Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

345. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

8818.

Tunis, September 10, 1986, 1540Z

SUBJECT

• GOT Decision to Participate in Joint Contingency Planning.

1. Secret/Entire text.

2. The apparently unequivocal GOT decision to accept the ten month-old U.S. proposal for Joint Contingency Planning came as something of a surprise.² That decision, conveyed to Assistant Secretary of Defense Armitage³ with the request that it be kept in deep confidence and coupled with the U.S. decision to recommend sale of Stingers to the GOT, resulted in an extremely productive sixth meeting of the Joint Military Commission. This message attempts to delve into the reasons that led the GOT to proceed with joint contingency planning.

3. The Minister of Defense, Slaheddine Baly, advised ASD Armitage confidentially of the GOT decision at the beginning of the visit. The highly positive tone of subsequent working meetings served as a further sign that the word had obviously gone out to cooperate with the U.S. The senior Tunisian military officers in the know have termed the decision an “historic” one, which makes interesting the apparent lack of internal GOT debate surrounding it.

4. There is no indication that any of the other national security leaders outside of the MOD had any substantial input into the decision. Min Int Ben Ali did not participate in any of the Armitage sessions, FonMin Caid Essebsi was absent, and PriMin Rachid Sfar acted as if he were hearing the proposal for the first time when Baly briefed him on ASD Armitage’s meeting with President Bourguiba (which Sfar did not attend). Baly told us the decision was made “some weeks ago.” Another senior military officer told us the decision had been fully studied and staffed within the military over past months. The original U.S. proposal having been made at the 1985 JMC, he explained, it was only “natural” that the GOT response be given at this year’s meeting. When we pointed out that several crises had arisen in the course of the year during which GOT had asked how we might help, our interlocutor replied that the GOT had not wanted to take the decision while “under pressure.” We believe that Baly having assessed the new atmosphere and conscious of support for the proposal among his Chiefs of Staff, simply bided his time and ran it by his President in the certitude that the latter, given his pro-American leanings, would approve.

5. That said, the single most important factor in leading the GOT to its decision was the removal from the scene of former PriMin Mohamed Mzali.⁴ Mzali’s Arab-leaning tendencies and his sensitivity to opposition views not only made him chary of a close relationship with the U.S.; he appeared at times to nurture the image of someone willing to resist us. Ironically, it was his mischievous hypothetical questions posed to us in late September 1985 that led to our own proposals for joint planning.

6. To be sure, the country’s economic straits argue for some adjustments in Tunisian defense planning. The GOT may have accepted part of our rationale that joint planning could reduce their own expenditures. The realization also appears to have come home that credits likely to be available from USG are simply not going to permit acquisition of past GOT wish lists. Hence a desire to please the U.S and particularly DOD, which is seen as more “appreciative” of Tunisia’s strategic value to the U.S. in pushing for additional funds than is the State Department. PriMin Sfar was rather blatant on this point during his meeting with Armitage (Tunis 8684).⁵

7. Baly repeatedly stressed the need for tight secrecy surrounding the upcoming planning discussions, for reasons relating to Tunisia’s internal situation and regional relations. We must honor that request. It is true that the GOT decided to be totally up front in its media coverage of the JMC meeting. But this does not mean that it can afford to ignore its political vulnerabilities, even though President Bourguiba apparently does not pay much heed to them. New incidents in the region, ranging from another bombing of Libya, sudden improvements in the Libyan-Tunisian relationship, or pressures from an Algeria likely to frown on U.S. forces exercising in Tunis, could alter the political context in which the GOT has taken decision to proceed with us.

8. One other matter needs to be addressed. Although we believe that GOT leaders understand the distinction between a formal mutual defense pact and contingency planning designed to facilitate subsequent—ad hoc—political decisions to employ U.S. assets, it will be necessary to reinforce that understanding as the opportunities present themselves in coming months.

9. Department please pass as appropriate.

Brown

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Tunis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. See Document 336.
3. In telegram 8682 from Tunis, September 5, the Embassy reported that during Armitage’s September 4 meeting with Bourguiba, “Baly briefed President on opening session of JMC, including GOT’s indication of readiness to discuss joint defense planning with US. Bourguiba ratified his previous decision in that regard.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1986 Nodis Telegrams: Lot 95D23, Tunis) Baly notified Armitage of his government’s decision on September 3. (Telegram 8636 from Tunis, September 4; ibid.)
4. See Document 343.
5. In telegram 8684 from Tunis, September 5, the Embassy reported: “In hour-long and animated discussion with Assistant Secretary Armitage, PM Rachid Sfar gave energetic exposé of Tunisian positions on US-Tunisian military cooperation, Tunisia’s economic problems and their impact on country’s security posture, position of Palestinians in Tunisia, and current Maghreb politics.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860677–0376)