No. 99.
Mr. Washburne to Mr. Evarts.
Paris, June 29, 1877. (Received July 11.)
Sir: After two months of steady, careful, and in some respects very wonderful preparations, for the persistent inundation of the Danube had compelled them to resort to extraordinary engineering work, the Russians have crossed that great stream. The event, as you have been apprised, took place on the 22d instant in the vicinity of Ibraïla, and was immediately followed by the capture of Matchin and Hersova, on the Turkish side. A Russian corps has now boldly penetrated in the swamps of the Dobrutcha; hostilities are open on the whole line of the Danube, from Widdin to Galatz, and another and more important crossing of the river is hourly expected. From this moment only it can be said that active operations have begun against European Turkey, and the calm observer can easily foresee how, and even when, the struggle will end, if there be no interference in the action of the contending parties.
But this can hardly be expected. Without speaking of Great Britain whose interests are so deeply involved in the Eastern crisis, and of Germany, whose policy is unknown to every one, except, perhaps, to a few of her own statesmen, there is at least one continental power which cannot look with indifference on the progress of Russian arms, and remain a passive spectator of even a partial dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire: it is Austria, whose action is now closely watched by every diplomatist.
As soon as it was known in Vienna that the Russians had successfully crossed the Danube, dispositions were taken to mobilize part of the Austrian troops and to concentrate two army corps in Croatia and Dalmatia.
It is evident that these preparations are made in view of an occupation, in certain contingencies, of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it is not at all clear whether this move is to be directed against Russia or against Turkey.
The position of the Austro-Hungarian Empire is peculiar. The elements of which that double-headed monarchy is composed are so widely different in race, language, tendencies, and the moral and material interests of its two great divisions are so often antagonistic, that the [Page 153] possible consequences of the Eastern war are viewed very differently in Austria and Hungary.
At Vienna it seems that there is no inclination whatever to come to the assistance of the Turks, but a perfect readiness to annex a part of their Christian territory should an opportunity offer.
These disposition can be explained, not only by the kind and friendly personal relations existing between the Emperor Francis Joseph and the Czar, but also on serious political grounds.
Ever since the policy of Prince Bismarck has succeeded in almost excluding Austria from Germany, the German subjects of the house of Hapsburg have lost the supreme influence they previously enjoyed, and the Hungarians have managed to appropriate so much of this influence that they can be considered as weighing somewhat heavily in the direction of affairs, if not virtually ruling the empire. The other populations have resisted this pressure, but always unsuccessfully, and in order to provide a counterpoise to the increasing influence of the Magyars, they would welcome any accession of territory which might give to their action increased authority and power. The center of this movement is at Vienna, where very little, if any, sympathy is felt for the Turks, and where the Russians would find a ready support should they be inclined to give to Austria a share in the spoils of the Ottoman Empire.
At Pesth, on the contrary, the Turks have nothing but warm friends, and no scheme tending to any diminution of their dominions can secure the consent of the Magyars. They oppose equally the project of annexing any of the Turkish provinces, and the plan of erecting them into independent states, or their incorporation in the Russian Empire. It must not be forgotten, in connection with these sentiments, that the Turks have always been friendly to the Magyars; that they have often in past times come to their assistance; and that the Russians, on the contrary, have helped Austria to put them down when they endeavored to recover their independence.
In presence of such conflicting tendencies in the governing classes of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, any attempt to predict on which side the government will lean at last, would be presumptuous. The prime minister, Count Andrassy, although a Hungarian himself, is charged by his compatriots with deserting their cause in order to court the Emperor Francis Joseph, who is known to be personally favorable to the views of Prince Gortchakoff; but this charge rests on very slight grounds, and no action of his has yet shown that he intends to favor the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire; many minor facts tend to the opposite conclusion. Be this as it may, it is certain that Austria is preparing to interfere in the war, and this step, if it is taken, will be, in my judgment, the first one in a direction involving a general European war.
Another important fact pointing to the same conclusion is the very unsatisfactory tone, in the light of British interests and prejudices, of Prince Gortehak off’s reply to the note Lord Derby addressed last month to Count Schouvaloff, when he was about to proceed to St. Petersburg on a short leave of absence. Lord Derby had seized that opportunity to place before the Russian ambassador some considerations of importance to the future good understanding between Great Britain and Russia. The reply made by Prince Gortchakoff, though fair, courteous, and inspired apparently by the desire of conciliating England and of dispelling her suspicions, is couched in terms of vague generalities, the effect of which has been to increase the feeling of alarm. For instance, the prince, who had before professed that Russia was acting in behalf of the Christian powers, speaks now of the “particular interest which she has at [Page 154] stake in the war,” and avoids to meet the plain declaration of Lord Derby that Constantinople must not and shall not “pass into other hands,” and that the treaty arrangements by which foreign ships are excluded from the Turkish straits are not to be materially altered. It is true the prince gives full satisfaction to England in respect to the exemption of the canal of Suez and of the Egyptian soil from any attacks, but such declarations are of minor importance to the British Government. The essence of the Eastern question concerns the Bosphorus and Constantinople.
It is not my province to dwell on this Russian dispatch, and on the effect it has produced in England. I only mention it to show that its language warrants the precautions England, like Austria, is about to take, and the apprehensions I entertain of seeing a general war succeed the local struggle now carried on between Russia and Turkey alone.
The fear that France may be drawn into that war, should it break out, is not unnatural, and many persons here of sound judgment feel quite uneasy in this respect. * * * *
I observe with surprise that for some time public opinion in France has been undergoing a somewhat curious change in relation to the Eastern crisis. When the war first broke out there was a strong feeling in favor of Russia, and the government itself, without departing, however, from its neutrality, had shown marked signs of sympathy in the same direction. This disposition has gradually changed within the last few months. Now the French foreign office seems to share more particularly the views of England and of Hungary, and public opinion has turned a little in favor of the Turks. One of the most conspicuous signs of this evolution is the change of tone of the République Française, the leading republican journal, which was a few months ago philo-Russian, and which is now nearly as strongly philo Turk as the Journal des Débats. Mr. Thiers, who has been all his life a warm advocate of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, is probably not a stranger to this change. In an interview I had with him several months ago, I was very much struck with the favorable tone which he held toward Turkey. I do not think, however, that it can run to an extent which might threaten the peace of France, but it certainly increases the moral difficulties which Russia has to contend with, and it gives countenance to those who still believe that it is the policy of Europe, as well as the interest of civilization, to uphold against young and progressive Russia the decayed and bankrupt government of the sons of Ottoman.
I have, &c.,