Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VII, Public Diplomacy, 1964–1968

100. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)¹

Washington, August 8, 1966

On July 25 I sent a circular message² to all of our posts requesting information regarding current public opinion on U.S. actions in Viet Nam.

We received an excellent response describing press and other reaction to our Viet Nam position, and suggesting courses of action that might be taken to explain our position.

The enclosed volume tabulates the responses from all posts and summarizes this reaction on the first three pages.

If you desire further detail for any country, a supplemental report will be sent to you.

Leonard H. Marks³

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Office of Policy and Research, United States Information Agency⁴

Washington, August 1966

VIETNAM and World Opinion: Analysis and Recommendations

ABSTRACT

What is the state of current world opinion on US actions in Vietnam?

What can the US Government do to strengthen understanding and support for its Vietnam policies abroad?

This report contains analyses and summaries of responses to these questions from US diplomatic missions around the world during the last week of July, 1966.⁵

Understanding and support for the US, both public and private, vary widely according to proximity to the scene of action and domestic political and economic considerations.

Vietnam seems far away and of little direct concern to most people. In many countries, however, public opinion shows increasing concern, reflecting in part the rising level of public controversy and debate in the United States. A strong contributing factor is the generally negative impact of international news media coverage, particularly the US wire services, Agency France Presse, The New York Times, the Paris Herald Tribune, and Walter Lippman,⁶ which makes the Communist’s propaganda job easier.

Principal negative points include:

1. The image of a huge white nation attempting to suppress an Asian struggle for freedom.

2. The image of the struggle as a civil war in South Vietnam.

3. The Viet Cong as embattled revolutionaries.

4. The military and non-representational character of the South Vietnamese government.

On the plus side, the US peace offensive has had a positive effect.

Opinions generally follow cold war alignments but most foreigners who support the US on other issues show some serious doubts about aspects of Vietnam. Many government officials are sympathetic in private but reluctant to show sympathy in public. In the developing areas there is a general feeling that the large US commitments in Vietnam markedly subtract from possible US aid to their countries. Opposition to US policies comes from influential groups including the “intelligentsia,” university students, left-of-center political parties and segments of organized labor, and is by no means limited to those controlled or influenced by the Communists.

Recommendations for US policy actions stress the need for:

1. greater persistence in identifying the US as the seeker of peace;

2. more actions to multilateralize the efforts to resist aggression;

3. more public and diplomatic actions by Asians in support of the effort.

Principal themes which missions most frequently cite as helpful are:

1. Economic and social progress as a principal US goal.

2. Emphasis on the role of South Vietnam in promoting economic and social progress, as well as in prosecuting the war.

3. Less emphasis on US military presence and actions wherever possible.

4. The US is in Vietnam only to help the Government of South Vietnam repel aggression.

5. By meeting Communist aggression in Vietnam we are weakening the Communist potential to make trouble elsewhere and demonstrating that aggression does not pay.

In the field of information activities, the survey confirms the validity of the general direction of our present programming. The majority of the recommendations are for enlarging or sharpening present operations.

Judged particularly effective are:

1. visits by indigenous newsmen to Vietnam;

2. the use of speakers—American, South Vietnamese and others, especially Asians—who have had direct observation or experience in Vietnam;

3. the views of respected, high-level public figures, presented in articles or books for selective USIS placement and in direct confrontation with critical or skeptical audiences.

The missions particularly request:

1. more material for use by all news media on the non-military aspects of the war, especially films;

2. more action by Asians, officially and non-officially, to tell the Vietnam story, even if this requires US financial support;

3. maximum precise information to justify any action which might be construed as intensifying or escalating the war, i.e., effect of POL bombings, air strikes in the demilitarized zone.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the paper, which contains information concerning specific responses from U.S. diplomatic missions around the world.]

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 212, Vietnam: Vietnam and World Opinion (USIA). Secret. A copy was sent to Jorden. An unknown hand wrote: “Mr. Jorden rec’d copy direct” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.
2. See Document 99.
3. Marks signed “LHM” above this typed signature.
4. No classification marking.
5. Reference is to USIA 882, July 25; see Document 99.
6. American journalist, writer, and political commentator.