No. 98.
Mr. Washburne to Mr. Evarts.
Paris, May 4, 1877. (Received May 17.)
Sir: I arrived at Paris on the very day of the reopening of the two chambers, after a recess of one month. The event was looked forward to with some curiosity, if not with anxiety, for it was known that the Duke Decazes would make an important declaration in regard to the policy of France during the diplomatic campaign which preceded the war which has just broken out, and defining its attitude until peace should be restored.
The declaration was frank and straightforward, and was frequently interrupted by applause. “We are free from all engagements,” said the minister. “Six months ago we were anxious for peace both for Europe and for ourselves; to-day we are anxious to preserve it for ourselves.”
“We are enabled,” he added, “to inform you that our relations with foreign states have never been on a better footing than to-day. Nothing in the language of neighboring states,” he continued, “allows any doubt to exist either as regards their peaceful sentiments or the value they attach to strengthening the bonds of amity between themselves and the Government of the French Republic.” It was noticed that the Duke was very emphatic in pronouncing the words, “Government of the French Republic.”
This declaration, important and satisfactory as it is to the French people, took no one by surprise, for the policy of peace and the strict neutrality of France is essential to her future interests. But some surprise was created upon reading the closing dispatch of the diplomatic correspondence which the Duke Decazes presented to both houses at the same time he made his declaration. This dispatch is very recent, its date being the 25th of April. It is in the shape of a circular addressed to all the diplomatic agents of France for the purpose of reminding them of the order of ideas in which the French Government has acted in the recent conflicts, as well as the attitude it proposes to assume.
After remarking that the good offices of France, as well as those of the other European cabinets, had been appealed to by both Turkey and Russia, in view of finding a means of conciliation between the Porte and its Christian population, the minister states that, “though the difficulties [Page 149] of reaching a mode of settlement were numerous, the cabinets thought they had reached the end of their patient efforts when they signed the protocol of the 31st of March. But the advisers of the Sultan declined that compromise which provided for Turkey an honorable means of pacifically solving the difficulties in the midst of which she was struggling.” The minister then goes on to show, in a clear and peremptory argument, that, after the conference of Constantinople, Turkey had stated that she was in accord with the European plenipotentiaries on all the points except two; that she had herself intimated that further deliberation would remove all obstacles to a complete understanding; that the London protocol was calculated to realize that desire, and that, nevertheless, “a contrary interpretation prevailed at Constantinople and precipitated the extreme resolutions which have just closed the road of diplomatic action in the sense in which it has been exercised during two years.”
You can see, therefore, that the French foreign minister throws upon Turkey the whole burden of responsibility for the present war. This language was unexpected. It indicates surely a modification in the traditional policy of France in regard to Turkey, which she has always sustained, particularly against Russia. There are good reasons to believe that the Government of Constantinople was made aware beforehand of these sentiments, and that the action it took recently was governed by this change.
You have doubtless been made aware, before this time, that on the very day when Russia declared war against Turkey (April 24) the Porte applied to the powers, parties to the treaty of Paris, for a mediation, based on article 8 of that treaty, which provides that, in case of difficulty between Turkey and any one of those powers, the others would endeavor to prevent further trouble by friendly intervention. In making this application, the Porte intimated that this new action of the powers could be based upon the protocol of London, which she had just declined to even take into consideration. This unexpected concession was hardly made known when the Porte came forward again and declared that the accepted the protocol. Of course it was too late. War had been declared by Russia, which had put her troops into motion, and could entertain no such proposition coming at such a time. If my information is correct, this proposition has not been pressed upon Russia by the powers, who very well understood that it could have no chance of success. France, at least, only consented to transmit it without any kind of indorsement. This sudden and rather strange step of Turkey, taken at the last moment, and after she had treated Europe with something very like bullying in the conference, scorned all her advices, and assumed an attitude in defiance of her wishes, has given rise to the suspicion that Turkey is now ready to go as far in the way of concession as she before went in declining all intervention.
However this may be, it is certain that Turkey has developed an unexpected weakness on the Danube, where Europe had every reason to believe she was strong. In fact, she holds all that portion of this great stream which flows through her dominions. On the Bulgarian side she has many fortified points, and was supposed to have a rather large army. The Roumanian side is defenseless; and the troops of this principality had evacuated the only place where they could have made any show of resistance, if they intended it. Turkey also commands the river, and has plying upon it a number of gunboats, of which a great deal was said when they were built. With all these facilities she has not landed a soldier on the left bank of the Danube. She has allowed Russia to [Page 150] come down unresisted from Jassy to Galatz, to take possession of a railway bridge at Barboche, of the first importance, which everybody believed Hobart Pasha’s gunboats would destroy, and to plant there batteries which we hear now are in full operation. This is certainly a bad beginning.
Opinions are widely divided here in regard to the great issues involved in the war. The antiquated doctrine of the necessity of maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire for the sake of the equilibrium of Europe, though much shaken by the events consequent upon the war of 1870, is still upheld by many, and such an enlightened paper as the Journal des Débats expounds it now every day. It is always difficult to depart from the traditional policy of a country, and the French people have not yet fully realized that what was called in the old diplomatic school of Europe the “balance of power” has lost its former signification, and that the conditions of the modern civilized world require a broader policy, resting less on the supposed interests of the governments than on those of the populations.
These views, however, are now making their way, and I am inclined to believe that they have already influenced the majority in favor of Russia. The Russians are very popular in France and in Paris; I may say that they share with the Americans the privilege of being the favorites of French society, particularly in the higher classes. Besides this social tendency, there is an unavowed political reason which works strongly in favor of the Czar; it is that every increase of the power and influence of Russia will tend to reduce proportionally the power and influence of Germany. In official circles it is evident that this sentiment prevails. I have no doubt it would prevail all through France if the force of events had not made Russia the principal agent of repeated assaults on the treaty of Paris, which France considers her own work, though it was the result of a policy pursued entirely for the personal benefit of the Emperor Napoleon, and from which France derived no special advantage.
I add to this dispatch a printed translation of both the declaration of the Duke Decazes and of his circular of April 25. I send you, also, the Livre Jaune, embracing the diplomatic correspondence of the French Government in relation to the Eastern conflict from 1875 to 1877. It is a bulky volume, containing more interesting and valuable documents than it has been the habit of the French foreign office to publish in this shape.
I have, &c.,