Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VII, Public Diplomacy, 1964–1968

49. Circular Airgram From the United States Information Agency to All Principal United States Information Service Posts¹

CA–3728

Washington, June 29, 1965

SUBJECT

• Materials on Viet-Nam in Support of Director’s Memorandum of July 17, 1964² assigning Priority Status to Viet-Nam

SUMMARY

• Requests within 2 weeks post’s specific needs for subject material

Many posts have indicated a need for additional materials and support on Viet-Nam and on U.S. policy as it relates to that country. The Agency is planning a number of additional products and projects designed to meet this need, but in order to provide the best possible materials on Viet-Nam we need reports from addressee posts on the problems encountered in attempting to explain the situation in Viet-Nam and suggestions and ideas which could be incorporated into materials produced.

Specifically, we need details regarding (a) what you have done on Viet-Nam and the response this has evoked in your country, (b) the issues and subjects which are drawing the heaviest criticism, (c) the gaps in information among critics of the Vietnamese situation which could be filled by providing background materials and (d) the types of products or support which you think would best meet your requirements.

A good example of the type of information needed here, and of the problems confronting one post, was revealed by Mr. Walt Rostow of the State Department during his visit to Japan in April.³ After numerous contacts with various elements of Japanese society, Mr. Rostow suggested the following six points on which USIS/Tokyo should focus its efforts in explaining the Vietnamese situation:

1) Arresting fears that the war in Viet-Nam was escalating toward a broader conflict.

2) Explaining the seriousness of military infiltration.

3) Countering the widely held belief that the Viet Cong is a genuine nationalist movement.

4) Emphasizing that American policies in Asia are not based solely on the use of military power for strategic reasons, but are considerate of Asian aspirations for economic development, national independence, etc.

5) Explaining the existing nationalism in South Viet-Nam, which has been concealed by repeated coups in the past 18 months, but which, nonetheless, is a strong force.

6) Explaining the 1962 Geneva treaty provisions and calling attention to the repeated violations committed against these during the past three years.⁴

For obvious reasons some of the above points are not applicable to the situation at your post; but these illustrate, in part, the types of information we need from you.

Request your reply within two weeks of receipt of this message.⁵

Rowan

1. Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Files: 1962–1965, Entry UD WW 191, Box 9, Director’s Office 1964. Confidential. Drafted by Burns on June 21; cleared by Tull, Smith, Murphy, McClure, Nevins, and DuBois; approved by Moore. Sent via air pouch.
2. See Document 25.
3. Rostow visited Japan for 10 days, beginning on April 22, to meet with Japanese officials and give a series of public talks on the war in Vietnam. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XXIX, Part 2, Japan, Document 46, footnote 2; and “Japanese Universities Cancel Rostow Talks,” New York Times, April 17, 1965, p. 7.
4. The Geneva Agreements of July 23, 1962, brought to a close the hostilities between left- and right-wing factions in Laos, and called for the country to become neutral and for the formation of a tripartite government that represented the conflicting factions. The agreement, however, did not hold and conditions continued to deteriorate over the course of 1963. For additional information about the agreement and crisis in Laos in general, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXIV, Laos Crisis, Documents 354–411.
5. An unknown hand drew a box around this sentence.