Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

197. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology (Bartholomew) to Secretary of State Baker¹

Washington, January 29, 1991

SUBJECT

• START and CFE for your meeting with Bessmertnykh

At Tab 1 are points for your meeting with Bessmertnykh. They have been reviewed by Rick and the ungroup.

If Bessmertnykh presses, as he indicated yesterday² he might, for inclusion of Midgetman in PPCM from the outset of START, you can begin with the points at Tab 1. That is the most we can clear with the others at this time.

If you get to the point that Bessmertnykh will accept a package including our approach on B–1 and B–2, but only if we agree to include Midgetman in PPCM, you could tell him you will talk to your colleagues and get back to him. You could then take this up with Cheney and Scowcroft.

OSD opposes inclusion of Midgetman from the outset of START because it is not at all clear that Midgetman will actually be deployed, so they are reluctant to accept the trouble of PPCM and other inspection requirements now. About 1995 the test program will be to the point where we have to decide whether to make the Small ICBM a mobile ICBM under the treaty (and therefore subject to PPCM), and OSD wants to put the decision off until then.

Brent has no problem with PPCM of the Small ICBM, nor does JCS.

Tab 1

Paper Prepared in the Department of State³

Washington, January 28, 1991

START

○ In Houston, Minister Shevardnadze and I were able to put together a package that put behind us a number of major START issues.

— Recorded in a letter of December 14 to Minister Shevardnadze.

— He wrote back on December 30 saying the Houston package was basically agreed.

○ Since then, important issues have been reopened. The way to finish START is to go back to the Houston package, and proceed from there to resolve the other issues.

B–2

Houston:

A heavy bomber of a type which has not been flight tested with long-range nuclear ALCMs will not be subject to exhibition or inspection.

Obukhov:

B–2 will not be subject to inspection or exhibition, but this is an exception to a general rule that all bombers are subject to inspection. Politically binding statement: — The US does not intend to equip B–2 for long-range nuclear ALCMs until it is tested with such ALCMs. — Once it is tested with such ALCMs it becomes subject to the START provisions (including inspection provisions) dealing with long-range nuclear ALCM heavy bombers. If the B–2 is flight tested with long-range non-nuclear ALCMs, the parties will agree in the Joint Commission on measures designed to show that it is technically impossible to launch long-range nuclear ALCMs from the B–2.

Points to make:

○ What we talked about in Houston was heavy bombers not tested with long-range nuclear ALCMs would not be subject to inspection or exhibition.

○ B–2 is an example of this rule, not an exception. In fact, today the only heavy bomber type in this category is the B–2. But we want the same rule for future bombers.

○ Without testing with long-range nuclear ALCMs, we would not equip a bomber type for them. The absence of testing with long-range nuclear ALCMs gives you the assurance you need.

○ We can make the points in your proposed statement if that is helpful to you.

○ On your proposal for what happens if B–2 is tested with non-nuclear ALCMs, we cannot agree that would trigger measures to show that it is technically impossible to launch nuclear ALCMs. But let me emphasize that no prudent person would assume that a system as complex as B–2 could launch one missile based on tests with an entirely different missile.

○ If it would help you, we could state that in the event B–2 is tested with a new non-nuclear long-range ALCM that had not been exhibited, we would give prior notification and prior exhibition of the non-nuclear ALCM. That way you could confirm that the missile was indeed non-nuclear.

○ If ambiguities should arise over any provision of the treaty, they can be taken up in the Joint Commission.

B–1

Houston:

The B–1 bomb bay bulkhead is configured so as not to permit long-range nuclear ALCMs to be loaded. The ALCM pylon attachment joints will be covered (except for two that serve as jacking points for the aircraft). Unique equipment for reconfiguring the B–1 bomb bay bulkhead and for loading long-range nuclear ALCM pylons on a B–1 will not be located at airbases for B–1 heavy bombers not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

Obukhov:

Wants confidence that there will not be rapid and massive conversion of B–1s to ALCM carriers. Wants the necessary work to be time-consuming and done at a factory or repair facility. (We privately offered information on the time it would take to reverse the Houston measures (perhaps 13 days of work per aircraft) and where we would plan for it to be done (at a repair facility), if Obukhov would close the issue on that basis.)

Points to make:

○ Amb. Obukhov sought assurances that the solution we worked out in Houston would not permit rapid and massive conversion of B-1s to ALCM carriers.

○ Amb. Bartholomew has offered some information on how long conversion would take and where it would be done, if this would close this issue once and for all.

○ (If he asks for it formally, i.e. in a letter or binding statement:) That’s too formal for something this detailed and operational. But we are willing to read it into the negotiating record.

PPCM

Houston:

PPCM will be established in the Soviet Union at facilities that produce mobile ICBMs (and their silo-based variants), and in the US at facilities that produce the accountable stages of mobile ICBMs (and their silo-based variants), or such assembled missiles. This translates into Pavlograd and Votkinsk in the USSR, and (because we have agreed to treat Peacekeeper as a mobile ICBM) Promontory, Utah. For reciprocity, we accept a second site in the US, but the location was not discussed in Houston. (Our proposal is to continue the INF site in Magna, Utah.)

Obukhov:

In Geneva, the Soviets assert the second US site should cover the Small ICBM from the beginning of the treaty, based the position in Shevardnadze’s pre-Houston letter. Obukhov, however, has only asked privately when in the development cycle the Small ICBM would become subject to PPCM. (I explained to him that the Small ICBM would be included in PPCM if we decide to make it a mobile missile, once it reached certain milestones that are years away.)

Points to make:

○ When we agreed to permit mobile ICBMs, that depended on working out an effective verification scheme. Then I made a big move in Houston, accepting PPCM at assembly facilities rather that solid rocket motor plants.

○ We have also agreed that each side should have 2 PPCM sites when START enters into force, even though we do not have any mobile ICBMs.

○ (If he asks about Midgetman:) The treaty specifies the point in the development process when a new missile becomes subject to PPCM. When the Small ICBM gets to that point, we will proceed the way the treaty requires. This means that if we decide to make the Small ICBM a mobile missile, it will become subject to PPCM.

Downloading and the SS–N–18

Houston:	The Soviets proposed to change the attribution of the SS–N–18 from 7 warheads to 3, and would draft a letter of assurances and clarifications on the SS–N–18. The US proposed to include the SS–N–18 in the provisions for downloading. The Soviets proposed to download 2 types of existing missiles, up to 5 RVs per missile, and up to a total of 1250 RVs (this would not include the SS–N–18). The US said downloading should be dealt with in Geneva.
Obukhov:	The assurances in the Shevardnadze Dec. 30 letter solve the SS–N–18 question. The change from 7 warheads to 3 should not be part of downloading. Obukhov claims (incorrectly) that the Soviet downloading proposal (2 types, 1250 RVs, etc.) was part of the agreed Houston package. (Obukhov also says our new, tougher position on downloading and the SS–N–18 has had a bad effect on his people.)
US position:	Ban downloading, with exceptions only for the SS–N–18 for the Soviets and the Minuteman III for the US. (This was worked out in Brent’s office last week.)

Points to make:

○ At the 1987 Washington summit, agreement was reached on numbers to be attributed to all existing missiles—including 7 for the SS–N–18.

○ This was recorded in the joint statement issued by our leaders. Subsequent negotiations have been on that basis.

○ Now we are surprised you want a different number. We are prepared to do that—we can lower the SS–N–18 from 7 to 3, and lower the US Minuteman III from 3 to 1. That is an equitable arrangement. (It would allow both sides to download about the same number of warheads.)

○ We have taken a hard look at downloading, and concluded that what we could accept at this time is an exception for one system on each side.

New types definition

Houston:	Soviets proposed a 5% length criterion and a 10% throw weight criterion. US proposed a 10% length criterion and no throw weight criterion.
Obukhov:	10% on both length and throw weight.

Points to make:

○ We oppose any throw weight criterion.

○ The Soviet approach would make it too easy to introduce new types. The throw weight could be increased with little or no change to the missile.

○ This would lead to loss of confidence in the warhead limits, because the so-called new types could have different numbers of warheads.

○ It would lead to endless ambiguities and disputes, as we saw in SALT II.

○ If our definition causes you a problem because of some specific missile you plan, you should tell us about that and we can discuss it.

[Omitted here is discussion not related to START.]

1. Source: Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, Lot 03D102, Dennis Ross Files, US Soviet Relations 1991. Secret.
2. See Document 196.
3. Secret.