Japan, do the utmost to keep them in the disarmament discussions (Sato had stated that their views were so at variance with the rest in view of their special position that they might have to retire from the disarmament discussions) and eventually when a treaty is achieved do our utmost, all of us, to bring pressure upon Japan to accept it; then if necessary leave on Japan the onus of rejecting a fair disarmament agreement, it being understood of course that our ratification of any such treaty could be dependent upon ratification by Japan. Or as an alternative if Japan refuses the treaty, work out limited regional understandings applicable to the European Continent.
- Fulvio Suvich, Italian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.↩
- For correspondence concerning the Four Power Pact, see pp. 396 ff.↩
- Telegram No. 425, p. 224.↩
- German Minister for Foreign Affairs.↩
- See telegrams Nos. 644, 646, 649, May 19, 20, 21, from the Chairman of the American delegation, pp. 154, 158, and 164; also telegram No. 335, May 20, to the Chairman, p. 159.↩
- Japanese representative to the League of Nations.↩