Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

75. Memorandum From James Stark of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, September 12, 1986

SUBJECT

• Discussions in Tunisia and Algeria

From September 1–7, I accompanied Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage to Tunisia and Algeria for bilateral political-military discussions. Also participating were LtGen Phil Gast (DSAA), Deputy Assistant Secretary Bob Pelletreau (OSD/ISA), Deputy Assistant Secretary Dave Zweifel (State/NEA) and RADM Tony Less (JCS/J–5) together with representatives from each Service and EUCOM. This memorandum reviews the highlights of those meetings.

Tunisia

The meetings were hosted by Defense Minister Baly and included short private meetings for Armitage with President Bourguiba² and Prime Minister Sfar.³ Armitage reported that conversations with Sfar were more substantive than previous meetings with Mzali, and that Sfar was an impressive interlocutor, dynamic, and articulate.

The meetings went very well. It was obvious that Bourguiba had given directions that U.S.-Tunisian security relations were to be expanded. As a result, agreements were reached on many minor issues and discussions of security assistance for Tunisia centered around a realistic request list.

The most important event of the meetings was close-hold Tunisian agreement to commence joint contingency planning. I suspect this decision was due to the success of the April raid on Tripoli, the continuing threat from Libya, and Tunisia’s hope that closer cooperation with the U.S. will free up additional economic and security assistance. As a first step, Admiral Less and the Tunisian Army Chief of Staff (General Baraket) met to discuss a draft TOR.⁴ Subsequent meetings will be held and will include EUCOM representatives.

Financially, Tunisia is very worried about the pressures of declining revenues and cuts in U.S. security assistance. In this area, Tunisia has three goals:

— It assumes FY87 security assistance will remain at FY86 levels. The U.S. delegation noted that this would be unlikely. Expect Ambassador Ben Yahia to lobby Congress for an earmark.

— Tunisia raised a possible rescheduling of its FY87 FMS loan principle. We promised to look into this, but noted that this could cause legal and downstream financial problems. They should not expect a positive answer.

— Tunisia wants to reduce the “exorbitant” interest rates on prior FMS loans, which currently run 11–14 percent. This issue is currently being actively worked by NSC, State, DoD, and Treasury. We hope to have some positive answers by the end of September.

While the very ambitious “Bourguiba list” of desired U.S. arms remains Tunisia’s goal, the GOT tabled a new, more realistic, list headed by Stinger, anti-mortar radar, and surveillance aircraft. Its total cost would be $325 million.

Finally, Tunisia expressed interest in receiving counterterrorism training for its army. Armitage noted that such training was not conducted solely by the U.S. Army, and that we would have to have further discussions at the policy level.

Algeria

The meetings with Algeria were hosted by Ministry of Defense Secretary General Cheloufi.⁵ The discussions covered military sales and cooperation, as well as regional political issues.⁶ Embassy officers commented that the high turnout of top Algerian officers was unique and illustrated Algeria’s commitment at the highest level to expanding its relations with the U.S.

Armitage stressed that the U.S. wished to improve and deepen its security cooperation with Algeria, but only at a pace with which both countries would be comfortable. The U.S. is not interested in short-term gains, but rather in a satisfactory long-term relationship. As we expand training, sales, and other contacts with Algeria, we should expect relations to improve.

Cheloufi, while stressing Algeria’s independence and non-alignment, also emphasized its desire to diversify weapons sources. Privately, he also acknowledged that the earlier emphasis on a socialist model together with its single product (hydrocarbon) economy was causing problems. Algeria’s leaders want to relax the strict socialism, making Algeria attractive to Western investment in order to diversify their economic base.

The Algerians were totally ignorant of FMS regulations. General Gast explained U.S. procedures in some detail. The Algerians proposed, and we agreed, to set up a joint military working group to handle questions about military sales, training, and equipment. After much last minute maneuvering, we signed agreements on a GSOMIA and IMET which had been under negotiation for almost a year. The Algerians also informed us that, in accordance with their sales agreement, the Soviets had said nyet to any Bear Spares⁷ program for the Algerian MIG–21s.

Political discussions centered on Libya and Morocco. Both sides openly discussed areas of disagreement.

— Algeria concurred on the nature of the Libyan threat, but disagreed with the U.S. decision to bomb Tripoli. Their approach is to open contacts with political and military circles in Libya and try to moderate Qadhafi’s behavior. Privately, they recommended action which would “eliminate the individual” without endangering the Libyan populace. For our part, we explained the rationale behind the April strike and the fact that assassination is not an option for the United States.

— Algeria’s only major problem with Morocco is the Western Sahara dispute. They agree that it cannot be resolved militarily and are anxious for substantive political discussions. They will not, however, agree to a meeting if it is solely to buy more time for Hassan. For its part, the U.S. stressed its interest in bringing Algeria and Morocco to a negotiating table, but refused to agree to pressure Hassan into concessions. As a result of the renunciation of the Oujda Accords, the Algerians expect Libya to offer military equipment and financial support to the Polisario, but feel they can control Libya’s access and activities. The Algerians stressed that they do not begrudge us our good relations with Morocco and do not expect the Western Sahara question to affect U.S.-Algerian relations.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Elaine L. Morton Files, Algeria. Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Teicher, Ross, Morton, Saunders, and Bohn.
2. For the Armitage-Bourguiba discussion, see footnote 3, Document 345.
3. Telegram 8684 from Tunis, September 5, contains a record of the Armitage-Sfar meeting. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860677–0376)
4. No record of this meeting has been found.
5. In telegram 4521 from Algiers, September 8, the Embassy reported on Armitage’s discussions about military issues with the Algerians. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860680–0680)
6. In telegram 4529 from Algiers, September 9, the Embassy reported on Armitage’s discussions about political issues with the Algerians. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860683–0479)
7. Reference is to the U.S. program that provided spare parts and ammunition for Soviet or Soviet-style weapons to countries wishing to reduce dependency on Soviet military aid.