Attachment
Draft Paper Prepared in the Department of
State4
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE RESUMED
TENTH SESSION OF THE THIRD U.N. CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
(UNCLOS III) AUGUST 1981
I. Background
The Senior Interagency Group on Law of the Sea decided on March 2,
19815to
conduct a policy review that would identify U.S. objectives in the
Law of the Sea (informal text) of September, 1980 to determine its
compatibility with those objectives, and elaborate options for the
achievement of those objectives. The U.S. Delegation to the Tenth
Session of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, which
took place in New York in March and April 1981,6 was instructed to prevent conclusion of
negotiations until the review was completed. Negotiations were not
concluded, but a resumed Tenth Session was scheduled for Geneva in
August 1981.
Several tasks mandated by the Senior Interagency Group have been
largely accomplished. U.S. objectives have been identified, and the
Draft Convention is being measured against them. Information
concerning the negotiability of desired changes in the text gained
at August session will be incorporated into the analyses of the
options for the President. The time-table for the review calls for
the options to be presented for decision in the late fall.
II. Instructions for the August Session
The Delegation should seek to achieve the following at the Resumed
Tenth Session:
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1. Preserve the full range of options for pursuing
U.S. Law of the Sea objectives. The Delegation should
prevent steps from being taken that would make an acceptable treaty
on the Law of the Sea impossible to achieve. In particular, the
Delegation should make every effort to avert formalization or other
prejudicial changes in status of the Draft Convention. The
delegation should oppose changes to the negotiating text that would
unravel it, or other changes running counter to U.S. objectives.
However, specific changes favorable to U.S. interests may be
accepted by the Delegation if they do not adversely affect the
delegation’s overall ability to achieve changes fundamental to U.S.
interests.
In order to preserve options outside the Conference context, the
Delegation should not conduct itself in a manner that could be
perceived as committing the U.S. to a comprehensive Law of the Sea
treaty. The Delegation should continue to indicate that no decision
for or against pursuing such a treaty has been made, but that the
U.S. is committed to rule of law in international affairs.7
2. Obtain the most accurate and complete assessment
possible of the negotiability of improvements, described below,
to provisions of the Draft Convention. To that end, the
Delegation is authorized to undertake detailed and intensive
discussions with foreign delegations and the Conference leadership.
The focus of this process should be on seabed mining provisions. The
negotiability of changes that might be regarded as useful or
necessary to the non-seabeds provisions may be discussed informally
in discrete groups, and when the risk of damaging responses in those
areas is minimal. In the case of navigation issues, which are most
sensitive from a security standpoint, discussions, if any, should
not go beyond the following points:
—the navigation provisions are still under review, and appear at this
stage to be largely satisfactory.8
—(if necessary) We will consult with you bilaterally as the review
progresses after the session.
3. To the extent possible consistent with 1 and 2
above, seek to induce a climate which lends itself to achieving
maximum improvement in the treaty text in further negotiations
at the Conference, should we choose to engage in them.9 The Delegation should
therefore work with U.S. friends and allies and other key Conference
participants. Improvements could include either amendment of current
provisions or their replacement in whole or in part by entirely new
alternatives.
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III. Pursuant to point 2 above, the delegation
should assess the negotiability of improvements in the current text
as identified below:10
A. Committee One (seabeds)
a. Institutional issues:
—guarantee a permanent seat for the United States on the Council and
eliminate any real or perceived imbalance11 in representation
between the United States and the Soviet Union. The latter objective
could be secured by eliminating two designated Soviet Bloc seats on
the Council. Both objectives could be reached under a suitable
system of weighted voting.
—give the United States, alone or with one or two other like-minded
states, the power to block all important operational decisions of
the Authority12 (including
those of a discretionary nature), while reducing the power of other
groups with opposing interests to block decisions we favor;
—subject to the foregoing points, increase the capacity of the
decision-making system for adjusting to changed circumstances;
—strengthen institutional safeguards so that the Authority,13 especially
the Council, Assembly, Legal and Technical Commission, and LOS Tribunal and Seabeds Disputes
Chamber, cannot make decisions detrimental to United States
interests,14 and can not
unilaterally expand or abuse their powers.
—eliminate15 the power of the Review Conference to adopt
amendments that may be brought into force for the United States
without our consent;
—assure16 that an appropriate organ is specified for
every function of the Authority;
—eliminate the possibility that liberation organizations can
participate in treaty organs or obtain benefits from seabed mining
revenues distributed to the Authority, while assuring that entities
with compe
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tences such as
the EC and entities emerging from
the TTPI can participate as
appropriate in treaty organs.17
—explore provisions for the application of appropriate fair labor and
safety standards to seabed mining.18
b. Access issues:19
—guarantee that all bona fide applicants receive seabed mining
contracts;20
—allow penalties to be imposed on seabed miners only after a positive
vote in the Council, which21 we alone or with one or two
like-minded states, could block;
—eliminate provisions that discriminate among seabed miners,
including anti-density and anti-monopoly provisions;
—obtain assurances that the equitable rights of pioneer operators who
have made investments prior to entry into force of the Convention
are fully protected, in conformity with Title II of P.L.
96–283;22
—eliminate any implicit moratorium on non-nodule development;
—reduce the production charge on gross revenues from seabed mining to
allow or increase profitability of seabed mining.
c. Commodity policy issues:
—eliminate production limitations on seabed mining, and explore, if
appropriate, an anti-subsidy provision;
—add a provision declaring that the overriding goal of the Authority
is to encourage the development of seabed mineral resources;
—constrain Authority participation in commodity agreements by
unambiguously requiring the concurrence of all major consumers and
producers, including the U.S., and limiting Authority representation
to Enterprise production;
—assure that temporary compensation for developing country land-based
producers of seabed minerals does not become a permanent
subsidy.
d. Technology transfer:
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—eliminate mandatory transfer of technology to both the Enterprise
and developing countries.
e. Parallel system issues:
—eliminate advantages of the Enterprise over private and state
miners;
—increase the ability of industrialized countries to influence
decisions and operations of the Enterprise;
—examine the feasibility of alternatives to the parallel system that
do not include a supranational mining entity.
B. Committee II (fisheries, continental shelf,
etc.)
—clarify fisheries provisions (particularly those relating to
anadromous fish and tuna and the rights of land-locked and
geographically disadvantaged States) to ensure conformity with U.S.
policies, as reflected particularly in the Magnuson Fishery
Conservation and Management Act;23
—eliminate continental shelf revenue sharing;
—eliminate or clarify the requirement to remove completely abandoned
shelf installations;
—clarify provisions relating to the delimitation of maritime
boundaries between opposite and adjacent States to protect affected
U.S. interests;
—clarify the role, powers, and composition of the Boundary
Commission.
—establish clearly that the Antarctic continental shelf is not part
of the “Area”.24
C. Committee III (Marine science and pollution):
Recognizing that the work of Committee III has been officially
closed, the USDEL should not take the initiative to reopen formal
discussions on marine scientific research, but should explore
informally with other Delegations the negotiability of improvements
to the text regarding marine scientific research in the economic
zone, with emphasis on the following:
(a) Elimination of the requirement that clearance requests be
submitted to the coastal State six months in advance;
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(b) Elimination or sharp reduction in the requirements imposed on
researchers in Article 249, especially paragraph 1(d)
thereof;25
(c) Limiting the right of and setting a time schedule for a
coastal State to request supplementary information regarding a
clearance request it has received; and
(d) Strenthening the implied consent provisions by assuring that
lack of a coastal State response to a clearance request can be
deemed equivalent to their consent for such
research.
D. Dispute settlement:
—improve the process for selection of judges for the LOS Tribunal and Seabeds Dispute
Chamber to better protect our interest in a fair dispute settlement
process;
—adopt compulsory conciliation as a major method of dispute
settlement;
—clarify the entire dispute settlement text through a major drafting
exercise.26