Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VII, Public Diplomacy, 1964–1968

99. Circular Telegram From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Marks) to All Diplomatic Posts¹

Washington, July 25, 1966, 1655Z

USIA 882. I direct your personal attention to Circ. Deptel 13082 re climate world opinion regarding U.S. Viet-Nam policy² and urge your continuing contribution to Country Team and Washington thinking on subject.

While recognizing that problem may appear be less urgent some areas and some countries than others, Viet-Nam continues be our country’s primary foreign policy consideration at this time and Agency’s primary concern now is world-wide public atmosphere in which Viet-Nam reported, discussed, and understood or misunderstood.

I urge all Agency officers consider best means by which Agency can improve and sustain public understanding issues involved and goals established both by U.S. and our adversaries. In addition to field implementation your best ideas, Agency wishes receive on continuing basis your positive suggestions for means achieve greater acceptance abroad our Viet-Nam policies, whose success truly vital to American security and world stability.

Whereas Agency can produce radio programs, films, pamphlets, etc. exposing American point of view to world interest, simple and repetitious restatement of American policies sometimes less persuasive than coverage resulting from thoughtful activity planned for purpose generating public interest in U.S. search for peace. Toward that end, especially, Circ. Deptel 13082 and this message seek your specific recommendations for public actions, announcements, visits by American officials, or other overtures which might enhance understanding and credibility U.S. efforts. I urge you to be specific.

Withal, our posture re Viet-Nam must be founded on (1) our absolute and continued determination resist aggression by Hanoi, (2) fact that Hanoi simply cannot defeat U.S. and that North Vietnamese failure is inevitable, (3) that peace equally inevitable but being delayed only by Hanoi’s unwillingness thus far rpt thus far to come to negotiating table and (4) that U.S. remains ready—indeed, eager—pursue cessation of hostilities and road to lasting peace by unconditional negotiations at any time and any place, as suggested so often by President and other American officials. Your advice to Country Team and your ideas forwarded to Washington should parallel this line of thought.

Request you mark all replies for my attention.³

Marks

1. Source: Johnson Library, Marks Papers, Box 30, Vietnam and World Opinion. Confidential. Drafted by Oleksiw; cleared by Ryan; approved by Marks. The time of transmission is illegible. Another copy of the telegram is in the National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1963–1967, Entry UD WW 101, Box 3. Field—Far East (Viet Nam) 1966 July, August. Marks sent a copy of the telegram to Kintner under a July 25 memorandum noting that the intent of circular message was to solicit suggestions by PAOs “on how we can improve public understanding of the issues involved in Vietnam.” (Johnson Library, Special Files, Handwriting File, Box 16, Handwriting File: Handwriting—President Johnson, July, 1966 (notes, instructions, doodles) [3 of 3]) Under cover of a July 26 memorandum, Kintner sent the telegram to Johnson and copied Moyers and Rostow. Johnson wrote a note on Kintner’s memorandum: “Excellent—I want more of this & I want to see responses summarized. L.” (Ibid.) Kintner, in a July 28 memorandum to Marks, highlighted the President’s comment (Ibid.)
2. In circular telegram 13082, the Department of State requested “posts’ ideas on what actions could be taken to bring about better climate of world opinion on U.S. policy in Viet-Nam, both in regard to host countries and generally.” The telegram continued: “Feeling is that this is appropriate time to examine what additional efforts might be undertaken to increase understanding and support for American position. For example, in many instances there is greater tendency to regard U.S. efforts as ‘war oriented’ rather than peace directed. In this respect, unrealistic approach to Southeast Asian situation fails to recognize necessity for continued U.S. military pressure as essential component in overall U.S. policy directed at achieving peaceful resolution by successfully persuading Hanoi to change her course.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1964–1966, POL 1, US-Viet S)
3. Under a July 28 covering memorandum, Lewis sent Marks a copy of telegram 72 from Ouagadougou, July 25, in which the Embassy transmitted its recommendations. Lewis, in his memorandum to Marks, wrote that the Embassy concluded that “the effort to improve understanding [about U.S. policy in Vietnam] should be handled on a long-term basis;” that “U.S. actions in other fields of direct, local interest to Africans raise our standing and having an important bearing on creating a favorable attitude toward our Viet-Nam policy,” that “efforts by South Viet-Nam to explain the situation are more effective than official U.S. efforts,” and that the “thrust of our information program should be aimed at influential elements in youth, labor and media groups.” (National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1963–1967, Entry UD WW 101, Box 3, Field—Far East (Viet Nam) 1966 July, August)