183. Letter From Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to Secretary of State Baker1
I have read very carefully your letter dated December 142 and can note with satisfaction that the “Houston package” that was designed by us to achieve mutually acceptable solutions to the principal issues relating to the START Treaty has, by and large, worked out good. This [Page 949] is the assessment of the entire Soviet leadership, personally of Mikhail S. Gorbachev.
Our text of the provisions that constitute the substance of this package and take into account both your letter and the discussions in Houston and Washington is being transmitted to the Soviet delegation in Geneva. We are assuming that, acting on the basis of the tradeoffs in concerns that we have made, our negotiators and yours shall undertake a vigorous effort to work out an agreed Treaty language.
In accordance with the practice that has proved useful it would be advisable that we instruct our Deputies (R. Bartholomew and A. Obukhov) to meet to discuss the details of the technical solutions to the outstanding issues. They could be accompanied by appropriate senior experts.
This would make it possible for the delegations to wrap up all the issues that are still outstanding and prepare the Treaty text and the related documents in their entirety before the end of January. Thus, both sides would have time to go through this landmark agreement over again and without hurry.
As for the meeting at the ministerial level prior to the Moscow summit, I intend to advise you on this matter at a later stage.
Let me now briefly respond to your comments on the “Houston package” that you made during our conversations on December 11–12 in the United States.
First. On the issue of heavy ICBMs, which you raised again during our last meeting in the US, I would like, in addition to the letter of December 6 signed by myself and Defense Minister Yazov, to make the following clarifications. When the Soviet side talks about a conceivable need for building new heavy ICBM silo launchers, it does not mean the possibility of an extensive construction of new silo launchers. What this means is that construction of new silo launchers, within the limits permitted by the START Treaty, could be done only to replace those heavy ICBM silo launchers that have been eliminated under the Protocol on the Conversion or Elimination Procedures. The need for such a replacement could arise, in particular, as a result of an accident at a silo launcher, of a silo launcher destruction resulting from an accident, or when emergency situations of an internal political nature could require a relocation of silo launchers, including heavy ICBM silo launchers, from one part of the country to another. We agree that in the event it becomes necessary to relocate such silo launchers the side that plans to build a new silo launcher would provide relevant information to the other side through the Joint Commission on Compliance and Inspections.
Second. At our meeting in Houston you expressed concern that during the data exchange in Geneva on strategic offensive arms for [Page 950] the START Treaty, the Soviet RSM–50 (SSN–18) SLBM was stated as equipped for three weapons, although it has earlier been stated as having seven weapons.
In order that there be no ambiguities on this matter between the sides, I wish to tell you this.
True, in the Joint Statement adopted in Washington in December, 1987, we indicated that this missile was attributed seven weapons. In actuality, however, we had tested the missile of this type both with a seven-weapon front end and with a three-weapon front end, and the greater number of those missiles (about three quarters of them) have been deployed precisely in a three-weapon configuration. However, following the position of counting the maximum number of RVs with which a particular missile has been tested, we indicated the larger number of weapons for this missile in the Joint Statement.
Subsequently, the missiles with seven weapons were being replaced by the three-weapon missiles. By the time of the data exchange, as of September 1, 1990, we only had those missiles equipped for three weapons. The launch of a RSM–50 SLBM equipped for more than three RVs conducted earlier, in August, 1990, was used, among other things, to destroy the remaining seven-weapon front end. The value of the accountable RSM–50 SLBM throwweight, after re-configuring those SLBMs for a three-weapon front end, has not changed.
Thus, the seven-weapon front ends for the RSM–50 SLBM have been retired and their inventory completely destroyed. I wish to call your special attention to the fact that we have gone even further than the US side proposed in terms of the START Treaty. Namely, we decided to destroy the retired front ends. All presently deployed Soviet RSM–50 SLBMs are equipped for three-weapon front ends of a new design that makes it impossible to place more than three RVs on them. The US side will be able to satisfy itself of it at the time of inspections to verify the numbers of RVs on ballistic missiles.
I would also like to add that the Soviet Union does not produce, nor has any plans to produce, seven-weapon front ends for the RSM–50 SLBMs.
Now, as to the question of downloading of accountable RVs on ballistic missiles of existing types, this matter can be considered agreed upon.
Third. On the question of criteria to be used in defining a new type of an ICBM or an SLBM, we took into account the US concern and have broadened the applicability of the “ten or more per cent” criterion as opposed to our previous position.
[Page 951]Fourth. We consider as definitively agreed the PPCM and the heavy bomber weapons issues, including verification of heavy bombers, as discussed in Houston and Washington.
Fifth. In Houston, we accepted a position, extremely difficult to us both militarily and politically, on temporary stationing of heavy bombers beyond national territories. In this connection, the Soviet side expects the same good will with regard to the remaining mobile and fixed ICBMs issues. As we understood your experts, those issues do not pose any insurmountable obstacles for them.
Six. I would also like to say a few words on telemetry data to which you devoted so much attention in your letter. In Houston and Washington, we reached a sufficiently simple and clear agreement on this very complex technical issue. Namely, both sides agree to maintain for three years their telemetry data transmission practices existing as of the data of the Treaty’s entry into force. Of course, in so doing, they would not use encryption. The procedures for telemetry data transmission from new types of missiles would be subject to agreement in the Joint Commission on Compliance and Inspections. If, after three years the sides fail to agree on a regime of telemetry transmission, each side will have the right to use the other side’s practices. Other technical aspects relating to telemetry data, including those outlined in your letter, will be discussed at the delegations’ level.
In this context, it seems to me that, given the shortage of time, we would do well to try and as much as possible simplify, rather than complicate, the already very cumbersome technical mass of data involved in telemetry. Briefly, we cannot permit that certain purely technical, and not at all of primary importance, aspects of telemetry on which our experts will continue their discussions within the Joint Commission, become an obstacle on the finishing stretch to the START Treaty.
So may I express the hope that the clarifications that I have provided remove some of the questions that you have asked to “plough the still fresh ground” of the Houston package, and that they open the way toward finalizing this package in a treaty form.
Sincerely,
- Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, John A. Gordon Files, Subject Files, OA/ID CF01034–005, START—January 1991 [2]. No classification marking. A typed notation on another copy of the letter indicates that a Soviet Embassy official delivered the letter to Bartholomew on December 31. (Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, Lot 03D102, Dennis Ross Files, US Soviet Relations 1991)↩
- See Document 179.↩
- Printed from an unsigned copy.↩