893.00/3206
The Minister in China (Reinsch) to
the Acting Secretary of State
Peking, July 16,
1919.
[Received August
21.]
No. 2898
Sir: In connection with your telegram stating
that the Japanese Minister had been instructed to talk over with me
fully and frankly the Tientsin incident with a view to settlement, I
have the honor to state that thus far I have not heard from my Japanese
Colleague.
I have the honor to enclose correspondence with the Consul-General in
Tientsin (letter to the Minister, July 14th, letter from the Minister,
July 16th). The great desire of the Japanese to commit us to a statement
of the possibility of American soldiers being in the Japanese Concession
on the night of March 12th leaves no doubt in my mind of the use they
intend to make of such an admission. I have the honor to refer you to
the previous correspondence in this matter to show how impossible it is
from the point of evidence and sincere belief to admit that American
soldiers were in the Japanese Concession on that night—as is claimed by
the Japanese—in large numbers, armed with police clubs, making assaults
on Japanese in the principal thoroughfare without a Japanese policeman
seeing or apprehending any one of them. It would seem to me exceedingly
stultifying to make any such admission in order to settle what remains
of this case after the Japanese have already made an apology for the
main incidents.
I have [etc.]
[Enclosure 1]
The Consul General at Tientsin (Heintzleman) to the Minister in China (Reinsch)
Dear Mr. Reinsch: My Japanese colleague
called on me by appointment on July 5, 1919. He expressed a desire
to effect a settlement of the Japanese-American incident at Tientsin
and stated that in seeking a solution he wished to offer two
alternative proposals, which, if I thought the Legation and the
Department might be willing to consider and agree to, he would
submit to his Government: (1) that a statement by me admitting the
possibility of American soldiers having entered the Japanese
concession on the night of March 12, 1919, be accepted by the
Japanese side, after which the Japanese would agree to pay Corporal
Rohner a solatium to the amount of several hundred yen, and to
censure their Police Inspector for making false statements to me on
the same night; or, (2) in the event that it is deemed impossible
for me to make such a statement
[Page 434]
or the Japanese Government find themselves
unable to accept the statement, then Major Nathan, Tientsin, of the
Royal Engineers British Army, should be invited by the American and
Japanese Consuls General to go over the evidence on both sides and
give an opinion as to whether American soldiers entered the Japanese
concession on the night in question, it being understood that while
great weight would be given his opinion our government would not be
bound thereby.
I promised to write requesting your views on the feasibility of these
proposals.
As to the statement I am asked to make, Mr. Kamei, Vice Consul
formerly in charge of the Japanese Consulate General here, in
conversations with me previous to the arrival of Mr. Funatsu,40 kept urging that the
American local authorities should admit that American soldiers had
entered the Japanese concession on March 12, 1919. I told him such
an admission in the face of the evidence submitted could not be
made; during a call on May 28, 1919, when he again emphasized the
necessity of such an admission on our part, I said that I might be
willing to make some such statement as the following:
“In view of the contention of several Japanese gentlemen of
standing who claim to have been injured by American soldiers
in the Japanese concession on the night of March 12, 1919,
the American authorities are willing to acknowledge the
possibility of American soldiers being in the Japanese
concession on that night, although every effort has been
made to investigate this matter and no evidence of their
being there can be found.”
Mr. Kamei requested permission to make a copy of the draft to which I
assented. I took pains to explain to Mr. Kamei at the time that this
was merely a proposed draft of what might perhaps be admitted by the
Commanding Officer of the 15th Infantry and myself, if approved by
our superiors who were in possession of the record in the case. I
further explained that the informal discussion resulting in this
draft could not be interpreted as an admission by Colonel Wilder and
myself of the Japanese contention. Mr. Kamei replied that he fully
understood.
Mr. Kamei during a call here on June 12, 1919, told me that his
Minister had hoped I would be willing to omit from the draft
statement the last two clauses, “although every effort has been made
to investigate this matter and no evidence of their being there can
be found.” He explaining [sic] that he and
Mr. Obata thought the last clause was a reflection on the evidence
presented by the Japanese. I replied that I saw no objection to
these deletions and took the
[Page 435]
occasion to repeat that this was merely a draft drawn up by me
informally and unofficially and that nothing was to be implied as
binding me or any of my superiors. He stated that this was his
understanding. During Mr. Funatsu’s call on the 5th instant, when
reference was made to the draft statement, I went over the whole
subject with him reading to him the above which I had written out as
minutes of my conversations with Mr. Kamei.
I would thank you to give me an expression of your views on the
suggested plan of settlement as proposed by Mr. Funatsu.
Yours sincerely,
[Enclosure 2]
The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Consul General at Tientsin (Heintzleman)
Dear Mr. Heintzleman: In reply to your note
of July 14th, I have to state that I see nothing in the proposal
made by your Japanese Colleague which can, in any way, advance a
settlement.
That the payment of several hundred yen, indemnity or solatium—in
itself, entirely inadequate,—should be made dependent on our
admitting the possibility of American soldiers having entered the
Japanese Concession on the night of March 12th, is joining two
things which have nothing to do with each other. Whether there were
or were not American soldiers in the Japanese Concession on the
night, Corporal Rohner was arrested in the French Concession and
[wounded?] while being dragged through the Japanese Concession to
the police station. The previous presence of American soldiers in
the Japanese Concession is a collateral matter.
As was clearly understood in our last conversation, it is to be
feared that if any admission of this kind is made, which is contrary
to the evidence in our possession and to the unanimous belief of all
Americans concerned, it would undoubtedly be used in an attempt to
shift the entire responsibility for all incidents to the American
side. As it was understood that no such admissions were desirable, I
am greatly surprised that without further consultation, you declared
yourself willing (1) to make a statement containing such an
admission and (2) specifically to engage yourself to omit a sentence
which states that we have no evidence of American soldiers being
there. After this action on your part, taken on your own
responsibility, it may be difficult to avoid the bad consequences
which we had all feared. We had a perfectly clear case on which we
could rest and it would, in my opinion, have been far better so to
rest than to accept
[Page 436]
a
settlement admitting the one point which to every American seemed
both impossible and unreasonable but which for a purpose of their
own the Japanese desire to have admitted.
As to the second suggestion of making Major Nathan an arbiter in the
matter, I cannot see in that a satisfactory solution. …
From the above you will see that I consider the position formerly
taken by us in this matter as still to be maintained; namely, that
the unsettled points in the controversy are the payment of solatium
to Corporal Rohner and some action of censure for the falsehoods
told you by the Japanese Inspector on the night of March 12th.
Faithfully yours,
