38. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Rowan) to President Johnson1

I wish to comment separately on a couple of my observations in South Viet Nam2 that seem to me to go to the heart of our future contributions to that country’s efforts to maintain its freedom. I believe it within my purview to comment on these things, because they are psychological factors in the most vital sense of the word.

The first observation is that top U.S. officers in Viet Nam must make a conscious and concerted effort to develop relationships of warmth, trust and easy collaboration with opposite numbers on the Vietnamese side. At lower levels, out in the provinces, Americans and Vietnamese have established a marked degree of camaraderie; they eat, work, fight, get ambushed together. But at the higher, decision-making levels there is for the most part only stiff formality. There is too much conference table negotiation between American and Vietnamese and not enough coming together in informal mutual trust to work on a mutual problem.

I want to make it clear that my first finger is pointed at my own operation in Viet Nam. Zorthian mentioned to me that several USIA officers “have never asked a Vietnamese in for dinner.” I have made it clear that under these circumstances we will never get GVN officials and the Vietnamese people to take the steps needed to beat off Communist aggression, and that I expect more of USIA officers than this.

I observed that on the military side not only is there a scarcity of warm relationships at policy-making levels, but there is considerable [Page 116] fear expressed among Americans3 that we are making mistakes that are certain to worsen the situation.

I refer, for example, to the fact that we have set up separate officers and non-commissioned officers’ clubs for Americans—clubs that are quite plush compared with those frequented by the Vietnamese. In Da Nang, General Thi has declared certain bars off limits to Vietnamese soldiers so as to prevent fights between Americans and Vietnamese.

From the standpoint of our refuting the persistent VC clamor that “the Americans are imperialists,” these developments are not good. I talked to Vietnamese who expressed fear that we are building divisive factors that the enemy can exploit in a devastating way. It becomes a point to consider seriously as we expand the American military presence.

Further, I think it is a serious psychological mistake for top Americans (military or civilian) to go to Saigon and proceed directly to a briefing session attended and presided over by American military men only. I feel, and I know some key GVN officials feel, that we blunder by creating the impression that Americans come out to sit down with Americans and plan the next steps in the war. It would be a fine stroke of public relations if we asked top GVN military people to join in the first briefing session—indeed to give their assessment of how the war is going in various areas. We Americans could then hold whatever private sessions we deem necessary—without creating the impression that we meet, make the decisions and then drag the GVN along.

Several top Americans in Saigon conceded that a desirable high level of rapport with top Vietnamese is lacking. Alex Johnson attributes this to the fact that, in his view, the Vietnamese are not as warm, friendly, outgoing as he found the Thais to be. This may be, but there are just enough cases in Saigon where genuinely warm relationships have been formed to make me believe that much more is possible. I believe it is incumbent upon us Americans, as the rich, powerful advisers, to make the first vigorous efforts to warm up the situation.

I recommend we start by pressing the Vietnamese military to use regularly the American officer and non-com clubs; by encouraging American officers to visit the Vietnamese clubs (many top GVN officers were trained in the United States); by having the Vietnamese military in frequent planning discussions and ensuring that the public knows of the joint participation, and finally by having Americans orient their entertainment programs toward building more Vietnamese friendships.

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Finally, I urge that we take much more seriously GVN sensitivities about our announcing actions4 here that catch GVN leaders in Saigon off guard.

When we announced abruptly the dispatch of 3,500 Marines to Da Nang we caused Prime Minister Quat to lose face among the GVN military. A Vietnamese who is close to the Prime Minister said to me: “We were in a mess, scrambling to inform our top people, to call a cabinet meeting, when the announcement already was on the radio. It made Dr. Quat look like a fool. This sort of thing gives his enemies an excuse to plot against him. It also gave the Viet Cong evidence with which to try to prove that we are lackeys.”

My conclusion, of course, is that it is of great political and psychological importance that we coordinate closely with Saigon, and that we not announce here what would be much better announced either by the GVN—or jointly.

I have made no other distribution of this memorandum so as to leave you free to judge whether these points have merit. If so, a suggestion originating with you will produce more effort in the areas mentioned. If on the other hand you see little more that can be done in this area, this airing of my views will not have caused any interagency irritations.

Should you desire, of course, I am quite prepared to discuss these issues frankly with other key officials in Washington.

Carl T. Rowan
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 190, Vietnam Rowan Report. Confidential. Rowan sent a copy of the memorandum to Bundy under a March 18 covering memorandum, stating, “I believe a bit of deft prodding by the President would help a lot in these areas.” (Ibid.) According to Johnson’s handwritten notes on a March 29 memorandum he received from Bundy, Johnson saw a copy of Rowan’s March 18 memorandum and requested that Bundy “raise these functions at lunch Tuesday not as coming from Rowan but say you have reports etc.” (Ibid.)
  2. See Document 37.
  3. An unknown hand underlined “fear expressed among Americans.”
  4. An unknown hand underlined “announcing actions,” drew a line from it to the margin above, and wrote two question marks.