500.A15Franco–British/137: Telegram

The British Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Cushendum) to the British Chargé in Washington (Chilton)44

Addressed to Washington, Telegram unnumbered of August 10th. Repeated to Rome, Tokio.

I gather there is a certain amount of misapprehension at Washington as to the exact scope and purpose of the Anglo-French proposals for the limitation of naval armaments.

[Page 276]

As you are aware work of League Preparatory Commission for Disarmament Conference has broken down largely as the result of a deadlock between British and French delegates in regard to principle on which process of naval limitation should be based. At meeting of Preparatory Commission last March British and French delegates announced that conversations were taking place between the two Governments, which might lead to some arrangement if time were allowed for the purpose. Work of Preparatory Commission has from the first been based on two drafts submitted by British and French Governments respectively in March 1927, His Majesty’s Government advocating the retention of the principle agreed upon at Washington of limitation by categories and the French Government advocating the principle of global tonnage. The aim has been to reconcile these by producing an agreed text which would necessarily represent a compromise between divergent views expressed in rival drafts. Clearly the first step towards such an agreement was to arrive at an accord between the two Governments responsible for the original drafts. The compromise telegraphed to you represents a successful attempt to do this, but we realise that it is no more than the first step which we hope may lead to a general agreement among the Powers represented on the Preparatory Commission enabling them to draft [an agreed] skeleton Convention (leaving figures blank) for submission to Disarmament Conference. In the divergencies of views which appeared at the outset between the British and French Governments the view of the United States was in principle in agreement with that of Great Britain and as the compromise now reached with the French goes a considerable way towards meeting the views of the United States and ourselves we entertain the hope that it will have the approval and support of the American Government. But we emphasise the fact that this Anglo-French agreement is not a treaty or even a final binding agreement in regard to naval disarmament. Unless it should lead to the signing of an agreed Convention at Geneva its purpose will not have been achieved and it will be necessary to make further attempts to arrange a compromise if we are not to abandon all hope of a limitation of armaments by international agreement.

This compromise has now been submitted to the United States Government in order that they may consider its terms and, should they see fit, give us the benefit of their observations and of any suggestions which may occur to them.

Premature publicity in regard to the details of the proposals would clearly be undesirable. Both His Majesty’s Government and the United States Government have been criticised on the ground that there was insufficient preparation between Governments before Geneva Naval Limitation Conference last year. However this may be we consider it very desirable that confidential preparatory conversations [Page 277] which we hope will take place between the two Governments before the meeting of the League Preparatory Commission at Geneva should not be prejudiced by premature publication. It seems only necessary to say to the Press that conversations are taking place between the Governments concerned with a view to the resumption of work of the Preparatory Commission and that it would obviously be prejudicial to their ultimate success if tentative proposals are at every stage to be prematurely published.

It has been stated in Press telegrams that this naval agreement with the French represents a bargain one part of which is that His Majesty’s Government agree to support the contention of the French Government in the matter of military reserves. Here again there is some misapprehension. His Majesty’s Government have reluctantly reached the conclusion that it will be impossible to move the French [and the] majority of other European Governments from the attitude which they have consistently adopted on this question and that in [present] conditions no further progress in regard to land disarmament will be possible as long as this stumbling block remains in the way. They do not therefore propose to offer any further resistance to the French contention at the present time. It is not believed that any American interest can be prejudiced by withdrawal of His Majesty’s Government’s opposition on the military reservist question. An agreement on land disarmament, even if it is in our view not entirely satisfactory in the matter of military reservists would represent an important stage in the general progress of disarmament and would be far better than no agreement at all. Moreover acceptance of the French Government’s thesis on reservists question will have important effect on [of?] winning French Government over to British and American side in the matter of classification to be adopted as a basis for naval limitation.

A reply before September 3rd was suggested in my telegram of July 30th because it was feared at that time that a meeting of the Preparatory Commission might be called before meeting of the Assembly. We ourselves should have much regretted premature summoning of Commission but might have been powerless to prevent it. There now seems little further risk of a meeting being summoned at that time. In the circumstances United States Government will no doubt prefer to defer replying until there has been time for a full consideration of the new proposal in all its bearings. It is of course feasible [desirable] that a meeting of the Preparatory Commission should not be summoned until Powers principally concerned have had sufficient time for reflection.

You should read this telegram to Mr. Kellogg at earliest opportunity.

[File copy not signed]
  1. Copy apparently left with the Secretary of State; date of receipt not indicated.