196. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
US:
- The Secretary
- Dennis B. Ross (Notetaker)
USSR:
- Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh
- P. Palazhenko (Notetaker)
[Omitted here are discussions not related to START.]
Baker: Well, should we go to arms control now. I’d like us to get back to the Houston agreement. Should we have Reggie and Obukhov come in and report to us where they are.
Bessmertnykh: You have introduced some new elements that were not in Houston.
Baker: We worry that if things come apart in the Soviet Union, we will lose START. Therefore, my feeling is let’s get this done before the political environment changes so that either it becomes difficult for you to conclude it or for us to ratify. So why don’t we try to do this before February 11 whether there’s a Summit or not.
Bessmertnykh: I agree totally, let’s get it done. Don’t overstate the difficulties in START and the Summit postponement.
Baker: How should we deal with signing START?
Bessmertnykh: Well, we could have the meeting, it doesn’t have to be a full-fledged summit, we could have the leaders sign it there.
[Omitted here is discussion not related to START.]
Baker: I think it is a good idea to have Reggie and Obukhov tell us where they are. Whether there is a difference, or whether we’re back at Houston or not, let’s hear it.
Bessmertnykh: I’ve got some ideas on B–1 and B–2 which I will present tomorrow. So let’s hear a summary.
Bartholomew: Let me give you my script that’s really based on the letter the Secretary sent to Eduard Shevardnadze2 and his response.3 Based on that, we don’t have closure on the B–2 question at this point. I’ll tell you what I’ve told Obukov that we’ve been ready to go beyond [Page 983] Houston and not withstanding the previous exchanges and undertake not to deplore a nuclear ALCM and the bomber without a flight test with the ALCM on the bomber first. But we’re not quite there. In addition, we’d be prepared to ensure that any non-nuclear ALCM tested on a B–1, B–2, would have to be distinguished from the nuclear ALCM. On the B–1 we have the Houston solution. The B–1 is not equipped now for nuclear ALCMs, and steps which we’re taking show that it is not so equipped. The Soviet side wanted to make changes in the aircraft to ensure they would be technically incapable of carrying such weapons. We’re not prepared to do that but I did point out that, we’re prepared to provide a statement that explains how long it would take to convert the aircraft to become an aircraft capable of carrying nuclear ALCMs and in fact where such a process would be done. We would read that statement into the negotiating record and we would point out what it would take in terms of adding the pylons, the bulkhead, the changes that would have to be made, and that this could only be done at certain repair facilities. We should point out that this is not the kind of procedure that could be done quickly and easily. It would have to be done in a way that is actually somewhat difficult to do and would take some time to do. The plans will have to be developed and I can tell you to convert 20 aircraft to become a nuclear ALCM carrier would take well over a year. So that’s where we left the issue.
On PPCMs, we had a couple of exchanges, and I’ve explained how the Midgetman would fit into the process that we’ve discussed. We don’t have closure based on, at this point unfortunately, on our big move at Houston on PPCM. There are two other issues that have a somewhat different status. One is the new types definition, which is to say when you determine the missile is a new type. We agree on the 10% rule, but we have not agreed on the question on throwweight. We have a difference on throwweight. We’ve also made an effort on downloading and we’ve tried to develop a new position given the problems with the SS–N–18. If we would allow the Soviets to drop their warheads on SS–N–18s from the number of seven to three provided we at the same time would be dropping our warheads on Minuteman from three to one. But I gather this has not been particularly well received.
Baker: For the purposes of organizing our work let me just ask what will be required to get us back to Houston? This after all is the commitment that was made and then confirmed in writing and I just want to see what are the essence of the problems. What do we need, in other words, Reggie?
Bartholomew: Well, on B–2s that there be an agreement that there be no exhibit of the aircraft. On the B–1 and the B–2, we have these outstanding issues that I described above and then we have the PPCM issue.
[Page 984]Obukhov: Well, the only issue there is that of the Midgetman and the Shevardnadze letter mentioned that specific point.
Burt: The Soviets say the downloading issue was agreed to at Houston.
Bartholomew: On downloading, we introduced a new element that we thought would make it simpler.
Obukhov: We offered some reassurances on the question of downloading which were embodied in the Shevardnadze letter of December 30th4 and January 12th.
Bartholomew: We hadn’t agreed to anything in Houston. We certainly didn’t agree to anything formally. We raised the question of being willing to look at certain assurances and we received some of the assurances in the letter, but this was never resolved formally.
Baker: When we were in Houston, we wrote out the deal that Obukhov had outlined to us and that was confirmed in the letter.
Bartholomew: Mr. Secretary, you said that going to 73 on the SS-N-18 would be a problem for us and you asked what assurances would they provide to deal with our concerns.
Obukhov: But the answer was laied out very thoroughly in the December 30th letter.
Burt: But as I said at the time I didn’t know and wasn’t certain that letter would in fact be sufficient to meet our concerns.
Obukhov: But now the US position is really a new position. And we’re getting a new position on new types and also a new position on downloading.
Bessmertnykh: What worries us is that a clarification is now exploding into a major technical problem.
Obukhov: I tried to understand what was behind the US position on throwaways and Brooks then made a presentation to us on that.
Baker: Let me ask this. Can we start with Houston, the record of Houston and the letter after it and take each of these issues one by one and see if we can get back to what we each thought was the basis of the agreement.
Bartholomew: Well, for the past five days we’ve tried to do this.
Bessmertnykh: I think we might make it easier for them if we can identify the unsolved areas—I think there are three or four areas—how would you summarize them.
Bartholomew: Well, they are bombers, PPC, downloading and new types.
[Page 985]Bessmertnykh: Now things aren’t settled on any of these?
Burt: Well, we still have the problem on data denial.
Bessmertnykh: Haven’t we suggested a reasonable way out?
Baker: Let me just interject and say we’ve been working on this treaty for eight years. We don’t know what the political situation is going to be or what could happen in the Soviet Union and I hope that it stays on the reform process. But let me just say it will be too bad to lose a START treaty when we’ve got 98% of it done. That would represent a failure on both sides. I think we have to find a way to conclude this treaty whether we have a Summit or we don’t.
Bartholomew: Unless the Soviet side has something on the bomber issues that takes us back to Houston, I don’t know where we go from here. We can grind on, but I think we’re really going to be stuck.
Baker: The Minister has said that he has ideas on the bombers, and we’ll hear them tomorrow. But I worry about losing START. I think it will be a real tragedy for both of us. I worry about what the atmosphere here in the United States, given what’s going on in CFE and what’s that likely to lead to. I want to be frank with you and lay all of our cards on the table. On CFE I’ve got to tell you we have problems on data discrepancy. But the really big problem we have is on the naval infantry. What you’ve said on the naval infantry amounts to adding three divisions. No country raised this at any time during the negotiations. It’s not on the record, it’s just not there. The data discrepancy problem is also there and it creates a problem of trust. Now, I think the military is playing some games and our military is saying if that’s the case, why should we have a treaty. And I don’t know what the procedure is going to be for handling this, but I know it’s going to have to be handled.
[Omitted here is discussion not related to START.]
- Source: Department of State, Office of the Executive Secretariat, Lot 96D277, Baker Subject Files 1990–1994, No Folder Title. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in Secretary Baker’s office at the Department of State. The full memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1989–1992, vol. III, Soviet Union, Russia, and Post-Soviet States: High-Level Contacts.↩
- See Document 185.↩
- See Document 190.↩
- See Document 183.↩