48. Guidance Prepared in the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office in Vietnam1
U.S. MILITARY BUILD UP AND PROBLEMS OF THE AMERICAN PRESENCE IN VIETNAM
The Problem:
To evaluate the psychological implications of the growing U.S. military presence in Vietnam and to determine ways and means of extracting the greatest psychological advantage from this presence while minimizing its adverse impact.
IT IS PROPOSED THAT:
1. All output to all audiences on the subject of the American presence be geared to President Johnson’s emphasis on the decisive role of U.S. military strength and determination in support of the valiant effort of the Vietnamese people to resist communist aggression and secure peace and independence.
2. A consistent, persistent and pervasive effort be sustained to assure association of the American presence with an inevitably successful military effort that will end Vietnam’s decades of war.
3. The reason for the American military presence be forthrightly attributed to communist aggression and that the duration of that presence be equated with the time required to make the enemy aggressor cease fighting.
4. The U.S. military build-up be presented as a positive measure designed to achieve the level of combined Free World strength which is needed to force the aggressors to accept negotiations for the kind of peace the Vietnamese people want.
5. Plans to minimize and localize tensions and frictions between U.S. troops and Vietnamese people presently be determined on the basis of local need.
6. All output be guided by the basic fact that the American purpose in Vietnam is to support the Vietnamese people’s struggle for freedom and independence but not to serve as a substitute for the Vietnamese’s own military effort.
[Page 141]ASSUMPTIONS:
1. The American presence is a “foreign” presence that unavoidably generates resentments which are likely to grow as the presence grows. This is particularly true in any country that has been previously exposed to foreign domination.
2. The people of Vietnam and the world at large understand that the Republic of Vietnam cannot, without assistance, hope to overcome hostile action supported by the resources of the entire communist world.
3. The American presence is most vulnerable to attack on political grounds:
a. The reality of the growing American involvement and presence in Vietnam will seed charges of “U.S. imperialist” infringement of Vietnamese “sovereignty” and political domination of GVN “lackeys.”
b. Vietnamese tend to associate the American presence with in-group GVN politicians and to blame the United States for shortcomings of incumbent GVN administration, their political personalities and their policies.
4. Divisive incidents will mount as the U.S. military build-up increases direct contact between American troops and Vietnamese people.
DISCUSSION:
The initial Vietnamese reaction to the U.S. military build-up is generally favorable and related psychological problems remain as yet at an acceptable level. This is because our Vietnamese friends tentatively view the American presence as their latest and best hope for successfully ending the war within a reasonable period of time.
Our task is to sustain Vietnamese confidence in the fact that the American military presence is linked solely to their war effort, is needed, will be effective and, most importantly, temporary. The key element of our psychological output on the American presence should be a single-minded stress on “decisive American strength and unflagging determination in support of the valiant Vietnamese people’s struggle to resist communist aggression and secure peace and independence.”
To the extent that we are successful in applying this clear cut psychological line, the unavoidable negative element of the American presence will be counterbalanced and avoidable problems will be averted or minimized.
By focusing on the military nature of the American presence, we reduce attention to sensitive political issues.
By stressing our “support” for the Vietnamese people’s struggle against the communist threat, we underscore the decisive but supple [Page 142] mentary role of Americans in what is essentially a Vietnamese struggle: this eliminates from our output any implication that the Americans are going to fight the war alone.
By stressing U.S. support for the “people,” we minimize unfavorable association with GVN political elements and unpopular policies. We must, of course, maintain proper courtesy and respect and avoid any reflection on Vietnamese “sovereignty” in our output. Our watchword should be: “Alliance of two sovereign peoples.”
In implementing President Johnson’s policy emphasizing U.S. strength and determination, three cautions should be observed. Firstly, we walk a psychological tightrope as regards the timing of inevitable victory over communist aggression. The burgeoning American military presence must be viewed as temporary and effective enough to conclude the war within a reasonable period. But as the initial overly-optimistic Vietnamese reactions to our bombing of the North demonstrated, we must at the same time reduce unrealistic expectations of “quick” victory. We must generate confidence that the victory of the American and Vietnamese peoples is inevitable but not immediately at hand. Our output must avoid the pitfall of attempting to time the victory.
A second caution is to play down defensive legalistic assertions that we are here “because” we have been “invited.” For this would unnecessarily focus attention on a sensitive political question and imply that U.S. strength and determination can be nullified by any Saigon coup which happens to produce an “invitation out.” If we must point out that we have been “invited,” let’s not stress that we are here “only because” and “only as long” as the “invitation” holds good.
International support of the Vietnamese struggle against the communist aggression should be emphasized but not transparently overdone. There must be no suggestion of a U.S. effort to conceal the dominantly visible American presence under the cloak of “internationalization.”
Straightforward emphasis on U.S. strength and determination conforms with the visible realities of the American presence and precludes resort to defensive, apologetic, argumentative, devious and, therefore, ineffective treatment of the subject.
Divisive incidents and other adverse effects on the U.S. military build-up will mount as direct contact between U.S. troops and the Vietnamese people increase. Psychological activities should support U.S./Vietnamese efforts to minimize and localize the impact of direct contact. The scope, content and form of these activities should be determined on the basis of local need. They should reflect the nature of U.S. troop discipline and be marked by a courteous and sincere concern for the people of affected communities. Those incidents and sufferings [Page 143] which in war can never be wholly avoided should be blamed on the enemy who brought this war about. It is, of course, understood that the cultivation of constructive community relations can do much to mitigate tensions.
CONCLUSIONS:
The U.S. military build-up and the strength and determination it implies constitutes the best psychological asset at our disposal for treating the issue of the American military presence in Vietnam. There can be no question but that it has negative implications as well. We must not, however, permit ourselves to be sidetracked by trying to cope with all conceivable negative effects and thereby focusing attention on them because that would mean sacrificing consistency and clear-cut focus to qualifications and equivocations bound to dilute and diffuse the basic message.
ACTION:
1. All U.S. personnel in headquarters and in the field whose work involves psychological activities are to be instructed to implement the proposals contained herein.
2. JUSPAO’s Program Services and Field Services and MACV’s PolWar Advisory Directorate and J–1 will be requested to develop appropriate program activities concerning the American military presence in Vietnam, to review current output, to determine audience accessibility, to explore media capabilities and potential, to consider ideas, approaches and format for the presentation of the message. (Everything from lectures by troop education officers and armed propaganda teams; through pamphlets, photo-features, movies, radio news and commentary; to cultural center student discussion groups and community relations projects should be utilized.)
3. JUSPAO will monitor and evaluate all output concerning the American military presence in Vietnam.
4. Action plans will be developed jointly with GVN staffs having responsibilities in the areas with which this proposal is concerned.
- Source: National Archives, RG 306, General Records Relating to the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) 1966–1975 Acc. #87–0089, Entry A1–31, Box 1, JUSPAO Guidance, Issue #3 U.S. Military Build Up and Problems of the American Presence in Vietnam—June 22, 1965. Unclassified.↩