185. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union1
SUBJECT
- START Letter to Shevardnadze
1. Secret, Entire Text.
2. Please deliver ASAP the letter in para 3 below to Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. It responds to Minister Shevardnadze’s letter of December 30, 1990 to Secretary Baker.2 There will be no signed original.
3. January 4, 1991
Dear Eduard,
– I have studied your letter of December 30 on the START package, and note that in the main it confirms the package you and I discussed in Houston and I outlined in my letter of December 14.3
– However, I must tell you as clearly as I can that certain substantive positions put forth by the Soviet side in Geneva are inconsistent with what was discussed by you and me in Houston and confirmed in our exchange of letters, cannot be the basis for a START agreement, and will block efforts to complete START by the time of the summit.
– Your letter of December 30 states that you have reviewed my letter of December 14, which laid out in detail the elements of the package, and your letter goes on to say that you consider as definitively agreed the PPCM and heavy bomber issues as we discussed in Houston and Washington. But the Soviet positions tabled in Geneva do not reflect your confirmation of the Houston solution on these issues.
– On the B–1, you and I discussed a specific set of measures that would give the Soviet side confidence that B–1 aircraft are not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. But the Soviet delegation in Geneva has gone beyond that to propose additional measures that are designed to make it technically not feasible to modify the B–1 to carry long-range nuclear ALCMs. This we cannot do.
○ Specifically, what you and I discussed in Houston on the B–1 was: the bomb bay bulkhead will not permit long-range nuclear ALCMs to be loaded, the ALCM pylon attachment points will be covered (except [Page 958] for two), and unique equipment for reconfiguring the B–1 bomb bay bulkhead and for loading long-range nuclear ALCM pylons on a B–1 will not be located at airbases for B–1 heavy bombers not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
○ The Soviet position in Geneva calls for additional changes to the B-1, including elimination of attachment points for moving the bomb bay bulkhead, and elimination of ALCM pylon attachment points (except for two). This is not a practical approach. We need to go back to the Houston solution.
– On the B–2, the situation is simpler because that aircraft has not been tested with long-range nuclear ALCMs. That fact provides confidence that this aircraft is not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. But the Soviet delegation in Geneva continues to press for exhibition of the B-2 in circumstances where it has not been tested with long-range nuclear ALCMs.
○ Specifically, what you and I discussed in Houston on
– the B–2 was: a type of heavy bomber which has not been flight tested with long-range nuclear ALCMs will not be subject to exhibition or inspection.
○ The Soviet position in Geneva calls for exhibition of bombers tested with long-range non-nuclear ALCMs. Again, we need to go back to the Houston solution.
– On PPCM, we discussed in Washington a solution in which, in the context of the package, the US would accept the Soviet position that PPCM be established in the Soviet Union at facilities that produce mobile ICBMs and their silo-based variants, and in the US at facilities producing the accountable stages of mobile ICBMs and their silo-based variants, or such assembled missiles. In the context of the overall Houston package and in response to your concerns, I agreed we would no longer press our long-standing proposal for PPCM at solid rocket motor plants.
○ The US currently has no mobile ICBMs. But for purposes of reciprocity we are prepared to retain the existing PPCM at Magna, Utah and establish PFCM at the facility producing the accountable stage of the peacekeeper ICBM. This would give each side two PPCM sites when START enters into force.
○ This was spelled out in my letter, and your subsequent letter described PPCM as definitively agreed.
○ Now the Soviet delegation in Geneva has raised an issue concerning the US small ICBM, which is still a prototype and has not been tested from a mobile launcher. We need to go back to the Houston solution.
– On the definition of new types of ICBMs and SLBMs, your letter states that to take into account our concern the Soviet side would [Page 959] broaden the applicability of the ten percent or more criterion, which I understood to be a confirmation of the ten percent length criterion that you and I discussed in Houston and Washington, and acceptance of all of the elements of the “new types” definition. But the Soviet side in Geneva is proposing to add throw weight to the list of criteria, which we agreed in Washington to set aside because it would lead to the same ambiguities and disputes that such a provision caused in SALT II.
– On data denial, my letter outlined a synthesis discussed and agreed by our experts in Houston, which includes your proposal for a three-year transition period. In my letter, I highlighted certain issues that need to be resolved to complete the treaty, and I look forward to their prompt resolution in Geneva. We also must reach agreement on the question of exemptions.
– On downloading, we said we would analyze the proposal you made in Houston, and these issues can be dealt with in Geneva. We continue to believe that if the SS–N–18 is to count as three rather than seven warheads, this should be dealt with in the context of downloading.
– On heavy ICBM silos, I note that your letter reflects the ideas that you and I discussed in Washington.
– Both sides contributed to the Houston package. For our part, we made difficult decisions on PPCM, on the maximum number of ALCMs on Soviet heavy bombers, on data denial, and on other issues. We recognize that the Soviet Union also made difficult decisions. As a result, following Houston it seemed that START could be completed for the February summit.
– Now Soviet backtracking in Geneva has taken us off the path to completion of START, and so I have to now look to you to conform the Soviet position in Geneva to what was discussed in Houston. In that context, we are prepared to engage in intensive negotiations in Geneva on the remaining issues to complete the START treaty that our leaders want.
– On the question of a meeting between Amb. Obukhov and Amb. Bartholomew, I agree that such a meeting could be useful. However, our experience has been that such meetings are usually more productive when held in close conjunction with a meeting of ministers, as in Houston, and I would prefer to proceed in that context. In any event, the first order of business should be to get the Houston package back on track in Geneva, and I hope you can move toward that end.
Sincerely,
James A. Baker, III
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N910001–0037. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent Immediate for information to NST Geneva. Drafted by Timbie; cleared by Bohlen, and in OSD, JCS, ACDA, CIA, NSC, S/S, and S/S-O; approved by Bartholomew.↩
- See Document 183.↩
- See Document 179.↩