Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

160. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan) to President Johnson¹

Washington, February 24, 1965.

Pursuant to our discussion Friday² about our psychological program in Viet Nam and the question of whether an outside observer like Frank Stanton should have a look at it, I wish to cite a few points that may help you to decide your next step.

1. First, let me say that we in the Agency would welcome a look at the situation by Stanton. We believe that the program we have developed in the last year is quite impressive—still, we welcome any fresh ideas as to how we might better do the job.

2. Having said this, let me emphasize quickly that efforts to develop among the South Vietnamese people a sense of national unity and a determination to fight off Communist aggression, have not progressed to my satisfaction. As you know so well, this kind of psychological operation cannot be divorced from other problems there such as:

a. Shortcomings in the pacification program and the failure to give lasting physical protection to the villagers we are urging to be brave;

b. The continuing political turmoil that leaves us uncertain as to whom we work with and the Vietnamese people confused as to who constitutes the government we are asking them to rally ‘round;

c. Or the widespread notion, voiced even by U.S. congressmen, that we are waging a futile effort in Viet Nam.

3. Despite these difficulties, we have made some psychological headway during the past year, particularly in the Hop Tac areas. Given any degree of political stability in the next year, and barring severe military defeats for our side, I believe our projected program is such that we can anticipate a further significant increase in unity and will-to-win on the part of the Vietnamese.

The Viet Nam Coordinating Committee has discussed thoroughly all the areas where U.S.-GVN programs might be strengthened. It has decided that a working team, including a USIA representative, should go to Viet Nam soon to effect whatever improvements are possible.

4. I mentioned to you Friday such things as my having almost doubled my American staff and reallocated an extra million dollars to the Viet Nam psychological program since I was there 10 months ago. You may be interested in the following brief summary of what we have built in the way of organization in that time:

Under the U.S. Mission Council in Viet Nam there is a Mission Psychological Operations Committee which has representation from all U.S. agencies in Viet Nam and is chaired by the USIS Country Public Affairs Officer, Barry Zorthian. A country-wide psychological operations committee has existed for some time in the Vietnamese Government but has not functioned with full effectiveness due to the continuing political turmoil. In some provinces, however, we have built local structures for waging psychological warfare, and these can now move ahead if there is a reasonable degree of political and military stability.

Under the U.S. Psychological Operations Committee is a Joint Field Services Center, housed at USIS and composed of personnel of USIS, USOM and MACV. In the Field Services Center are thirteen USIS Americans, two USOM employees, five MACV military personnel and seventy Vietnamese employees of USIS (twenty-three of these Vietnamese employees are stationed in provincial offices of the Vietnamese Information Service).

MACV has a total of approximately seventy American military personnel engaged directly in psychological operations and civic action—working under general policy and strategy developed by USIA. More than forty of the MACV Psychological Operations Civil Affairs Officers are stationed full-time in the various provinces. Others serve at division, corps and Saigon level.

In addition to the USIS personnel directly engaged in field operations, five USIS Americans and 57 Vietnamese USIS employees are engaged in producing such products as films, publications and leaflets designed for Vietnamese rural audiences.

Also, 51 third-country personnel, including Filipinos, Chinese and Australians, are engaged in operations closely related to the aforementioned activities. Their work includes civic action, political warfare and radio broadcasting.

One of the most significant developments in recent months has been the formation of Provincial Psychological Operations Committees. Usually chaired by the provincial governors themselves, these committees usually have USOM (AID), MACV and, where possible, USIS representation.

5. Of course, numbers and statistics are not so important as the ideas and their implementation. I am attaching for your perusal USIS Saigon’s field message no. 35 of January 26, 1965,³ which illustrates some of the ideas and imagination going into the psychological effort. I have underlined some of the more important points.

6. You asked me who in USIA might go with Stanton to Viet Nam. I believe he should be accompanied by Jim Tull of my staff. Tull is a real expert on Viet Nam who has inspected our operation several times and knows well the strengths and weaknesses of the psychological campaign.

Incidentally, I weighed seriously your good and friendly advice and decided to cancel the trip to Africa. Should you decide not to send Stanton to Viet Nam, I think I should have another look at the situation there myself. I believe I should spend a day at the Far East ambassadorial conference (March 9), talking to our ambassadors about USIA programs and problems in such places as Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, and Cambodia, and go on to Saigon for a few days.

Please have me informed at your earliest convenience of your decision regarding Stanton in order that we might assist him to the fullest extent. No one believes more strongly than I that USIA must make a major contribution if we are to succeed in this grim effort, and we do not want to miss any opportunity.

Carl T. Rowan

1. Source: Johnson Library, Confidential File, CO 312. Confidential. Copy sent to McGeorge Bundy.
2. On Friday, February 19, Rowan met alone with President Johnson from 6:05 to 6:44 p.m. No other record of the discussion has been found. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary)
3. Attached, but not printed.