500.A15A4/2319

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State

Dear Cordell: For your information I am enclosing copies of memoranda of recent conversations with Messrs. MacDonald, Daladier and Paul-Boncour, and also a copy of a letter which I have written to the President.

I have been somewhat disturbed by the action which seems to have been taken by the British Admiralty8 in giving out information regarding the questions raised by the British Government. I am inclined to believe that the Admiralty did this most deliberately, realizing that if it became known at home that they had in effect protested, it would make it more difficult for us to modify our program even if we were disposed to do so and that this would help to cinch for the Admiralty authorization for similar cruisers.

With best wishes [etc.]

Norman H. Davis
[Enclosure 1]

The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to President Roosevelt

My Dear Mr. President: I am enclosing memoranda of recent conversations with Messrs. MacDonald, Daladier and Paul-Boncour which will give you more detailed information than was contained in my official telegraphic despatches.

[Page 212]

While the atmosphere here is very tense and some of the speeches in Germany glorifying war have been disturbing, I feel more hopeful of the possibility of agreement on disarmament than I did a few days after my return here.9 The seriousness of the situation and the realization of what a failure would mean is having a very sobering effect. The French instead of holding back as heretofore are now eager to reach an agreement without further delay because if it is not possible to get an agreement they wish to take preventive measures to protect themselves. The result is that a big game of European politics is being played in the effort on the part of France, England and Italy to bring about an appeasement of the political situation if possible, and to decide which way to jump if it is not possible.

I was sorry to hear from press despatches that you were suffering from a cold, and I hope that you are entirely recovered again.

With warm regards [etc.]

Norman H. Davis
[Enclosure 2]

Memorandum by the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis)10

Mr. Davis mentioned that press inquiries had been made of him on the boat regarding an alleged British naval building program. Sir John Simon stated that no program had been decided upon and none existed. He was glad, however, that Mr. Davis had raised this question since he wished to tell him in the utmost friendliness and frankness that the fact that we were building 10,000 ton six inch gun cruisers, even though it was tonnage permitted under the Treaty, was creating a new type of six inch cruisers of greater broadside capacity and thus would tend to counteract the efforts which the British had been making to reduce the size of unit cruisers. He went on to say that once the unit for six inch guns was established at 10,000 tons it would be difficult to prevent the British Admiralty and other Admiralties from following that pattern. Mr. Davis said that he appreciated this frankness on Sir John Simon’s part, that he was not fully informed regarding the details of our building program, that the President had seen an opportunity in the reconstruction program of getting an appropriation without a great deal of talk and devoting this appropriation to naval purposes. In the ticklish situation with Japan it was well to have our unbuilt tonnage completed as we would be in a better position in 1936 to negotiate with Japan if we had [Page 213] afloat the tonnage permitted to us. Sir John stated that in any case he would like to talk further with Bellairs11 and Craigie12 to get the facts on the matter as he had an impression that there was some sort of an understanding either in the Treaty of London13 or during the discussions to the effect that this type of vessel would not be constructed.

Sir John and Mr. Davis both recited their information regarding the proposed discussions on disarmament and it resulted therefrom that Eden will go to Paris about the 17th to consult with the French. After he has had the consultations with the French it will be determined what his subsequent movements are to be and it will probably be time then for him to continue to Geneva to attend the Council.

Sir John explained that a Cabinet had sat yesterday and that it had been decided not to give Eden binding instructions but to let him speak to the French saying that they had invited this meeting and he was anxious to ascertain just what they had in mind. First, did they really want a disarmament treaty; second, if they did want a treaty what were they prepared to do in order to make it possible to have one.

Then followed a discussion of the French and German attitudes but it was apparent that none of the parties had any information later than that of the last three-cornered conversation14 and Mr. Henderson’s conversations.15

Mr. Davis showed Sir John and then Cadogan the personal letter from the President to Mr. Davis which Sir John found of high interest. Mr. Davis said he intended to show this letter to the Prime Minister and that he also had a personal letter to deliver to the Prime Minister. Sir John explained that the Prime Minister was going to Balmoral and that he believed he was returning to his home in Scotland after that. In any event the near future was probably compromised by the condition of Viscount Grey who is at death’s door. In the event of his death the Prime Minister would undoubtedly have to attend the memorial services.

Mr. Davis let it be known that he desired to have a personal meeting with the Prime Minister and would bring up the matter subsequently.

As for Sir John, he is going to the country for some days and after that to Balmoral. He will probably not return to London until the latter part of next week.

[Page 214]

Throughout the entire conversation Mr. Davis repeatedly raised the thought that with the present conditions on the Continent and the apprehension regarding the Hitler regime the British Government might find itself drawn so close to France that it would be unable to exercise pressure upon them in disarmament matters. Sir John replied emphatically and repeatedly that a Disarmament Convention is in his opinion essential to the peace of Europe and to preventing an eventual war. He gave every indication that British pressure would be vigorous and continuous.

[Enclosure 3—Extract]

Memorandum by the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis)16

After some general conversation at the breakfast table about conditions in general I told the Prime Minister that I was leaving for Paris at eleven o’clock to resume the disarmament discussions and that I was glad of an opportunity to have a talk with him beforehand.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I then tried to get onto disarmament but he first wanted to bring up the question of the navy. I told him about what Simon had said to me on the subject of our program for naval construction and that I had told Simon I would be glad to communicate with my Government if he could give me all the details and that he had asked me to wait, stating that the Prime Minister was more conversant with this and that he wished to talk with him and with Admiral Bellairs. I had waited and had heard nothing further until last Thursday the 14th when talking to Eden and Cadogan when I asked Cadogan, who was present at the conference with Simon, if he had cleared up this matter. Cadogan then told me that they had looked up the records, that they could find no agreement not to build any new type vessels but that in a memorandum which Mr. MacDonald had made of a conversation with Secretary Stimson17 the latter had stated that although the United States had authority in the Treaty to build six inch cruisers of ten thousand tons it was not the intention of his Government at that time to build any new types of vessels; that clearly there had been no violation of the agreement and since Japan was the first to start the construction of four cruisers of 8500 tons they realized that our building program was in answer to that. He then informed me that the Foreign Office had sent a despatch on the preceding [Page 215] Monday night to their Embassy in Washington asking them to deliver a communication18 to the American Government setting forth these facts and views and asking if it would have any objection to having the British Government approach the Japanese Government to see if they would agree not to construct any more of this type of vessel so as to avoid a race in a new type. MacDonald told me that he had been completely out of touch for the past week and that he did not know about that communication.

I then told him that while the British had a perfect right to communicate directly with Washington it did seem to me rather strange, in view of the fact that they had raised the question with me and asked me not to communicate with my Government until they could get more facts, for them to have sent this communication without at least advising me of what had been done. MacDonald said he thought this was very strange himself and said he would look into it. He then said that the Foreign Office had given me a correct statement; that while Stimson did not agree that we would not build any of such type vessels he had said it was not our intention then to do so and that the spirit of this he understood to mean that if we should decide to build any such new types we would at least first communicate with them in a friendly way and talk the matter over. I told him that I had not gone into the question of the naval construction, assuming that since we had gotten so much below the treaty limit there could be no question raised by anyone regarding our taking steps to bring up our strength and that, in fact, the British should look upon this construction with considerable satisfaction particularly as it was the logical consequence of the Japanese building program. He said he realized that and that the only thing which concerned him was that it gave the Admiralty in England a chance “to get their teeth in” and demand some vessels of the same type which would not only involve a considerable outlay of money which they would like to avoid now but would considerably complicate an agreement in 1935. I told him that without knowing more about it nor having authority to do so, I was not in a position to say anything more definite but that I would like to know how he himself thought we ought to look upon our own situation and the Japanese program and whether they would not really prefer to have us take steps to counteract what Japan had done. He said that he certainly wanted to see us keep up our naval strength but that he thought we might have confined ourselves for the present to building more cruisers of the present type, so as to bring up our strength without building a new type which would bring about another race to avoid which so much effort had been made. I told him [Page 216] that I could not quite understand why the Admiralty should be so disturbed over our building program as they must realize that our navy did not have Great Britain in mind in any respect whatever. I then told him that the Hillman press service had sent a despatch to America giving an account of what Simon had said to me on this subject, which was so strikingly close to being correct as to arouse curiosity and that I had been informed that Hillman got this from the Admiralty. This seemed to surprise and disturb him somewhat. After some further discussion he said that he would try the next day to get in touch with the Admiralty and that possibly Simon would be able to give me some more facts when he came to Geneva the latter part of this week.

I then told him that while all of these questions we had discussed were of importance they were of infinitesimal importance in comparison with the bigger issue of world peace to which the United States and England could contribute so much by cooperating; that we were facing a very critical situation with regard to disarmament and that it was most important for us to put our heads together. He agreed to this and said that with the Germans in their present state of mind and with the French in their state of mind it was going to be a very difficult question with which to deal and that what complicated it still further was the uncertainty of the position which Italy was going to take.

I told him that I had found suspicion in England as to Italy and I was inclined to believe it was not well founded. He said he thought that suspicion was possibly the wrong word, that what he himself felt was disappointment that Italy was not taking a more definite attitude. I told him that Grandi19 had told me on last Friday that Italy found it difficult to cooperate satisfactorily with either Germany or France because neither seemed to understand friendly cooperation without an agreement which was in effect an alliance and if Italy did not agree with them on anything she was accused of being a traitor; that Italy did not want an alliance—she wants peace and to obtain disarmament; that my own belief is that it would not be difficult for England and the United States to enlist the full support and cooperation of Italy with regard to disarmament. He said that this would be very helpful and that we must try to do so.

During the course of the talk about Italy I told him I had been informed that Aloisi expressed himself as believing that the Disarmament Conference would fail and that the sooner the better because they could then proceed under the Four Power Pact20 to do what the [Page 217] Disarmament Conference was unable to do. I told him this seemed foolish to me because it would be impossible to bring about any disarmament under the Four Power Pact and that if the Disarmament Conference failed I did not believe that the Four Power Pact would last a week. He indicated his complete agreement with this.

He then said that Eden had gone to Paris without any authority, that this was done deliberately because they suspected that the French wanted to avoid a disarmament agreement now and wished to discuss the rearmament of Germany and infractions of the Treaty of Versailles21 rather than actual disarmament. Therefore they thought it better for Eden to have no authority to discuss this.

I told him that while I was fearful of a change in the French attitude I was assuming that we would resume with the French the three power conversations along the lines of the one day’s discussion we had in Paris the early part of June. He said that was, of course, what we ought to do. I told him that the real danger would be to have the question of disarmament slide; that at one time the Germans seemed determined to bring it to an issue, but that there were some indications of late that the Germans would be willing to avoid this on the theory that time is an asset and the longer they can drag out the stronger their case becomes for renouncing the Treaty of Versailles and rearming; and there was danger that the French, who were reluctant to disarm, would fall into their trap. I further stated that it seems to me there are only two policies possible. One is to use force to prevent Germany from rearming but that this seemed impracticable because to succeed it would mean that they must jump on Germany now and try to destroy her before she gets rearmed and I did not think it possible to get any armies to go into Germany and murder the Germans after they had been defeated. The only other wise course was to get Germany into a disarmament agreement that would provide against German rearmament and at the same time provide for the progressive disarmament of her neighbors under a system of strict supervision and control. He said he agreed with this and that we would have to see what could be done and that we could tell more about the situation in the next few days.

In substance he said that he did not want to be jockeyed into a program that would result in the French refusing to disarm. My impression was that while he agreed with my views as to disarmament and realizes the importance of it his mind is still more occupied with the Economic Conference and the naval question but that he is firmly convinced of the importance and is desirous of cooperating with the United States and remaining on most friendly terms with us.

[Page 218]
[Enclosure 4]

Memorandum by the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis)22

Mr. Paul-Boncour began by stating that France had not changed its attitude as revealed in the conversations in June23 and he was anxious to know whether there was any modification of the American position. Mr. Davis replied that not only was there no modification but that as a result of numerous and lengthy conversations which he had had with President Roosevelt on the subject he could say that the President is even more interested than ever in disarmament and most desirous that something should be accomplished of a definite nature. Mr. Davis stated that he had told the President that he understood there was some impression in Europe that due to his immersion in internal affairs the Government of the United States was thinking along nationalistic lines and not interested in international questions—such as disarmament—and that the President had authorized him to state that such was not the case and that never before had he been so convinced of the necessity for success of the Disarmament Conference.

M. Paul-Boncour expressed himself as very satisfied with this news. He added that though the French thesis had not changed from the June conversations the French were more than ever convinced of the necessity for a trial period. They were firmly convinced that Germany is now rearming and at a speed much greater than the world dreams of. They are assured of this not only from French sources but from German socialists and in fact from all members of the Second International. Since, therefore, the state of affairs in Germany is such it is essential that the trial period be set up and this is the irreducible demand of the French. They will make definite commitments as to serious reduction to take place after the trial period provided the parties to the treaty live up to their contract. This program should give the Germans satisfaction in several respects. In the first place the control will be on all states alike therefore discrimination disappears. In the second place, during the trial period the transformation of the Reichswehr will be accompanied by the reduction of effectives and disappearance of professional formations in other armies. Further they will have definite commitments on the part of other powers for reductions, and substantial reductions, in matériel to take place at fixed periods after the trial period. Mr. Davis replied first with the suggestion [Page 219] that we adopt another name for the trial period which would be a more accurate indication of what it was to be and also less objectionable to Germany and suggested “transition period.” To this M. Paul-Boncour acquiesced as he himself had thought the phrase “trial period” objectionable.

Referring to the essential nature of the French desire to obtain a trial period to the treaty, M. Paul-Boncour said that if France could not win the consent of the other states to such a provision they would have no alternative but to demand either through the Disarmament Conference or through Article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles,24 an investigation of the present status of German armaments. He recognized that such action would probably cause the break up of the Disarmament Conference and perhaps the withdrawal of Germany from the League of Nations but they could not tolerate that present conditions continue.

Mr. Davis then said he felt there were two courses open now. However, the United States not being in such an exposed position, did not wish to accept the responsibility of offering advice. The first possibility was in trying to crush Germany at once. While France could easily overrun Germany she could not destroy the German people and the whole situation would have to be redigested and it would not be a permanent solution. The other pathway lay along the lines of establishing a treaty which must be fair but which at the same time must be firm. This treaty would provide for such definite control that the fear and uncertainty which now exists would be thereby eliminated. The justice of the treaty would, Mr. Davis hoped, appeal to the reasonable elements in Germany and make it more difficult for the German Government to preach any mad program. In order to reach such a treaty it seems essential that Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States should find a program which they consider just and reasonable; that they should agree upon this program and lay it before Germany. The real danger lay in procrastination wherein the present situation could continue.

M. Paul-Boncour said that he had told Mr. Henderson this morning that members of the Second International, Mr. Henderson’s comrades, not French citizens, had yesterday urged that the only course he could now pursue in view of the speed with which Germany was rearming, was a preventative war. M. Paul-Boncour stated that this was not his policy and very definitely not the policy of France; that they had definitely decided their wisest course must be to obtain a treaty of disarmament and that the only hope for peace in Europe lay through the accomplishment of such a treaty.

[Page 220]

M. Paul-Boncour brought out a point which troubled him. It was perfectly feasible to provide that if the inspection provided for revealed that Germany was violating the treaty after it was signed, the obligations of the treaty would naturally fall. This, however, was not sufficient since this meant that a period of years might go by during which discussion of violations might be carried on and the same speed of rearmament continued by Germany. M. Paul-Boncour recognized that the question was extremely difficult for both Great Britain and the United States but thought that something would have to be worked out as a greater penalty for violators than a mere end of the obligations on the part of other members of the treaty. Mr. Davis replied that he had given a lot of thought to this but obviously any positive action on our part was out of the question. He had thought his declaration of our position on neutrality would have given the French much comfort on this question. M. Paul-Boncour replied very earnestly that such had been the case and that they thoroughly recognized and were gratified at our position in this connection but they had to work out somehow a more positive action to meet this eventuality.

It was apparent that M. Paul-Boncour felt that conversations on further detail could not be usefully carried on until the British had answered certain questions which the French had put to Eden. It was then decided that Massigli would keep in touch with Mr. Davis and that when replies had come through either Lord Tyrrell25 or through Eden further meetings would be arranged, possibly on Thursday.

Mr. Davis told M. Paul-Boncour that before leaving America the President had written him a very personal letter expressing certain thoughts on disarmament and had asked him in this letter to convey a message to M. Daladier. He thought that courtesy demanded that he convey the message first to M. Daladier, but would like to tell M. Paul-Boncour about it afterwards. M. Paul-Boncour requested Mr. Davis to return to the Foreign Office after that message had been presented to the Premier.

Immediately after the meeting with Daladier Mr. Davis returned and read to M. Paul-Boncour the President’s letter and postscript, having taken pains to explain that it was a very personal letter from the President to Mr. Davis and that, therefore, the views of the President were expressed with entire freedom and with no attempt at diplomatic phrases. Mr. Paul-Boncour expressed his appreciation of the [courtesy?] extended in acquainting him with this.

[Page 221]
[Enclosure 5]

Memorandum by the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis)26

M. Francois-Poncet, French Ambassador to Berlin, was just leaving M. Daladier’s office as we entered and remarked to Mr. Davis that he would like to have a talk with him and tell him of his impressions of Germany where conditions had vastly changed since M. Poncet and Mr. Davis had discussed the situation at the time of Mr. Davis’ April visit.27

M. Daladier welcomed Mr. Davis back to France. Mr. Davis said that he had appreciated the suggestion received through the French Embassy that they desired him to join with them in preliminary conversations and he was here to be of any possible help. He realized the situation had undergone a considerable change since he had left in June, a little over two months ago, but he was relieved to learn from M. Paul-Boncour, whom he had just seen, that despite the apprehension caused by Germany’s attitude, France was still prepared to agree to substantial steps in disarmament provided a transition period were allowed in which to establish an effective control and provided Germany respected her obligations.

M. Daladier confirmed the general position which M. Boncour had outlined. Hitler’s Germany was naturally giving them great concern and the President of the Council remarked that he was having considerable difficulty in keeping the French people calm and reasonable in the face of Germany’s provocative attitude.

Mr. Davis then told M. Daladier of his talks with the President just prior to his departure, stating that the President was even more interested in the success of the Disarmament Conference than ever, and was confident that such success would contribute in a greater degree than any other single thing toward promoting peace and solving some of the economic problems with which the world is faced. M. Daladier said he thoroughly agreed that a successful disarmament agreement would bring about a general European appeasement which would permit the economic recovery that they were all striving for. Mr. Davis said that President Roosevelt in his talks with him had indicated his personal regard for the serenity and ability which M. Daladier had manifested. In a postscript to a personal letter the President had asked Mr. Davis to express to the President of the [Page 222] Council his regret that he had not the pleasure of knowing him personally. Mr. Davis said that while the letter in question was a very personal one to him giving the President’s views as to the vital importance of the success of the Disarmament Conference he felt that it might be useful to let M. Daladier know what the President’s views were in the President’s own words. Mr. Wilson then translated the President’s letter to M. Daladier and Mr. Davis handed him a translation of the postscript. No copy or translation of the letter was left with the Prime Minister.

M. Daladier expressed his appreciation for this opportunity to get at first hand the President’s views and expressed his great admiration for the President and the work that he was doing toward economic recovery in the United States. On many phases of the President’s policy he disagreed with the critical attitude of his financial advisors. He admired the boldness of the President’s conception and the vigorous measures he had taken which had produced such a change in psychology and enlisted to so large a degree, on a voluntary basis, the cooperation of the people of the United States in the task of recovery. He said that he had remarked to his financial advisors that he wished that at least one of them had been brought up in the Roosevelt school since if they had they would be bringing him new and bold ideas rather than more threadworn doctrines based on past experiences, that what he was looking for was a fresher approach to the whole situation.

Turning to the question of disarmament Mr. Davis remarked that he fully realized the problem presented by Germany’s conduct, in fact Germany seemed in many respects to have gone quite mad. In this situation he could appreciate that many in France might feel that of the two conceivable courses that might be taken it would be best to jump in and smash Germany, but that he still felt that it would be wiser to join with England, Italy and the United States in taking a firm but equitable position as regards disarmament along the lines of the conversations of last June. Certainly, delay which he felt the Germans were seeking, would play right into their hands. Personally, Mr. Davis felt that any effort to crush Germany would in the long run defeat itself. Doubtless France could now gain an easy military victory but you could not exterminate 65,000,000 Germans and a military victory would only create fresh problems and be no permanent solution. If on the other hand an effective system of control could be established and a transition period allowed for checking up the situation France would seem, in the long run, to have accomplished more toward securing its position than by any other course. Naturally, a decision as to France’s future conduct was one of such momentous importance to them that no one would be justified in assuming the responsibility of trying to tell France how she should settle the problem. Mr. Davis suggested that a good many people felt that Hitlerism [Page 223] had been in part created by the long delay of the other powers in taking steps in disarmament.

M. Daladier said that he did not feel that such was really the case. Hitlerism had come as a result of inflation in Germany which had rendered the middle class and the small bourgeoisie helpless and in many cases completely impoverished them. Thus instead of being the bulwark of democratic institutions this class had been a ready material for the Hitler propaganda based on an appeal to selfish nationalism. His whole policy in France had been to protect and strengthen the small bourgeoisie.

Mr. Davis stated that he had had a brief talk with Captain Eden following the latter’s conference the day before with M. Daladier and M. Paul-Boncour and had gained the impression that Captain Eden was both satisfied and encouraged by his conference. M. Daladier said that he also had received a favorable impression from the stand taken by Captain Eden who had seemed disposed to take a more helpful attitude in the matter of supervision and control. In return for that, M. Daladier had thrown out encouragement to Captain Eden, that he might be able to go even somewhat farther in the matter of eventual reduction than had been indicated at the time of the June conversations. He reemphasized, however, that while France was prepared to take a definite commitment to carry through substantial measures of disarmament this was contingent upon a test period during which Germany’s intentions and actions in the matter of armaments would be subject to examination. He was convinced that a disarmament treaty was the only possible solution and he was absolutely firm in his resolve to work toward that despite the obvious political difficulties involved for any government in following such a course. He agreed with Mr. Davis in the desirability of agreement between France, Great Britain, Italy and the United States as to their position with respect to Germany and the disarmament treaty. If Germany then refused and the Disarmament Conference failed he would take steps and would ask for an immediate appropriation of one billion francs. M. Daladier said that in order to get the French people to accept the idea of a disarmament treaty it would be necessary to have,—he would not call it a guarantee,—but at least some form of assurance of moral support from England and the United States as to their position in the event that Germany was shown up as patently violating the terms of the treaty through rearming. The mere right to denounce the treaty in that event would not be sufficient as Germany might already have gotten too long a lead. He appreciated that this was a difficult problem particularly for us. He greatly appreciated the work which Mr. Davis had done in the matter of disarmament and the stand which the President had taken as expressed by Mr. Davis had been of the greatest possible help in bringing the British to a more reasonable position. [Page 224] In this connection Mr. Davis said that the American position in this general connection had been set forth in the speech which he had made last May.28

Mr. Davis told M. Daladier of his talk with Ramsay MacDonald before he returned to America in June when he had told the British Prime Minister that he felt the French position in the matter of supervision and control was logical and necessary and that Great Britain should be the last one to desire France to disarm unless there could be assurance through the system of supervision that Germany was not preparing to strike at her after she had taken steps in disarmament.

M. Daladier said in the strictest confidence he could not fully understand the British hesitation on this point. What would be the British position if by any chance France and Germany should enter into an agreement. After all, there were no serious territorial questions separating them. Austria was more Italian than a French problem, the Corridor29 a Polish problem. France and Germany if they wish could divide up Continental Europe. Obviously this was not his policy, but the British should realize the inherent danger which might exist if France should ever be forced to adopt any such policy. After all, France had either to make her peace directly with Germany or obtain the greatest possible measure of protection against being overrun by Germany. England should realize this situation and do its share to help.

Mr. Davis said that in view of Captain Eden’s return to London to report to the British Cabinet, he assumed that no further conversations would be held until the British answer was forthcoming. He would therefore keep in touch with M. Paul-Boncour and hold himself in readiness to meet with the French or with the British and the French at such time.

  1. For correspondence on naval questions, see pp. 330 ff.
  2. Mr. Davis left New York, August 30; in London, September 6–17; in Paris, September 18–23; arrived Geneva, September 24.
  3. Of a conversation held at the Foreign Office, London, September 6, 1933. Present were Sir John Simon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Alexander Montagu George Cadogan, Adviser on League of Nations Affairs; Mr. Davis; and Hugh Wilson, American delegate.
  4. British Admiralty representative on the League of Nations Permanent Advisory Commission on Military, Naval, and Air Questions.
  5. Counselor in the British Foreign Office.
  6. Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament, signed at London, April 22, 1930, Foreign Relations, 1930, vol. i, p. 107.
  7. See telegram No. 260, June 8, 9 p.m., from the Ambassador in France, p. 190.
  8. See telegram No. 713, July 25, 4 p.m., from Mr. Wilson at Geneva, p. 204.
  9. Of a conversation between Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald and Mr. Davis at 10 Downing Street, London, September 18, 1933, beginning at breakfast at 8:15 a.m. and lasting until 10:20 a.m.
  10. For Mr. Stimson’s view, see memorandum of November 3, p. 389.
  11. Post, p. 382.
  12. Italian Ambassador to Great Britain.
  13. Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between the United States and Other Powers, 1910–1923 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1923), vol. iii, p. 3329.
  14. Of a conversation held at Paris, September 19, 1933. Present were Joseph Paul-Boncour, French Minister for Foreign Affairs; Rene Massigli, Assistant Director, Political Section, French Foreign Office; Mr. Davis; Hugh Wilson and Allen Dulles of the American delegation.
  15. See telegram No. 260, June 8, 9 p.m., from the Ambassador in France, p. 190.
  16. Treaties, Conventions, etc., 1910–1923, vol. iii, pp. 3329, 3415.
  17. British Ambassador to France.
  18. Of a conversation between Edouard Daladier, President of the Council of Ministers, and Mr. Davis at the Ministry of War, Paris, September 19, 1933. Hugh R. Wilson and Allen W. Dulles accompanied Mr. Davis.
  19. April 9 and 10, en route from Berlin to Paris, Mr. Davis and the French Ambassador compared notes on their respective talks with Chancelor Hilter. For memorandum of conversation between Mr. Davis and Chancelor Hitler, see p. 85.
  20. See telegrams Nos. 644, 646, and 649, May 19, 20, and 21, from the Chairman of the American delegation, pp. 154, 158, and 164; also telegram No. 335, May 20, to the Chairman, p. 159.
  21. For correspondence concerning the Polish Corridor, see pp. 448 ff.