711.9412Anti-War/70
The Chargé in Japan (Neville) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 27.]
Sir: Supplementing the Embassy’s despatch No. 961, of September 24, 1928,84 I have the honor to enclose a translation from the Jiji Shimpo of an article purporting to describe the attitude of the Privy Council with respect to the Treaty to Outlaw War.84
The more moderate element in the Privy Council, it states, attach more importance to the connotation of the word “peoples” than to the interpretation of the phrase “in the names”, and they are satisfied that, in the case under discussion, it can be construed to mean “states”. They are said, however, to be of the belief that the construction placed by the Japanese Government on this phrase should have been set forth publicly by Count Uchida when he signed the Treaty. The article points out that some of the Privy Councillors have taken a more uncompromising attitude and contend that the Treaty as it stands should not be ratified. The present consensus of opinion among the press, in the Foreign Office, and in non-official quarters is that the failure of the Government to obtain a formal and open understanding with respect to its interpretation of Article 1 of the Treaty, and perhaps the Treaty itself, will be subjected to a severe attack when the Treaty is submitted to the Privy Council, but that the Privy Council [Page 216] will eventually recommend its ratification but attach a vote of censure of the Government.
According to the Tokyo Hochi, the organ of the principal opposition party, the members of the Privy Council are also exercised over the possibility that China’s adherence to the Treaty to Outlaw War may be construed as implying Japan’s recognition of the Nationalist Government as the Government of China, the reports that the law officers of the Department of State were of the opinion that the conclusion of the Customs Treaty constituted recognition of the Nationalist Government, and that Senator Borah had stated that adherence to the Treaty to Outlaw War by Russia implied recognition by the United States of the Soviet Government as the Government of Russia, having apparently drawn attention to this question. The Foreign Office is reported to have admitted that the adoption by the United States, Great Britain and France of the doctrine that, adherence to a multi-lateral treaty of Governments to which previous recognition had not been accorded constituted recognition, would have to be considered by Japan. “However,” an official in the Foreign Office is quoted as saying, “Japan’s diplomatic relations with China occupy a most important place in the formulation of her foreign policies, and in view of her particular interests in China Japan must adopt some appropriate measure which will fit in with the complicated relations existing between the two countries. The following questions must be answered: Should Japan, in the present circumstances, ratify a treaty to which China has adhered? Would it be possible to ratify the Treaty with the reservation that the obligations created by the Treaty shall not exist in respect of China so long as Japan withholds recognition from the Nationalist Government?”
No opportunity has as yet been offered to ascertain the correctness of the report, and I do not wish, therefore, to comment upon it at length. However, if it has any basis in fact, it should be examined, in my opinion, in the light of the controversies between the Japanese and Nationalist Governments over the abrogation by the Chinese of the Sino-Japanese Commercial Treaty and the Tsinan Incident, and of the numerous other issues which combine to complicate the relations between the two countries. The Nationalist Government would undoubtedly draw great satisfaction from its recognition by the Japanese Government, as it apparently did from its recognition by a country of so little importance as Cuba. It is, therefore, reasonable to suppose that the Japanese Government is counting upon the recognition hitherto withheld as one of the means of inducing the Nationalists to assume a more concessive attitude, and that it would be loath, [Page 217] particularly at the present conjuncture, when signs are evident of a resumption of negotiations over the Commercial Treaty, to give any evidence of acceptance of the present Nationalist regime.
I have [etc.]