File No. 812.00/23445.
The Secretary of State to the Special Commissioners.
Washington, May 27, 1914.
The President directs me to say:
“We are seriously disappointed by the character of the proposals outlined in your dispatch of the 26th. We have reason to believe that the acceptance by Huerta of such a plan as that proposed could have been secured by this Government some months ago.
“The most serious and pressing question with regard to any plan, the question by which it must, whatever our preference, be tested, is this: Who would put it into operation if the victorious party refused to accept it? We are of necessity seeking a solution which is practicable as well as just, and likely to yield the results we have all along had in mind. Our object is the pacification of Mexico by reforms and changes instituted by her own leaders and [Page 510] accepted by her own people. A provisional arrangement established by force, especially if established by the force of the United States, would inevitably be temporary and the prelude to other revolutions. Certain things are clearly inevitable in Mexico as things now stand, whether we act or not. One of these is the elimination of Huerta. Another is resistance, and successful resistance, to any arrangement which can be made to seem to be a continuation of the Huerta régime.
“It would, in our judgment, be futile to set up a provisional authority which would be neutral. It must, to be successful, be actually, avowedly and sincerely in favor of the necessary agrarian and political reforms, and it must be pledged to their immediate formulation, not merely ‘requested to devote special attention’ to them.
“And it will be impossible for the United States to withdraw her hand until this Government is finally and fully satisfied that the programme contemplated will be carried out in all respects.
“We are putting these conclusions bluntly, not in the form, of course, in which we wish you to present them to the Mediators, but flatly for the sake of clearness.
“The case lies in our mind thus: the success of the Constitutionalists is now inevitable. The only question we can now answer without armed intervention on the part of the United States is this: Can t!>3 result be moderated; how can it be brought about without further bloodshed; what provisional arrangement can be made which will temper the whole process and lead to the elections in a way that will be hopeful of peace and permanent accommodation? If we do not successfully answer these questions, then the settlement must come by arms, either ours or those of the Constitutionalists.
“Every plan suggested must, therefore, of necessity be subjected to the test of these questions. We will not make war on the Mexican people to force upon them a plan of our own based upon a futile effort to give a defeated party equality with a victorious party. The whole present hopeful effort for peace would fall to pieces were we to attempt it.
“Confidentially we suggest that the Mexican representatives, being Científicos, are making a last desperate attempt to save their privileges from the reforms which the Carrancistas would certainly insist on. It is too late to save that régime. If we went in our ourselves we would not try to save it. It seems plain to us that their real interest lies in as early a settlement as possible and at our hands rather than at the hands of Carranza. Delay is likely to be fatal to them. It may be worth considering whether Huerta’s pride might be saved by resigning in favor of his present Foreign Minister and letting him do the rest.”