Foreign Relations of the United States, 1989–1992, Volume XXXI, START I, 1989–1991

195. Memorandum From Arnold Kanter of the National Security Council Staff to Florence Gantt of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, January 25, 1991, 7:47 a.m.

SUBJECT

• START Talks with the Soviets

Florence:

Please give the following message to Brent and Bob. Thanks.

—Arnie²

Brent:

The welcome silence you have heard from our meetings with the Soviets on START has resulted from the absence of any major developments, much less progress.

In more than twenty hours of meetings³ so far this week, we have entertained ourselves with replowing lots of old ground, concentrating on those issues that were “settled” as part of the Houston package and were declared by Shevardnadze to have been “definitively agreed.”

— B–2: The Soviets (led by their bomber general) want to ensure that after a B–2 is flight-tested with a non-nuclear ALCM, it could not be covertly deployed with nuclear ALCMs. They have all kinds of bad ideas about how to do this. We have offered them a couple of statements of fact: (a) we would not deploy nuclear ALCMs on a B–2 until such nuclear ALCMs have been flight-tested on a B–2; and (b) once a B–2 has been flight-tested with nuclear ALCMs, it counts as an ALCM-carrier under START. They haven’t said yes yet to the proffered face-savers.

— B–1: The Soviets (again led by their bomber general) argue that despite all of the measures we have offered to take, the B–1 could quickly and easily be converted to carry nuclear ALCMs. They want a commitment (or treaty obligation) that the B–1 would instead be modified in ways that would require it to take a trip back to the factory before it could carry ALCMs. As above, we have offered them some statements of fact related to how long it would take to convert B–1s into ALCM carriers. As above, they have not seized the opportunity.

— PPCM: The Soviets want to be able to PPCM Midgetman from the outset, despite the fact that it will not qualify as a mobile ICBM under START for several years, if ever. We have told them that we will PPCM Midgetman if and when it is declared to be a “mobile missile” and that meanwhile, we will agree to have two PPCM sites in the US in the interests of numerical reciprocity. The Soviets are thinking this one over.

— new types: The Soviets (led by the military-industrial complex guy) want to make it easy for variants of existing missiles to be treated as “new types” by making changes in throw-weight a criterion. Since we want to make it hard for a missile to be treated as a new type (so that this doesn’t become an easy circumvention route around a restrictive approach to downloading), we have flatly rejected adding throw-weight to the list of criteria. We are simply at an impasse on this issue.

— downloading: With grudging acquiescence from the Navy, we gave the Soviets our relatively tough line on downloading (i.e., ban downloading except for MM III and SS–N–18). Their military-industrial complex guys literally came out of their chairs. Obukov responded with a tone of hurt betrayal. He even had the chutzpah to accuse us of reopening Houston by walking back our “acceptance” of the Soviet approach to downloading. Given our insistence on a tough line on “new types,” our downloading proposal made them doubly unhappy.

Although several ash-and-trash issues are being resolved at the Burt-Nazarkin level (e.g., when to exchange SLCM data, how to treat the modified Soviet bombers that schlep their space shuttle around), there has been no convergence on any of the major remaining issues, including several that we thought had been previously (and repeatedly) resolved. Maybe Obukov will come in this morning with a “here’s the deal” pitch. Maybe there will be a breakthrough when Bessmertnykh arrives. Barring any such developments, however, we are in no danger of completing START any time soon.

At least some of the Soviets really appear committed to wrapping up START, if only to open the way to the summit. But they don’t have the will or the clout to overrule the general staff on the one hand, and the acquisition types on the other. We have made abundantly clear that we are anything but desperate to complete START (and banged on them on CFE just to underscore the point). It is up to the Soviets to get it together. I am skeptical they will be able to.

We meet yet again with our Soviet friends later this morning.

These sessions persuade me that I am paid either far too much or far too little for this job. You can guess which I think it is.

Cheers.

—Arnie⁴

1. Source: George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, National Security Council, John A. Gordon Files, Subject Files, OA/ID CF01034–007, START—January 1991 [4]. Secret. Copied to Hall, Uhl, Gordon, Davis, Kuehne, Rice, Gompert, and Lampley.
2. Printed from a copy bearing Kanter’s typed signature.
3. No memoranda of conversation for these meetings were found.
4. Printed from a copy bearing Kanter’s typed signature.