Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920, Volume III

763.72119/9747: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

San Remo, April 27, 1920—6 p.m.
[Received 10:10 p.m.]

13. Following answer to the American note on Turkey was approved by the Supreme Council at the sitting Monday afternoon.¹ It was also decided that the note should be signed by the President of the Conference and forwarded through me:²

“The Allied Governments value the frank expression of the view of the United States Government. They have, however, necessarily deferred a reply to the note of the Secretary of the State Department until the terms of the treaty have been sufficiently formulated to be submitted to the Supreme Council now assembled at San Remo.

The Council notes that the United States Government do not propose to be represented by a plenipotentiary at the conference charged with negotiating the treaty of peace with Turkey, otherwise than in the capacity of an observer, from which it follows that the United States Government do not intend to become signatories to the treaty.

The Council welcomes, however, the assurance borne out by the presence of the United States Ambassador at Rome³ that the United States maintain their close interest in the terms of the settlement, and is happy to take this occasion to afford the United States Government further news and explanations concerning the terms agreed upon before Mr. Johnson’s arrival. The Allied Governments do not interpret Mr. Colby’s desire for such information to mean that the negotiations with Turkey should be delayed until each of the particular points raised in his note has been exhaustively discussed with the United States Government, and an agreement with them arrived at. This would, indeed, in existing circumstances, have rendered all fruitful negotiations impossible.

The Allied Governments have never concealed their wish to see the United States associated in the preparation and signature of the treaty which is to embody the re-settlement of Turkey on a just and lasting basis. In the hope and expectation of American participation they had delayed the negotiations with Turkey at the risk of gravely imperiling the prospect of any satisfactory settlement being effected without a fresh recourse to arms. They fully understand and appreciate the reasons for which the United States Government have not, finally, seen their way to become parties to the treaty. The burden of the negotiations which has not been lightened by the long delay which has unhappily, but in the circumstances unavoidably, intervened has therefore fallen on the Allies alone. They have readily accepted it, and have endeavored to discharge an increasingly difficult duty to the best of their ability and judgment. They feel confident that the settlement which they are about to propose to the Turkish Government will be found in harmony with the principles and ideals which have inspired them, in common with the United States, in waging war and in concluding peace with Turkey’s late allies. The desire of the United States Government that the treaty shall be fair and just to all parties is entirely shared by the Allied Governments. When, however, it is urged that the settlement shall be made with scrupulous regard for the interests of victor, vanquished and neutral, it must be remembered that there cannot in justice be equality of consideration on the one hand for the interests of the Turks who wantonly joined Germany and Austria-Hungary in their war of aggression, and on the other hand for the interests of the former subject races of Turkey whom the Allies, at immense sacrifices of life and treasure, have delivered from Turkish misrule.

The Allied Governments now pass to the consideration of the specific points raised in Mr. Colby’s note.

1. With regard to Constantinople, the advantages and disadvantages of excluding the Sultan’s Government from any territory in Europe have been very carefully weighed. An exhaustive examination of the problem in all its bearings had convinced the Allied Governments that, supposing such a policy to be in itself desirable, its adoption would entail upon them responsibilities, dangers and sacrifices which, with due regard to their own national interests and obligations, they are not in a position safely to incur. At the same time the Allied Governments recognize that the problem might have presented itself in a different light if those responsibilities, dangers and sacrifices were not to be borne by themselves alone but shared by the United States of America.

2. The southern frontier of Turkey has been drawn after due consideration not only of the ethnical but also of economic and geographical factors involved. The United States Government will readily recognize that, as in the case of the other treaties with enemy powers, it is impossible to isolate these factors. In the region of Cilicia, the problem is more than usually complicated by the intermingling of those racial elements whose interests it is the object of the Allied Governments to protect.

3. The Allies note with pleasure that the United States Government welcome the provisions made in the treaty for the representation of Russia on the Straits Commission. The United States Government would, however, appear to be under a misapprehension in supposing that the scope of this Commission is to be extended to the administration of Constantinople itself.

4. The question of the Straits has formed the subject of prolonged and careful consideration with a view to safeguarding freedom of passage, and it is hoped and believed that the United States Government will be in full accord with the provisions agreed upon. It has obviously been impossible to defer the drafting of so vital a chapter of the Turkish treaty pending the eventual consultation with Russia.

5. The decision of the Allied Governments to incorporate eastern Thrace, outside the zone of Constantinople, in the Kingdom of Greece, appears generally to conform with the views of the United States Government. The statistical data in the possession of the Allied Governments do not, however, support Mr. Colby’s contention regarding the Bulgarian character of the cities of Adrianople and Kirk Kilisse and of the surrounding territory. On the contrary all sources, sometimes most widely divergent in other respects, agree in estimating the Bulgarian population as a marked minority compared with either Turks or Greeks. The effects of the inter-emigration clauses in the Turco-Bulgarian treaty of 1913 in diminishing the Bulgarian element in northern Thrace must also be borne in mind.

6. It has in the past been the policy of the Turkish Government to endeavor to play one European power off against the other with a view to retarding or evading the execution of necessary reforms. It is the desire of the Allies to prevent such tactics in the future. It is, therefore, the intention of the Governments of France, Great Britain and Italy to conclude a self-denying ordinance which shall avoid any semblance of rivalry or competition among themselves and which shall conduce to the more effective protection of the minorities still remaining within the Turkish Empire. It is needless to observe that such an ordinance only binds its signatories, and that there is nothing therein to impede the free entry for commercial and economic purposes of the nationals of other states into any part of the area mentioned in the Allied agreement.

7. The Allies share to the full America’s interest in the establishment of an independent Armenia. It has been their earnest desire to accord to Armenia the territory which she might reasonably claim for her present needs and future expansion. The problem has proved to be the most difficult of the whole treaty and the obstacles with which the Allies have found themselves confronted have at times seemed almost insuperable. The matter is being fully and frankly dealt with in a separate communication to the United States.²

8. The Allied Governments are in accord with the United States in holding that Turkey should relinquish by the treaty her former rights over Mesopotamia, Arabia, Palestine, Syria and the Islands. The precision with which the arrangement for the future status of these territories can be formulated in the Turkish treaty has of necessity been governed by the necessity of expediting the conclusion of the treaty with Turkey—a conclusion which, as already pointed out, has been deferred to the limits of expediency.

9. The settlement of the district of Smyrna has proved one of the most difficult problems with which the Allied Governments were faced. The most impartial statistics at their disposal show that at a date prior to the forcible expulsion of the subject population from this area, a majority of Greeks existed in the sanjak of Smyrna and in some of the neighboring cazas. Past experience of the Turkish treatment of this Greek population, who have preserved in a marked degree and in spite of oppression their national characteristics, [has] led the Allies to grant their strong claim to be placed under Greek administration. On the other hand the interior of this region, in which the Turkish population gradually increases until it markedly predominates over the Greek, is connected economically with Smyrna. Indeed, Smyrna forms the present natural outlet for the trade of a large part of western Anatolia. Moreover, the Allied Governments have been advised that the immediate and complete cession of an area so closely linked with the economy of Anatolia and for so long a time an integral part of the Asiatic provinces of Turkey would in practice have aroused national feeling to a degree which might have rendered the rest of the contemplated settlement of Turkey difficult if not impossible.

The Allies have fully weighed these conflicting considerations and have agreed upon a settlement which, while placing a carefully defined area securely under Greek administration, safeguards Turkish access to the port of Smyrna and preserves Turkish suzerainty over the whole region during a period fully sufficient for the true wishes of the population to find expression.

10. The economic provisions of the Turkish treaty are in general harmony with those approved in the treaties with the other enemy powers. With particular regard to concessions in the former Turkish Empire, these were, as is well known, not infrequently obtained by dubious means, and in conditions inconsistent with the best development of the areas where they were located. The eventual right to cancel concessions has only been provided for in territories which are to be placed under the tutelage of the Principal Allied Powers. It has been felt unfair necessarily to saddle these new states with burdens which they had no voice in incurring. All that is sought in the present treaty is the right inherent in every sovereign state to cancel or resume concessions incompatible with the interests of the state; but in any such eventuality the fullest provision is made for the indemnification, if necessary by way of arbitration, of the concessionaire. With regard to the general financial provisions of the treaty, the aim of the treaty is to protect Turkey from the exploitation to which she is exposed by her financial necessities, and to establish a sound system of finance which will enable her to meet her obligations and to reap herself the advantage of her economic possibilities.

11. Finally, the Allied Governments take this opportunity of assuring the United States Government that the Allied Governments have in no way sought by the territorial changes and arrangements provided for in the Turkish treaty to place corporations or citizens in a privileged position as compared with American citizens or corporations. They feel, however, that they would be lacking in candor if they did not point out that as they are precluded from undertaking obligations on behalf of non-signatory powers, so also they are unable to stipulate conditions in their favor.[”]

Johnson

1. Apr. 26.
2. Text of note corrected to accord with a copy received July 21 as enclosure to despatch no. 1361 July 8, 1920, from the Ambassador in France (file no. 763.72119/10162).
3. For papers concerning U. S. representation at San Remo conference, see vol. i, pp. 1 ff.
2. See telegram no. 10, Apr. 27, 1920, from the Ambassador in Italy, p. 779.