Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VII, Public Diplomacy, 1964–1968

37. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan) to President Johnson¹

Washington, March 16, 1965

I have completed a thorough investigation of the informational and psychological warfare programs in South Viet Nam.² This included conversations with top American and Vietnamese officials, and with the ten USIA officers and several of the Army officers who are working in the provinces. I concluded that:

1. The program designed to commit the Vietnamese people to greater support of their government and of the war against communist aggression is vastly better than ten months ago. USIS has proved its ability to help the Vietnamese Government meet the insurgency problem through joint development of many techniques (rumor teams, cultural teams, tactical leaflets, loud speaker appeals, film showings, political seminars, etc.) that have met with success in several local areas.

2. Nevertheless, this program is still far below what is required to do the job, and is considerably inferior to what USIA and this country are capable of providing.

3. The long period of government instability and the failure to provide basic physical security to the people in the hamlets and villages are overriding handicaps, but these factors must not be accepted as excuses for our failure to mount a psychological effort commensurate with the challenge we face.

MAJOR U.S. SHORTCOMINGS

There are two fundamental problems on the American side. First, while various mechanisms have been created for inter-agency “coordination,” what is lacking is unified control and direction of psychological operations. As you will see later, I have taken steps to erase this, and believe that I have won government-wide acceptance of the several recommendations that will give USIA both the responsibility and authority with which to do the job. Fundamental to all else is a declaration that USIA has primacy in this field. With the proper mandate, we will do the job.

Second, our psychological program is still penny ante in comparison with our expenditures in other fields. The yearly cost of USIA’s operation in Viet Nam barely exceeds the cost of one day’s operations in the military and economic fields—this despite the fact that I have virtually doubled our program in the last ten months. So, whereas the money invested in the effort to win over the Vietnamese people was appallingly small a year ago, it can be described even today as glaringly inadequate.

I recommend that we alter this situation both by having USIA “borrow” resources from wealthier agencies and departments, and by having the Agency seek a supplemental appropriation for South Viet Nam. I request your authorization for USIA to seek through the Bureau of the Budget additional funds and American positions as needed for fiscal 1966. We will need at least 60 additional Vietnamese positions, but I will take these out of other country allotments.

PROBLEM OF COORDINATION WITH SOUTH VIET NAM

Even when appropriate steps are taken to increase and improve these programs on the American side, we shall still face the crucial problem of provoking proper action on the part of the Vietnamese Government. If the Vietnamese people are to be won over (and I am convinced we have no chance whatsoever of winning this war unless more and more are won over), we must press the GVN to move skillfully and resolutely to meet the problems of apathy, indecision, talent shortage and so forth that have caused the psychological program to remain inadequate.

While in Saigon I spent an hour and a half with Prime Minister Quat, with the Minister of Psychological Warfare, General Vien, and with Quat’s principal aide, Bui Diem. I presented to them a 12-point program (TAB A) that would ensure more effective US–GVN action in the psychological field.

I am encouraged by the intellectual fervor that Dr. Quat brings to a discussion of how to improve this program, as well as by the Cabinet-level actions in this direction taken even before I left Saigon. The question remains, however, as to how secure Quat’s position is and to what extent his government’s talk will be translated into action.

Ambassadors Taylor and Johnson warned me that there is a limit to what we can expect the Vietnamese to accomplish. They say that we can smother the GVN by loading too much on it. I believe, however, that the situation is so urgent that we must demand vastly more of the GVN, in terms of this program, than we have in the past. We must push it to its utmost.

I emphasize, however, that the program will not succeed on either the American or GVN side unless and until there is greater recognition throughout both governments of the importance of the psychological aspect of this struggle. On the American side, these programs to affect what the Vietnamese people think must be given the same status, the same concern, the same adequacy of working resources, as our military and economic operations. I hope that my discussions here and in Viet Nam, and your approval of the actions that I shall recommend, will achieve this.

PROPOSED ACTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. I propose to reorganize drastically USIA’s mission in Saigon so as to permit a substantial expansion, and more senior-level direction, of the program to inform and influence Vietnamese in the countryside, lift their morale, erase apathy and move them to a commitment to preserve their freedom. This would involve the prompt addition to our staff of 36 Americans, bringing the total to 114, and of 60 Vietnamese, bringing the staff total to 325. (TAB C)³

I plan also to reorganize our procedures in Washington for backing up the staff in Viet Nam. Instead of a desk officer, I shall create a small working group that will devote itself exclusively to seeing that the Saigon operation has the proper direction, personnel, program materials, etc.

2. I recommend that, just as we did in the Honolulu meeting some months ago regarding the handling of the press, State, Defense, CIA and USIA state jointly that Minister for Public Affairs Barry Zorthian has overall responsibility and authority for the coordination and direction of the entire psychological warfare program in South Viet Nam.⁴

3. Pursuant to the above recommendation, the following steps should be taken to bring vital support operations under Zorthian’s control:

A. The MACV officers doing psychological warfare work in the provinces (the S–5s) should operate under direct instructions from USIA’s Field Services Center.⁵ A MACV Colonel would be made deputy director of the Field Services Center. These officers already work closely with USIA field representatives and are dependent for most of their activities on the USIA contingency piaster⁶ fund which I shall discuss later. I have discussed a more co-ordinated arrangement with General Johnson, General Peers and others. We have agreed on a plan which does not go as far as I wish, but which may be workable. General Peers agrees with me that if it turns out to be inadequate, we must move promptly to place the psywar officers under direct control of the Center.

USIA would not assume operational jurisdiction over the psywar officers serving with combat units. These officers will, however, receive general direction from the Mission PysOps Committee, chaired by Zorthian, and guidance from the Field Services Center.

B. USOM’s ComMedia operation, which provides some $600,000 a year to the GVN’s Ministry of Psychological Warfare, should be brought under the direction and control of USIA. Only through control of this program, which provides such things as cameras, mimeograph machines, paper, radios and other information materials, will USIA have the necessary leverage to force the Ministry to undertake the programs necessary to cause the people to respect and support their government.

AID’s Assistant Director for the Far East, Rutherford Poats, agrees with me on this point. He and my Assistant Director, Ken Bunce, left Baguio⁷ together for Saigon where they are to work out the details for the transfer of ComMedia’s staff and funds to USIA.

3. USIA’s expenditures and its personnel commitments to Viet Nam must be sharply increased. We now have 10 men doing an admirable job in the provinces, some of them operating under conditions of considerable danger. I propose to place 15 more officers out in the field, meaning that a single officer will then have only an average of two provinces to cover.

Some of our additional personnel needs can be met by absorption of the staffs from present USOM and MACV psychological programs, and hopefully by borrowing other personnel from the military and AID.

It is vital that the people we send into the field be young, vigorous and skilled in the techniques of political motivation. Some ability to speak Vietnamese is also required. I have already begun an effort to locate the right kind of personnel within government. I believe, however, that we must also carry the search outside government, and will want to have a look at some former Peace Corps volunteers who may be just the kind of individuals we want.

4. Perhaps the most urgent financial requirement is a guarantee that USIA will have, on a continuing basis, the contingency piaster fund that is indispensable to the psychological operations in the provinces. As you are aware, several months ago AID made $200,000 (the piaster equivalent) available in order that we might halt a situation where psychological operations were at a stand-still in many provinces because the Vietnamese Information Service had no ready cash for ink, paper or the repairs of mimeograph machines, projectors and the sort. The military psywar experts, who get no direct funds from the military, told me that without this USIA contingency fund they would have virtually no psywar program. The importance of this fund is illustrated by what was achieved in Tan Ba Village by the expenditure of $279 combined with some vigorous and shrewd work by our people (see report at TAB B).⁸

Both USIA and MACV field representatives said they have been “nursing” the $200,000 and declining to initiate programs involving continuing costs, because of doubts that a new allocation would be forthcoming. I have assured them that new funds will be forthcoming, and I now recommend that arrangements be made through USOM or elsewhere to allocate to these field workers a minimum of $75,000 per quarter.

5. I recommend that the military make available 20 fixed-wing aircraft (U–10s) or helicopters with loud speakers, these to be available for psywar use four days and nights a week. These aircraft should be divorced from regular flights or combat units, otherwise military operational priorities will too frequently deprive the psychological operations of their use. These loud speaker flights were described to me as one of the most important and best-used media in this war. Many province chiefs say that the sustained use of such aircraft, with messages locally prepared for specific villages or Viet Cong units, are the most effective form of psychological warfare. In the Fourth Corps, I found evidence that a rise in the number of Viet Cong defectors was clearly and directly related to the occurrence of these loud speaker missions.

The number one complaint of the military psywar experts as well as the USIA field representatives is that aircraft are available for such flights far too rarely. These loud speaker planes have been most effective in using letters from relatives, or the taped voices of wives and parents appealing to young men to leave the VC and return to their homes. It is recalled that during the Korean war the communists sought vigorously to overrun command posts so as to get troop lists and thus be able to make propaganda appeals to individual Korean soldiers.

6. Steps must be taken to give USIA the necessary leverage to induce the province chiefs to include in their economic and military activities the psychological punch that will lift the morale and win the support of the people. At present, these province chiefs listen to advice of the military sector advisors and USOM representatives because each must “sign off” before the pigs are delivered to a village, or the funds are approved for any other project desired by the province chief. Our field representatives working to enhance the people’s view of, and respect for, the government are ignored because they have no voice in the decision as to whether the province chief gets what he wants. I have proposed that the USIA representative in the province be added as a “sign off” official, or that through some other means he be given the leverage he needs. I have taken this up with top AID officials in Washington, and it is to be discussed in the Mission Council⁹ in Saigon this week.

7. I recommend that steps be taken to increase radio broadcasting both in South Viet Nam and to North Viet Nam. 20 of some 25 small transmitters taken into Viet Nam by USOM’s ComMedia are presently not being used because of the lack of trained GVN personnel to operate them. We must make a concerted effort to get these stations on the air. A comprehensive radio survey has just been completed by a joint US/GVN committee, and I am urging that it be adopted and quickly put into effect. It is my understanding that this committee has not recommended a powerful new transmitter for broadcasting in South Viet Nam. However, both Prime Minister Quat and General Vien spoke to me of their eagerness to have such a transmitter. If this can be the sweetener needed to pull the government into the kind of imaginative, vigorous program needed, I recommend that we provide it.

8. Ambassador Taylor urges also that we go ahead with the establishment of television in South Viet Nam. There are some substantial drawbacks to doing this, the major one being the fact that inadequate personnel exists to operate the radio stations, and the shortage would be even more acute were television introduced. Nevertheless, because of the great psychological impact of television, and because its introduction would be a dramatic way of saying that the United States intends to stay, I believe that we ought to move speedily to introduce television.

I feel strongly that our go-ahead on television should be contingent upon the GVN adopting and following through promptly on the radio report.

9. There must be an immediate joint US/GVN program to train more Vietnamese in the techniques of radio and television, and in the general art of information and propaganda. I have told Dr. Quat that the entire facilities of USIA are available for such training, and that I am willing to send personnel to Saigon to train people there. The need is so great, however, that we need third-country help. This seems to me an area where third-countries can easily make a significant contribution, and I urge that through both State Department and USIA channels we solicit such assistance.

10. Receipt of this and other third-country help is to a degree dependent on the skill with which the GVN tells its story to the world. Both Prime Minister Quat and I hammered on the need for an overseas information program on the part of the GVN. I expect it will boil down to the question of whether the U.S. can give the GVN some financial support for this program. I recommend that we do so, if necessary. USIA will help to some extent by using its wireless file and other channels for the distribution of some GVN propaganda materials.

11. I recommend that steps be taken to remove the “Chieu Hoi”¹⁰ program from its apparent “stepchild” status. This program to lure VC defectors and turn them into loyal citizens is largely ineffective because neither we nor the Vietnamese are devoting adequate personnel or resources to it. Vietnamese sources indicate 17,519 communists have “rallied to the national cause.” Interviews with Viet Cong who have recently defected indicate that poverty, disillusionment and increased GVN and US air strikes are tempting VC soldiers and cadres to defect in larger numbers than before. In spite of an increased number of returnees, Chieu Hoi rehabilitation centers are presently without even the most elementary psychological indoctrination programs. Viet Cong returnees generally languish two or three months in “detention” with few daily activities beyond interrogation and occasional lectures on the “good national cause.”

A recent visit by a USIA officer to the Chieu Hoi center in Bien Hoa province revealed the following facts: 1) Over 750 returnees had been processed through the camp in 1964, among whom were VC commissars, political propaganda cadre, and a large number of soldiers. 2) No Vietnamese or American official had visited the center in recent months. 3) Through discussions with the returnees it became evident that their propaganda indoctrination by the VC still remained unanswered and unchallenged.

The result is that some Viet Cong defectors have become disillusioned anew, returned to the VC fold, and are now warning their colleagues not to fall for the promises of the government’s Chieu Hoi program.

Ambassador Taylor expressed the view that this program probably belongs under the USIS umbrella. I think it does—but is so woefully inadequate at present that I shudder at the thought of taking responsibility for it. USIA will do so, however, if we can get some assurance of reasonable funds, personnel and facilities with which to run it. This would include the building of centers and the kind of program I saw the British using on the Mau Maus in 1956.¹¹

This program is very important, and if it is to succeed there must be major American involvement for the simple reason that many GVN officials involved seem more interested in killing VC than in rehabilitating them. One of our problems in the villages, I fear, is that some of the extra zealous activities designed to kill VC have wound up infuriating and disillusioning so many non-communist people that US/GVN actions have created more VC members and sympathizers than they have killed.

12. I recommend that USIA and the Pentagon, jointly or separately, launch immediately a vigorous program to produce a corps of experts in psychological warfare. Lt. Colonel Morgan, the Psychological Operations/Civil Affairs Advisor to the 9th Division, characterized the present situation accurately when he told me: “Our biggest problem in Viet Nam is that we are trying to do a psywar job with a bunch of amateurs, both American and Vietnamese.”

I think it is beyond dispute that this country’s greatest reservoir of trained psywar manpower is in USIA, but I am quick to concede that USIA has only a fraction of what we need or are likely to need in the future.

The fact is that in earlier years USIA never planned, staffed, organized or budgeted for psywar operations; until recently it was not assumed that USIA would be called upon to step in and serve as a surrogate information service for a fledgling nation that has neither the professional skill nor the inclination to explain its programs, actions and policies to its own people.

Not only do we need a larger pool of talent for Viet Nam, but it is also vital to the protection of our national interest in the Congo, Venezuela, and almost certainly in the near future in many other places, possibly including the Philippines. Most military S–5 advisors and some USIA officers have been school trained in methods used during World War II involving the relatively sophisticated use of mass media aimed at literate populations with clearly established ethnic and national unity. Our target in Southeast Asia is different in virtually every respect, and we must develop training and techniques to meet the circumstances that prevail.

This has been discussed with General Johnson and some civilian officials in the Pentagon, one of whom has said that a major reorganization is planned in counter-insurgency training at Fort Bragg and that this reorganization may open the way for implementation of this proposal. I shall pursue this idea.

13. We need to exploit to greater advantage VC prisoners, defectors, captured terrorists. I have been assured of the necessary cooperation of MACV intelligence officers, and MACV and USIA are moving jointly to secure the necessary GVN cooperation. Also, as a result of this mission, I have made arrangements for much closer high-level liaison between USIA and Pentagon officials involved in psychological warfare.

14. There would be considerable psychological advantage if we proceeded immediately with our plans to build a new embassy in Saigon. Not only is the present ugly and inefficient structure no credit to the United States, but the beginning of a new embassy would be an additional strong indicator of our intention to stay there and to keep our commitment to the Vietnamese people.

15. USIS will increase its work in urban areas among youth, labor and religious leaders and the intellectual community. This is essential because there can be no government stability unless these groups are included, or their views and opinions considered, to their satisfaction. I shall have a separate memorandum for you on what I think is the vital need for our top people to establish a warmer, closer relationship with leading Vietnamese, both military and civilian.

16. I have talked so far in terms of the need for greater authority, better coordination and more personnel. Effective execution of this program will also require a substantial increase in hardware—more paper and ink for provincial newspapers and leaflets, several trilambrettas to give psywar cadre mobility, perhaps 1,000 new projectors and a suitable collection of films for each province, batteries and generators for radio equipment and projectors, mimeographing machines, and so forth. We shall provide all we can from USIA resources, but will certainly have to call on other agencies and departments for assistance.

I emphasize, in conclusion, that we take these steps fully aware that many vital factors will still remain beyond our control. But given a reasonable degree of governmental stability in Saigon and physical security in the countryside, I am convinced that this program will have significant impact. Our first hope is that it will prompt GVN officials to act out of certain knowledge that they hold the final key to producing a sense of unity and loyalty among the Vietnamese people.¹²

Carl T. Rowan

Tab A

Aide-Mémoire¹³

Saigon, March 8, 1965

Discussion Points of Mutual Interest With the Prime Minister by Mr. Rowan

Following for the consideration of the Prime Minister are major subjects in the psychological domain which the United States Government suggests are of mutual interest and of critical importance. Insofar as the Prime Minister would desire their implementation, the U.S. Government stands prepared to provide such assistance as the Government of Vietnam deems appropriate:

1. Credo—A major public statement by the Prime Minister of the principles to which his new Government is dedicated. This statement could be given the widest distribution throughout Vietnam and throughout the world.

2. Central Role of the Ministry of Psychological Warfare—To establish clearly that the PsyWar Ministry is the central voice of the Government of Vietnam, with coordinating authority over public statements in Vietnam of other ministries. The PsyWar Ministry would coordinate with ARVN and would provide full production support to the Foreign Ministry as the voice overseas of the Government of Vietnam.

3. Participation by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet in Psychological Programs—To assure the ready cooperation of ministers in personal participation in GVN activities particularly important for psychological objectives. The Quat Government should emerge publicly as a Government at work among its people, with ministers personally visiting and talking with public servants in the field and with the people they serve.

4. Qualified Personnel—To emphasize the training of well qualified personnel in the psychological domain, at the national, provincial and international levels.

5. U.S. Consultants—To increase as needed the number of American technical consultants to the PsyWar Ministry and to VIS in the provinces.

6. GVN Image in Provinces—To establish the presence of the GVN in the provinces, through action on behalf of the people by GVN personnel, civil and military, with a broad public information program to tell how the Government is serving its people.

7a. Fiscal Responsiveness to Provincial Needs—To make clear to fiscal authorities that it is imperative that funds be provided quickly and fully to provincial authorities charged with psychological responsibilities. It is suggested that the Prime Minister request a report from appropriate fiscal authorities on any present obstacles to such fast and full fiscal support.

7b. Provincial Flexibility—To assure sufficient authority to provincial officials with psychological responsibilities, so that they can promptly take advantage of new local opportunities by making decisions and immediately initiating action.

8. Hop Tac Psychological Program—To establish an integrated, effective psychological program for the priority Hop Tac area of the critical Pacification program.

9. Urban Youth—To demonstrate the Government’s awareness of the needs of youth, particularly university students, in carrying out their education to become future leaders of Vietnam. A Government statement of present and planned action to improve the educational opportunities and the welfare of students might assist in achieving their recognition that through education this Government will help provide them with the dignity of useful lives and the security of economic well being.

10. Economic Progress—That the PsyWar Ministry conduct an appraisal of present and impending economic progress in Vietnam, as the foundation of a public informational program to explain the Government’s action in terms the people can understand: what is being done to provide more Education, Health, Food, Housing, etc.

11. GVN Overseas Information—That the voice of Vietnam overseas be notably strengthened, by implementation of the August 18 recommendations to then Foreign Minister Quat of his request for an improved Vietnamese International Information Program.¹⁴ The first step might be a discussion with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Psychological Warfare, to assure that the production capacity of the PsyWar Ministry is fully aligned behind the Foreign Ministry’s needs in conducting the diplomatic offensive of Vietnam overseas. The second step might be for a meeting of operational personnel from the two Ministries and USIS to coordinate implementation of the program.

12. Coordinated Program Direction—That the coordination of the GVN informational activities with the U.S. Mission be conducted through the present Joint Psychological Operations Committee for policy and through the Joint Working Committee for operations.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 190, Vietnam Rowan Report. Secret. Another copy is in the National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 26, Field—Far East (Viet Nam), 1965.
2. Rowan, together with Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton, accompanied Army Chief of Staff Johnson on a mission to South Vietnam, arriving in Saigon on March 3 and departing on March 12. For information about the mission, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. II, Vietnam, January–June 1965, Documents 178 and 179. In a February 24 memorandum to President Johnson, Rowan noted their earlier February 19 conversation in which they discussed the feasibility of sending Stanton, rather than Rowan, to South Vietnam. Rowan, within the context of the memorandum, commented that USIA would “welcome a look at the situation by Stanton: “We believe that the program we have developed in the last year is quite impressive—still, we welcome any fresh ideas as to how we might better do the job.” (Ibid., Document 160)
3. Attached but not printed at Tab C is an undated organization chart.
4. The meeting took place on June 2, 1964, in Honolulu, Hawaii. Those attending included Rusk, McNamara, Rowan, and Lodge. In a June 3 memorandum to Johnson, Bundy noted that “the one major new agreement growing out of Honolulu is that we need to centralize authority for public information on Vietnam, both in Saigon and in Washington. Moreover, there is agreement on the names of the men to do this job: [Barry] Zorthian of USIA in Saigon, and Bob Manning back here.” (See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, Vietnam, 1964, Documents 189, 192, and 193)
5. For a description of the Field Service Center, see footnote 8, Document 32.
6. Currency of the Republic of Vietnam.
7. Reference is to a city in the Philippines.
8. Attached but not printed is USIA Field Message No. 31 from USIS Saigon, January 28. According to this message, “A little over three months ago Tan Ba village (population approximately 2,000) was one of the 17 out of 21 villages in Phuoc Thanh province which belonged to the VC. Few if any Vietnamese in Tan Ba or in the province believed in the ability of the government or local authorities to provide security or assistance to this poor farming community.” The message further states: “Today all of Tan Ba’s population, together with the majority of people in the contiguous VC communities, are aware of the successful government pacification program which is underway.” It concludes: “The Trust Fund allotted to the USIS Field Representatives played an important role in this project.”
9. For information regarding the formation of the U.S. Mission Council, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, Vietnam, 1964, Document 229.
10. The English translation of this Vietnamese term is roughly “open arms” or “call to return.” For an explanation of this program, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Documents 60 and 92.
11. Reference is to an African nationalist movement originating in the 1950s among Kenya’s Kikuyu ethnic group.
12. Bundy sent Johnson a copy of Rowan’s March 16 memorandum under a March 17 memorandum that summarized Rowan’s memorandum and offered commentary. Bundy’s memorandum is in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. II, Vietnam, January–June 1965, Document 203. In National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) No. 330, issued on April 9, the President gave “general approval” to Rowan’s March 16 recommendations. The NSAM also directed Rowan to “continue to advise the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Central Intelligence and others as appropriate on psychological and foreign public opinion aspects of the Vietnamese situation.” For the text of NSAM 330, see ibid., Document 246.
13. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the aide-mémoire.
14. Not further identified.