Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VII, Public Diplomacy, 1964–1968

107. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Kaplan) to the Ambassador at Large (Harriman)¹

Washington, September 13, 1966

SUBJECT

• Climate of World Opinion Regarding U.S. Policy in Viet-Nam

1. The replies to the Department’s circular telegram 13082² and USIA’s circular telegram 882³ on this subject have provided many useful ideas on actions which might be considered to improve the climate of world opinion regarding U.S. policy in Viet-Nam. The analysis prepared by USIA, entitled “Viet-Nam and World Opinion”,⁴ together with the addenda thereto, recapitulates the replies to both circular messages;⁵ in most cases posts replied to both with a single Country Team telegram.

2. In reviewing these materials, I am particularly struck by the following facts:

(a) the air strikes against North Viet-Nam are most often cited as a major unfavorable element in terms of opinion on U.S. policy in Viet-Nam;⁶

(b) the fear that the conflict will escalate into a major war involving communist China is virtually universal;⁷

(c) nevertheless, opinion in many countries is preoccupied chiefly with local problems and the conflict in Viet-Nam is of relatively remote interest;

(d) the military emphasis of reporting out of Viet-Nam, the use of body counts, discussion of POW treatment, and the widespread use of pictures of suffering and destruction are important factors working against us;⁸

(e) the apparent Americanization of the conflict similarly works against us, and there is a considerable David-and-Goliath sympathy for the North Vietnamese;⁹

(f) statement and actions by American domestic opposition elements are important elements in creating unfavorable opinion;¹⁰

(g) active opposition elements tend to be comparable to those actively opposed in the U.S., such as students, intellectuals and university teachers;¹¹

(h) many undeveloped countries relate their desire for a peaceful settlement to freeing U.S. attention and resources for assistance to them;

(i) opinion tends to be favorable to us and unfavorable to the Communists regarding readiness to negotiate, although inclusion of the Viet Cong as an independent entity in negotiations tends to be favored;¹²

(j) we need to continue working on the problem, but we should not be overly pessimistic since much good will remains toward the U.S.;

(k) we ought not to expect too much in terms of public statements and other additional measures of overt support; and

(l) what we do is much more important than what we say.¹³

3. Suggestions of an informational-psychological nature are being followed up systematically by USIA. Actions of a more political nature suggested by the posts which we may wish to consider are as follows:

(a) There have been too many high level statements. These need to be better timed, more widely spaced, and more specifically aimed at foreign countries to be more effective. They should emphasize the GVN’s role, place the problem in the perspective of Asia as a whole as enunciated in the President’s speech to the American Alumni Council,¹⁴ give more attention to Asian help, and reiterate both the firmness of our commitment and our readiness to negotiate. They should be less vociferous and more subdued in tone than in the past, and they ought to exploit the communist Chinese sensitivity regarding negotiations.¹⁵

(b) Statements should be made by the President, as well as by the Secretary and other high level officials, explaining U.S. policy.

(c) The President should reiterate his offer of economic aid to North Viet-Nam.¹⁶

(d) The President should make a major speech addressed to fellow citizens of the world, calling on their help for peace.¹⁷

(e) The President should make a worldwide humanitarian appeal for help to the refugees in Viet-Nam (the King of Morocco originally suggested this).¹⁸

(f) The President should write letters to heads of state and heads of governments about Viet-Nam.¹⁹

(g) The Vice President should visit the Latin American capitals to explain U.S. policy.

(h) There should be a Presidential or other high level speech on “the other war” in South Viet-Nam.²⁰

(i) Steps to “Asianize” the discussion should be taken, such as statements by GVN leaders, stationing GVN and other Asian diplomats in more capitals, arranging tours and visits by Vietnamese and other Asians including cultural presentations, and getting Southeast Asian leaders to issue statements. A conference of Asian and U.S. intellectuals could be organized, perhaps at the East-West Center. There should be more exploitation of Asian statements.²¹ A Southeast Asian (preferably Moslem) “trade delegation” should tour Arab capitals.

(j) Members of Congress and high level Administration officials should tour foreign capitals regularly to discuss U.S. policy in Viet-Nam. More officers with Viet-Nam experience should do the same.²²

(k) We should make a standing offer to negotiate, setting out our minimum demands. We ought periodically to repeat our concerted diplomatic campaigns.

(l) There should be periodic high level briefings for Latin American chiefs of mission accredited to Washington.

(m) Governor Harriman should meet with a senior communist Chinese official to discuss all differences between Peiping and Washington.²³

(n) More attention should be given to influencing opinion indirectly, such as encouraging more paid advertisements for U.S. products, arranging to buy military supplies in Australia, and pursuing constructive relations.

(o) Statements by liberal U.S. educators should be encouraged and exploited.

4. A number of suggestions of an administrative support nature were also made by posts. The most feasible of these are:

(a) issue a factbook on Viet-Nam;

(b) arrange for posts to get advance texts of speeches by U.S. officials; and

(c) issue a weekly situation report so that posts can regularly brief senior host government officials.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1963–1967, Entry UD WW 101, Box 3, Field—Far East (Viet Nam) September–December 1966. Secret. Drafted by Arzac. In the top right corner of the first page of the memorandum, below the date line, written in an unknown hand is the letter “M,” which is crossed out with a single slash.
2. See footnote 2, Document 99.
3. See Document 99.
4. See the attachment to Document 100.
5. The phrase “both circular messages” is underlined in an unknown hand.
6. An unknown hand drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this point. Next to it is a hand-drawn checkmark.
7. An unknown hand drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this point. Next to it is a hand-drawn arrow pointing to it.
8. An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this point.
9. An unknown hand underlined “there is considerable David-and-Goliath sympathy for the North Vietnamese” and wrote in the left-hand margin diagonally above this point: “Major project.”
10. The entire point is underlined in an unknown hand. An unknown hand also placed two parallel lines in the left-hand margin next to this point.
11. An unknown hand placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this point.
12. An unknown hand underlined “inclusion of the Viet Cong as an independent entity in negotiations tends to be favored.”
13. An unknown hand placed a vertical line in the left hand margin next to this point.
14. See footnote 4, Document 101.
15. An unknown hand drew two parallel vertical lines in the right-hand margin next to this sentence and drew a question mark next to the lines.
16. An unknown hand drew a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this point and drew a question mark in the left-hand margin.
17. An unknown hand drew a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this point.
18. An unknown hand underlined “The President should make a worldwide humanitarian appeal for help to the refugees in Viet-Nam,” drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this point, and drew a question mark in the right-hand margin.
19. An unknown hand drew a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this and the subsequent point.
20. An unknown hand drew a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this point and wrote “Election” next to it.
21. At the beginning of the paragraph an unknown hand underlined “Steps to ‘Asianize’ the discussion should be taken” and the sentence “There should be more exploitation of Asian statements.”
22. An unknown hand drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this point and a question mark in the right-hand margin.
23. An unknown hand underlined the entire point and wrote “How” in the right-hand margin.