500.A15Franco–British/13: Telegram

The Chargé in Great Britain ( Atherton ) to the Secretary of State

184. [Paraphrase.] Lord Cushendun assumed his duties as Acting Foreign Secretary yesterday and at his request Marriner42 and I called upon him this morning.

Cushendun said that he wished very much to avoid any complications that might be brought about by a misinterpretation of the Franco–British agreement concerning the principles of naval reduction by the press.… [End paraphrase.]

He said that he had been struck by the obvious misunderstanding of both the American and European press of the nature and scope of the Anglo-French conversations which he said had been merely the effort of Great Britain as representing a school of thought on naval subjects in which England had been in close agreement with, on the one hand, the United States and Japan during all the course of the Preparatory Commission, and French as representing the divergent [Page 274] point of view on the other, and that any agreement arrived at between them could only serve as a point of departure for discussion with all members of the Preparatory Commission.

Marriner stated that he felt that due to the publicity given the statement in Parliament43 the American press had taken the whole thing as a definite fixed agreement upon which Great Britain and France would stand even in opposition to the other members of the Commission. Lord Cushendun emphasized his conviction that there was nothing whatever of this kind and that his Government had only been interested in making some progress toward the solution of Preparatory Commission problems as envisaged in the two opposing draft conventions now before it. Marriner and I are quite convinced of his sincerity. Marriner then referred to the press reports especially in France concerning the withdrawal of the British objection to the French thesis on trained reservists. Lord Cushendun said that he did not feel that any agreement had been reached on this point but that his Government had indicated that it might be willing to withdraw this objection in case progress could be made on the naval question. He stated in an aside that this objection could probably never be sustained in any case. He pointed out that Great Britain, and he presumed the United States, was not essentially interested in the question of land forces. Marriner then referred to the wording of the Foreign Office telegram to Chilton asking an American reply before September 3rd and questioned this urgency. Lord Cushendun said that he believed the desire for a reply had been in order that all information possible on this subject should be available at the opening of the League Assembly but that he personally felt that this was not in any way important since any information obtained could only be of actual use at the time of the next meeting of the Preparatory Commission although undoubtedly at the forthcoming meeting of the Assembly many questions would be asked of these Anglo-French discussions. In fact Cushendun gave as his preference that no answer be given until more time had elapsed for American consideration and for a simmering down of the press discussions. He added that the British Embassy in Washington would be instructed to judge in this sense.

Cushendun then inquired what might be done to correct general press opinion on this subject particularly in the United States. Marriner suggested that if it were possible some form of statement be made either on the part of Lord Cushendun himself or of the Foreign Office setting forth the idea that Great Britain as representing one school of thought at the Preparatory Commission on [Page 275] naval questions had made an effort to reach some compromise proposals with France as head of the opposing school of thought and had requested the reaction of the other powers thereto. Marriner said that the question of the combination of the categories of cruisers and destroyers would, no doubt cause difficulty for the United States which had a great preponderance of destroyers and Cushendun said that the Anglo-French compromise was of course not altogether satisfactory to Great Britain which would welcome any attempt of the American authorities to discuss with France the maintenance of the present categories. He said that he regretted that he had no engagement for a public speech in the immediate future, but he would cause Willert to be instructed to attempt to find an opportunity to give out from the Foreign Office to the newspaper reporters information of this nature and hoped that if this proved feasible something of a similar nature might be done in Washington.

A copy of any remarks Willert gives out here on this subject will be telegraphed to the British Embassy in Washington.

[Paraphrase.] Both Marriner and I feel that Cushendun is attempting to remove any atmosphere of suspicion touching this whole subject and is not in any way endeavoring to obtain any international recognition for British Foreign Office. From manner in which he intends to handle this matter we have concluded that he was looking forward to opportunity of renewing his acquaintance with you when you are in Paris for signature of the renunciation treaty, since he remembered you so vividly from your days in London, and that he hoped you would not feel under any pressure to answer questions raised by the Anglo-French conversations before your departure. Cushendun’s reception of us confirmed a statement which a member of the Government made to me that with his taking office any American question would meet with understanding attention.

Copy sent to Brussels.

Atherton
  1. J. Theodore Marriner, Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs.
  2. For statement by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Chamberlain), July 30, 1928, see Great Britain, Cmd. 3211, Miscellaneous No. 6 (1928), p. 28.