No. 28.
Mr. Kasson
to Mr. Evarts.
Vienna, May 8, 1878. (Received May 22.)
Sir: I am not able to communicate by this mail any decisive advance toward a definitive settlement of the war-breeding questions arising from the treaty of San Stefano. The evidences of an understanding between [Page 37] Austria and Russia, however, appear to be increasing. This government has asked the legislative bodies to provide for the credit of sixty millions granted conditionally to the imperial administration, and of which they now propose to use a considerable part. Ostensibly it concerns the maintenance of a strong corps of observation along the Roumanian frontier, and an “escort” for the protection of Bosnian refugees who are to be repatriated. For a long time this government has supported perhaps 100,000 poor wretches who fled from Bosnia and Herzegovina to points within the imperial frontier, to escape the terrors of the internecine struggle going on between the Christians and Mussulmans of those provinces. The disbursements for that purpose already amount to several millions of florins, and have created so serious a charge upon the treasury that it was resolved to stop the supplies on the first of this month. The refugees were accordingly notified that they must prepare for a return to their homes. Turkey was also notified.
But the former object that the danger continues, and that they are likely to starve if they survive the other personal dangers to which they will be exposed. This government has desired of the Porte provision for their protection; but the demand has not been satisfied. It now appears to be the intention of Austria to escort them as peaceably as possible by a military force into their country, thus assuring them of protection against the dangers threatened by the Mussulmans.
Naturally, this force must remain in that country for this purpose till the questions of local government and protection are settled. Thus “occupation” takes effect, and with what ultimate result is beyond our forecast at this hour. You will readily observe that with some millions charitably expended for Ottoman subjects, and constituting an equitable claim on Turkey; with the plea of defending their own boundaries against a reincursion of refugees, and with the claim to suppress insurrectionary disorders along their frontiers when Turkey fails in the duty of government, the Vienna cabinet have a “case” to which they may hereafter be disposed to apply the maxim of beati possidentes, while they hold as security for various interests the soil on which their muskets are stacked. To all this Russia opposes no objection.
Russia and Turkey: While the movements of Austria appear no longer to cause anxiety at St. Petersburg, new anxieties have been created on the side of Turkey.
The persistence of the British fleet inside of the Dardanelles, together with the threatening behavior of England, put a constraint on the Russians which prevented them from retiring their forces from Turkish territory within the time stipulated by the treaty. So when Russia demands the possession of Schumla, Varna, and Batoum, according to the treaty, the Porte, quite probably inspired by England, yet very properly, answers, “But when are we to have possession of our own territory, and especially of the suburbs of Constantinople, according to the treaty?” It goes without saying that the English saw their own advantage in this phase of the debate. They indicated war; they threatened Gallipoli and the Bosphorus; thus forced Russia to watch them from forbidden ground, and, while that ground is occupied, Russia is placed in the attitude of justifying Turkey in retaining the occupation and control of the three fortresses which are most needed by Russia in case of a war with England, in which Turkey would be the moral if not militant ally of the latter. Especially does Russia require Batoum and Varna. This embarrassment still continues. The insurrectionary troubles along the borders of the new Bulgaria have been exaggerated; still they are sufficient [Page 38] to justify Russian apprehensions for the safety of their military communications in the event of war.
England and Russia: Just at that moment when diplomacy seemed in a dead-lock, and England congratulated herself upon the progress of events which threatened to leave the Russians in a cul de sac at San Stefano and blockaded in the Baltic, the Cimbria, which had secretly passed to the north of the British Islands, and, unobserved, traversed the Atlantic, cast anchor in Southwest Harbor. Never did a transition scene in a theater produce a more startling effect. Never was a chess-player, intent on his own plan of the game, more surprised when his opponent moved a knight to check the king, and at the same time disclosed check to the queen, than were the English, who, while they were gazing with satisfaction upon Constantinople, thus heard the Russians on the other side of the globe cry check to their Atlantic commerce.
I think it is not wrong to ascribe in large part the increasing tendency toward a peaceful solution, which is apparent during the last few days among the English people, and in their press, to this, the most significant movement which Russian diplomacy has made. The diplomatists on both sides are now silent touching their work, which is a sign of more earnest efforts for an adjustment. But the scales appear still to be balancing between war and peace. If England were now to make peace, her government could fairly plead, in justification of their previous warlike demonstrations, that they had gained three essential advantage: first, they have distracted attention from the victories of Russia, which were calculated to establish for her an immense prestige in the East, and have attracted the eyes of both Asia and Europe to England instead; second, they have won for England a considerable moral prestige before the world as a regulating power, and have proved that she possessed still the courage to strike in her quality of “great power”; third, they will have secured important modifications of the San Stefano preliminaries in a sense adverse to Russian interests. The extent of these modifications, and of material advantages secured to England, will only be known when the result of Count Schouvaloff’s present visit to St. Petersburg shall be known.
I have, &c.,