Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

130. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

Geneva, August 25, 1981, 1336Z

8569. For Secretary from Malone. Subject: LOS Conference Decision on Status of Text and Future Work. Ref: Geneva 8552.²

1. (Secret–entire text)

2. The LOS conference decided in plenary session yesterday on the status of the draft convention and future sessions of the conference. The full text was sent yesterday in Geneva’s 8552. The purpose of this telegram is to analyze that conference decision.

3. As G–77 and Soviet perceptions of the US position became more clear during this session the desire to formalize the text became widespread. The original arrangement we made with Brazil to keep this session of the conference under control began to look uncertain for awhile.³ By the middle of last week the Eastern European, Asians, Latin Americans and African groups had all taken decisions in favor of formalization. It was clear to us that these decisions were taken out of the desire to send a message to Washington rather than from a conviction that US concerns should be summarily dismissed.

4. In the face of these developments, we were able to arrange for a private dialogue last Sunday⁴ with many of the conference leaders to put our position in as favorable a light as possible and to urge that flexibility on their part would create a better atmosphere in Washington for continued active participation next year. As a result of these and other efforts it was possible on Monday⁵ to convert the conference decision reported in reftel 8852 into a document which is in full compliance with our instructions.⁶

5. The conference decision indicates that the text will have a higher status in the future and characterizes it as the “official draft convention” of the conference. Last minute negotiations yesterday with the conference leadership resulted in removing the words “formal text” and this change is widely known at the conference which improves the record from our point of view. The three conditions explaining the status of the text make clear beyond question at the conference that the text has no status different from the previous texts and cannot be used as a launching platform for submitting formal amendments.⁷ Moreover, this decision extends into the next session of the conference.

6. In order to further hold our feet to the fire, the conference decided that its final decision-making sessions would take place in New York for eight weeks beginning 8 March and the conference ordered the Secretary General of the United Nations to arrange for the signature of the final action in Caracas in early September 1982. It is our belief that if negotiations occur next year and we are active participants with a position which is widely perceived to be tough but reasonable, this schedule could be postponed until 1983. This view has been privately conveyed to us by the coordinator of the Group of 77’s Contact Group on Seabed Mining Issues.⁸

7. To the extent there is any perception that the text has a slightly higher status than before, this tends to reinforce the navigational provisions of the treaty in the event the conference ends without a successful result.

8. We will be paying particular attention this week to the working out of the work program for the next session of the conference to insure that we are not faced with difficult or artificial deadlines which could hamper our negotiating leverage if our final decision is to renegotiate the convention.

9. We have consulted with all of our Western allies who agree that the conference decision is an excellent result for fulfilling the collective wishes of the CG–5. Moreover, because the USSR completely mishandled the debate over this conference decision,⁹ the final atmosphere at the conference is that the US and the G–77 managed by working together to develop an approach for the future which left the USSR in a corner, totally isolated from the mainstream of the conference. The Soviet move in the debate was sufficiently mismanaged so that by the end of the day yesterday, they were forced publicly to concede that the Group of 77 did not want to formalize the draft convention despite the strong push of the Eastern European countries to do so. The Soviets persistent efforts to make propaganda points with the G–77 have conclusively backfired to their clear disadvantage.

10. The conference also decided not to extend this session into a fifth week. The session will end on Friday, August 28.

11. On balance, the entire US delegation is quite satisfied with the result.

Helman

1. Source: Reagan Library, Bandow Files, [LOS: June-August 1981 Cables]. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Ratiner; cleared by MacDonald; approved by Malone. Sent to Bandow and Guhin.
2. In telegram 8552 from Geneva, August 24, USUN reported that the Collegium to the General Committee had recommended that the text of the draft convention be revised at the end of the Geneva session; that the revised text no longer be considered informal; that a final intersessional meeting be held in New York from January 18 until February 26, 1982; that a final decisionmaking session be held from March 8 until April 30, 1982, in New York; and that the convention be opened for signature in early September 1982. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810396–0793)
3. In telegram 7865 from Geneva, August 3, USUN outlined a proposal from Brazil wherein the “U.S. would agree now that at the end of this session the President of the Conference would issue a new treaty text incorporating the drafting committee’s changes. The new text would be labeled the ‘draft convention on the Law of the Sea’ and the words ‘informal text’ would be dropped from the title. On issuing the text the President would announce that this new text could be changed or amended only in accordance with the same rule of procedure applicable to earlier texts—the rule of consensus. The new text thus would remain informal. If the U.S. agrees now to this result, Brazil will undertake to ensure a quiet session giving ample time for full discussion of the U.S. areas of concern in an atmosphere free of rhetoric, threats of voting, or other G–77 induced crises.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810463–0846)
4. August 23.
5. August 24.
6. Draft instructions and Haig’s comments are in Document 126.
7. See footnote 3, above.
8. Not further identified.
9. In telegram 8742 from Geneva, August 28, USUN reported that “Soviet position during the session has been unhelpful although in the end they were unable to do any actual damage. They apparently believed the G–77 would decide to turn its back on the U.S. at this session. As a result they publicly supported continued progress on outstanding issues and formalization of the text at this session. Privately they told us they would not create obstacles for the dialogue we sought and would not oppose us on substance. In the final negotiations over formalization of the text they found themselves isolated when the G–77 supported the compromise arrangement worked out with us.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810405–0781)