Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

76. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

1856.

Tunis, February 19, 1987, 1459Z

SUBJECT

• Prime Minister Baccouche Discusses Maghreb Issues.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Summary: Prime Minister Baccouche said Qadhafi had been on his best behavior during February 5–7 visit to Tunis and appeared willing to allow Tunisia economic benefits from normalization. He did not push for exchange of Ambassadors. While professing readiness to enter Tripartite Accord² if others wished, he readily agreed to Tunisian position that resolution of Western Sahara issue should have priority so that Morocco also could join in a five-state Maghreb. Thus, in Baccouche’s judgment the March 19 fifth anniversary of the Tripartite Accord would not witness startling events. Tunisia was exploring how it might helpfully play an intermediary role in the Saharan issue and would welcome U.S. suggestions. End summary.

3. In one hour meeting February 18 PriMin Baccouche briefed Ambassador on Tunisia’s relations with Libya and his view of Maghreb developments following recent visits. After reviewing on again, off again background to Qadhafi’s February 5–7 visit, Baccouche said Tunisian leadership had not known what to expect from Qadhafi, such as whether he would go on the offensive over reasons which had led to earlier postponements, i.e., Tunisia receiving President Bendjedid first and welcome accorded to visiting French and U.S. Mediterranean fleet commanders. In fact, Qadhafi was on his best behavior while in Tunis, intent on demonstrating his friendship and goodwill. He insisted on treating Ben Ali and Baccouche as “revolutionaries” who had overthrown the hated Bourguiba regime and persistently refused to see continuity of Tunisian policies even when Tunisian leaders had pressed this point. On bilateral economic matters, Qadhafi had been accommodating but very general, leaving the details to be worked out during re-established joint commission sessions which Baccouche thought would take place in late March. Joint commission would include a number of sub-committees on specific issues such as workers, tourism, trade, etc. Tunisia intended to prepare well for this session and seek maximum economic benefits, both in order to provide relief for the hard-pressed south and also, Baccouche implied, in order to recover ground which was being lost to Algeria in exploiting Libyan economic opportunities.

4. In answer to specific questions, Baccouche said that Algeria had supported having the previously agreed Algerian-Libyan gas pipeline pass through Tunisia. This would provide potential energy for Tunisian light industries, as well as western Libyan cities and towns. Minister of Interior Ammar had visited Tripoli Feb. 16 to discuss entry modalities. Ben Ali and Qadhafi had agreed to eliminate visa requirements for each other’s citizens as of February 15 but in practice Libya was requiring each Tunisian to have TD200 in hard currency. In the other direction, only twelve Libyans had entered Tunisia thus far, owing to the requirement for a Libyan exit visa, which only proven regime loyalists could obtain. Baccouche did not yet have Ammar’s report of his meetings but assured Ambassador that Tunisia had the means and the will to monitor closely all Libyan visitors. The question of naming Ambassadors did not come up during Qadhafi’s visit, and Tunisia was in no rush to name an Ambassador to Tripoli. Nevertheless, GOT had identified its current Ambassador to Jordan, said Ben Mustapha el Gharbi, as its likely candidate.

5. Ambassador told Baccouche that Qadhafi’s impromptu remarks on Feb. 8³ at Sakiat Sidi Youssef were insulting and unacceptable to the U.S. We knew GOT agreed and did not intend to make an issue of it. Baccouche noted that Qadhafi had gone out of his way to attack all Tunisia’s friends and confirmed President Ben Ali’s extreme displeasure with Qadhafi’s remarks. They had been blacked out in Tunisia. When Ben Ali had taken Qadhafi to task afterward, the Libyan had responded that he was by mentality a revolutionary, not a head of state, and thus could only talk in this way. As for more general impressions of the Libyan leader, Baccouche said, he and Ben Ali thought that Qadhafi was less energetic and aggressive than in the past. Whether the causes were physical or mental, they did not know, but they felt it was harder for Qadhafi to act. In addition, Baccouche said, he estimated that 80–90 percent of the Libyan population was ready for a change of leadership.

6. The Maghreb. Qadhafi had explained to Ben Ali that he was not keen to join the Tripartite Accord and saw no particular value in it, but he would do so if others wished. Tunisia had countered with the necessity of including Morocco in any larger Maghrebian agreement. Qadhafi, said Baccouche, agreed completely that a five-state Maghreb should be the objective rather than a four-state accord. He also agreed that the first step had to be to accelerate a solution to the problem of the Western Sahara. Thus in Baccouche’s judgment no startling event would happen on March 19, the fifth anniversary of the Tripartite Accord, as Algeria had hoped. Baccouche added that Qadhafi had told Polisario leader Abdul Azziz during their meeting at Annaba that the Polisario must also work to resolve rather than perpetuate the Western Sahara issue.

7. Baccouche said that Tunisia was examining how it could play a more active intermediary role in the Sahara question. Foreign Minister Mestiri had recently visited Gabon to consult with a senior U.N. official on this issue. Baccouche himself would shortly visit Rabat and Algiers, and President Ben Ali would make an official visit to Algeria on March 2 and 3. The essence of the problem, he said, was to convince King Hassan that he had to help Algeria disengage from the Polisario. A face-saving formula needed to be found. Algeria could not just put 500 or 5,000 Polisario supporters in jail. Baccouche said he would welcome ideas or suggestions from the U.S. regarding how Tunisia might help in this process. He closed by saying Tunisian officials would look forward to discussing this and other subjects with General Walters during his upcoming visit.

Pelletreau

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D880143–0505. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, London, Madrid, Nouakchott, Paris, Rabat, Rome, USUN, and USCINCEUR.
2. See Document 30.
3. Not further identified.