74. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1

NESA 86–10037

THE MAGHREB: POPULATION PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL STABILITY

Key Judgments

The serious and deepening social and economic problems in North African—high unemployment, overcrowded cities, and a growing food deficit—are undermining the foundations of political stability in the region. Rapid population growth is a major factor in these problems, and the situation will worsen as the population in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia jumps from 53 million today to a projected 84 million in the year 2000. [portion marking not declassified]

The rapid population growth is destabilizing because it is eroding the old land-based, family-oriented, traditional Islamic society of the Maghreb faster than governments in the area have been able to promote development of economically advanced, urban-based societies. The traditional rural economy cannot absorb the population increase, and, as a result, the cities are drowning in an excess of youthful jobseekers. [Page 159] Rapidly expanding public education systems try to inculcate the skills and habits of thought needed to adapt to modern society, but all too often they only broaden horizons and whet ambitions faster than the job market can grow to satisfy them. [portion marking not declassified]

As these developments have gathered momentum, increasingly large numbers of people—especially the younger generation—have become alienated from their societies. Some of these socially and intellectually uprooted individuals have started to turn their backs on modernization and reject along with it the United States and other Western countries that they see as principal agents of change. This impulse has been the driving force behind the spread of the Islamic fundamentalist revival in the Maghreb. Other individuals are discontented that their governments are not doing more to promote change, and this group—substantially smaller than the fundamentalists—is the recruiting ground for radical leftists. [portion marking not declassified]

Political protest is not yet a major force, but it almost certainly will become so as social and economic conditions deteriorate in the region. Political leaders who fail to accommodate either leftist or fundamentalist aspirations almost certainly will be forced to use more repressive measures to shore up their authority. Leaders who lean too far toward either fundamentalism or leftist radicalism, however, will probably stir up opposition from the other quarter. Moreover, fundamentalism and leftist radicalism imply different political blueprints, and the underlying conflict between them suggests that politics in the Maghreb will become increasingly turbulent. [portion marking not declassified]

Maghreb leaders are aware of the dangers that rapid population growth poses to long-term political stability, and they have begun to deal constructively with some of the principal causes and consequences of the problem. In Morocco, family planning is slowly gaining acceptance, especially in the cities and among the better educated. Algeria recognizes the need for family planning, though a national program is still in the initial stages of implementation. Tunisia already has made limited gains in controlling population growth through goverment-sponsored family planning programs. In spite of these efforts, progress in population control is likely to remain limited in North Africa for some years to come. Inadequate education is a fundamental obstacle, and governments will proceed cautiously in order to avoid offending traditional values. [portion marking not declassified]

The strong possibility that rapid population growth will continue and could contribute to increased political instability and anti-US sentiment is of particular concern because of the region’s strategic location. Political leaders in the region are well aware of the Maghreb’s strategic importance. We anticipate that Morocco, Tunisia, and possibly Algeria will try to exploit that fact by pressing Washington for financial assistance as they struggle with the economic and political consequences of [Page 160] rapid urban growth. Maghreb governments almost certainly will view Washington’s response to their requests for assistance as a measure of US commitment to their needs and—in the case of Morocco and Tunisia—as an indication of US reliability as an ally. [portion marking not declassified]

[Omitted here is a map and the body of the memorandum.]

  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–88–0039, 1986 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 36, Morocco 1986. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Information available as of September 11 was used in the memorandum’s preparation.