No. 30.
Mr. Kasson
to Mr. Evarts.
Vienna, May 19, 1878. (Received June 3.)
Sir: Count Schouvaloff yesterday left St. Petersburg for London. As the diplomatic pulse at Vienna responds quickly to the Oriental pulsations of the northern courts, I availed myself of the opportunity of a dinner at one of the embassies yesterday, at which were two or three officials of the foreign office, to ascertain the fact that the count’s object had been gained, and that he was returning to London feeling that his mission had been successful. The hopes of a congress and of peace are [Page 40] therefore strengthened. Still the most complete ignorance exists of the points which form the basis of the expected adjustment. But the assurance is everywhere felt that if, in anyway, England is satisfied, European peace will not be further disturbed.
If it were not for the energy displayed by the Russians in preparing to add to their navy the vessels they appear to be buying in American ports, I should still consider the chances of war and peace about equally balanced. But the unquestionably justifiable apprehensions in England of a serious loss of the Atlantic commerce in the event of war, and the consequent disturbance of their great manufacturing industries, have converted the warlike demonstrations of Russia upon our coasts into effective movements toward peace. This influence has been aided by the serious discontent of the laboring classes, breaking out recently into destructive tumults, which are but a foretaste of occurrences to be expected if Russian naval operations should abridge the already diminished demands upon their factories. So, at this moment, the chances for peace preponderate, but with a still uncertain balance. I have more than once advised you of the interest manifested here in the possible facilities afforded along our coasts for naval aid to Russians in case of war between them and England. Since I began to write upon that subject it has been largely discussed in the English press. This discussion itself has practically helped the cause of peace, by indicating to England her vulnerable heel, which all her mailed ships cannot cover from the attacks of flying cruisers. A few days since the British ambassador made me a long call and turned the conversation into inquiries on the subject of our neutrality laws, whose complete stringency I explained to him. At the same time I did not conceal from him the difficulty of enforcing them along 5,000 miles of coast, where in many cases all the evidences would go to sea with the violators of the law, leaving the most energetic prosecutors helpless.
I beg leave now to bring to your attention, if not already anticipated by your own examination, another point, arising from the sixth article of the “Alabama” treaty. Its importance has been suggested to me by the anxious assertions of the London journals of their confidence in our fidelity to the three rules established by the Washington treaty of 1871. These rules are at first only declared applicable to the particular cases pending in arbitration. Then follows this clause: “And the high contracting parties agree to observe these rules as between themselves in future, and to bring them to the knowledge of other maritime powers, and to invite them to accede to them.”
If I am not wrongly informed, the United States Government has repeatedly urged the English Government to comply with the second branch of this engagement, but without result. The records under your hand will determine the fact. This engagement is absolutely mutual and entire. If England has refused, or neglected after demand, to execute a part of it which devolved on her, how much obligation remains imposed on our government to execute another part on the demand of England? The clauses behind the comma are as much a part of the consideration as that before it; and I am under the impression that the English minister was warned of this construction before Mr. Fish went out of office.
In commenting here on our neutrality laws, and especially on section 5283, I cannot, in the absence of advice from the Department, construe the law prohibiting the purchase or equipment, in our ports, of vessels adapted to war uses as applicable in time of peace. If the literal construction [Page 41] claimed (in one instance by an American journal) were to prevail, our shipbuilding and gun factories must be permanently closed against all purchases by foreign governments except those should be our actual allies in war. For all such vessels and arms are in fact bought “with intent” to be used against a nation with which we are at peace, if and whenever war shall break out between the purchaser and such friendly government, or even against our own. Certainly our law did not intend to stop commerce in military material preparatory to possible or even probable war, so long as the world actually continues in a state of peace. Troubled relations between two governments friendly to us do not banish either of them from our ports, ship-yards, and factories, until such relations have been notified to us to be belligerent, or have notoriously become so.
I have, &c.,