Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

190. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Baker’s Delegation in Damascus¹

12562/TOSEC 10393.

Washington, January 12, 1991, 2328Z

SUBJECT

• Shev Letter on START

1. Secret—Entire Text

2. In para 5 below is the text of a letter delivered today in Washington from Shev on START, responding to your letter of January 4.² It contains little of substance, saying they are prepared to modify their position on bombers if the US sticks to the Houston package on PPCM. (This probably but not definitely means they can accept our position on B–1 and B–2 if we agree to include Midgetman in PPCM.)

3. The letter pleads again for a meeting between Bartholomew and Obukhov January 17–18, and describes this as the position of the Soviet leadership. It does not propose a place for the meeting. (Obukhov delivered a copy of the letter to Jack Matlock in Moscow this morning and took the opportunity to press Jack for a response ASAP to the Soviet proposal to hold a meeting between Bartholomew and Obukhov in Geneva next week. You recall that several days ago Obukhov told Jack that their preference was to meet in Geneva, but if necessary he is prepared to come to Washington.)

4. I will want to talk to you first thing Monday³ about how to respond. If we decide to go forward. I don’t in any event see how we could be ready before the first of the week after next, i.e. January 21 at the earliest. I understand this is your view as well. I plan no further action until we have talked.

5. January 12, 1991, Moscow

Dear James,

– I consider our continued personal exchanges—through letters and by telephone—on START issues after Houston and Washington to be extremely useful. They help not only focus on and keep in the forefront what matters most—the resolve of our leaders to sign the START treaty at their meeting in Moscow on February 11–13, but also to expeditiously deal with those concerns that are inevitably arising on both sides in Geneva at the level of delegations as the Houston package is being consummated.

– It is certainly encouraging that you share our understanding of the Houston agreements, which was spelled out in my letter dated December 30. Thus, the Houston package has begun to work in all its major aspects, and the task now at hand is that this effort to translate its constituent provisions into a treaty text proceed steadily and at a good pace in all areas, without stalling or exemptions.

– In this connection, I consider your reiteration of the position on heavy ICBM silo launchers that you and I agreed upon in Houston and Washington to be of fundamental importance. You certainly noted that we had tried to take into account to the maximum extent possible your concerns in this matter which I hope is now definitively closed.

– Now, about the interpretive differences that have emerged. One shouldn’t perhaps overdramatize them and still less, attempt to portray them as some connivance against the treaty. This would simply be wrong substantively.

– Apparently, it is something else. As you told me on many occasions yourself during our talks, “the devil is in the details.” And it is exactly the technical details that we are dealing with at this time. Quite complicated details at that.

– As I understood you, the most difficult for the US side is presently that “node” of the Houston package which ties our concern regarding your B–2 and B–1 heavy bombers with the US concern about continuous monitoring.

– We have once again analyzed the approach that our delegation recently presented in Geneva on the heavy bomber issues and we see that some modifications are possible here. Naturally, they will be possible only if the US side sticks to the Houston package with respect to PPCM.

– How to do this technically is another matter, and the Soviet leadership has specifically instructed my Deputy A. Obukhov to discuss this with Mr. Bartholomew. As I wrote to you, A. Obukhov and his team will have the necessary authority to resolve all the START treaty issues which are still outstanding.

– Therefore, James, I continue to believe that this meeting of our deputies cannot be delayed. January 17–18 is all but the latest possible date as it is, considering that the summit meeting has been scheduled for February 11–13.

Awaiting your reply,

Sincerely,

E. Schevardnadze

Bartholomew

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N910001–0231. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Timbie; cleared in S/S and S/S-O; approved by Bartholomew. From January 6 to 14, Baker was traveling in Europe, the Middle East, and Canada to discuss the Persian Gulf crisis.
2. See Document 185.
3. January 14.