62. Interagency Intelligence Assessment1
MOROCCAN-LIBYAN UNION: ONE YEAR LATER
SUMMARY
The year-old Moroccan-Libyan union was a product of pragmatic considerations on the part of two Arab leaders who continue to have divergent long-term interests in North Africa. Both partners have achieved what they perceive as useful benefits from the union, although the costs so far have been far greater for Moroccan King Hassan. We see nothing on the horizon to suggest an early end to the union.
Hassan claims the union is a means to eliminate Tripoli’s support to the Polisario Front. More importantly, it should be seen as a strategic challenge to Algeria, and as an attempt to ease Morocco’s pressing economic and social problems that had sparked riots in January 1984.2 Libyan leader Qadhafi views the partnership as a major coup in his efforts to enhance his international standing, isolate Algeria, and in turn to counter US attempts to isolate him. He also hopes to use Morocco as a conduit to obtain restricted US equipment and spare parts, particularly for Libyan aircraft.
Hassan’s benefits so far have been primarily economic. Since the union, he has received around $150 million in aid from Qadhafi as well as a growing, but still small, market for Moroccan agricultural exports and jobs for Moroccan workers. These gestures, however, have fallen far short of making the union the great economic panacea touted by Hassan at the time the agreement was signed.
The benefits to Qadhafi have been several, and have entailed little cost. Morocco is no longer a center of Libyan dissident activity and Hassan has toned down considerably his comments on Libyan subversion in Sudan and Chad. Algeria has been strategically challenged. Morocco is less supportive of moderate Arab efforts related to the peace process. Moreover, Moroccan goods have helped ease a crippling shortage in Libya of essential consumer goods that has prompted [Page 137] unprecedented criticism of Qadhafi’s policies. Nonetheless, increased Algerian animosity may ultimately prove to be the biggest drawback to Qadhafi.
The union’s drawbacks have been almost exclusively borne by Hassan. He has suffered a public and nettlesome setback in his relations with Washington and has exacerbated an already deteriorating situation with neighboring Algeria. [2 lines not declassified] Moreover the union has strengthened Algerian determination to challenge Morocco, and Algiers has successfully widened diplomatic recognition for the Polisario during the past year.
On balance, we believe that Morocco would be the more likely of the two to end the pact. Hassan might allow the treaty to atrophy if Qadhafi does not continue to provide sizable amounts of economic aid, particularly if the opposition tries to develop Libyan assistance into a major political issue. The King might even break openly with Libya if Qadhafi insisted on closer military cooperation or on Rabat’s adopting a more anti-US and anti-Israeli stand. Hassan almost certainly would denounce the union if Moroccan security uncovered clear evidence of Libyan-sponsored threats to his regime or if Qadhafi resumed supplying the Polisario. If Rabat did abrogate the pact, Qadhafi would turn sharply on Hassan, and seek to overthrow him.
Hassan wants to maintain close relations with the United States, but fears Washington will take more significant punitive action against him. Of particular concern would be a large cut in US economic and military assistance; he is already sensitive to slights in protocol to himself and senior Moroccan officials. If Moroccan-US relations were to severely deteriorate, Hassan could terminate the joint military access agreement and US use of [less than 1 line not declassified] facilities in Morocco, despite the strategic and financial costs such a step would entail.
[Omitted here is the body of the assessment.]
- Source: Reagan Library, Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, Morocco 1985 (10/01/1985). Secret; [handling restrictions not declassified]. Prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia, and coordinated within the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense. Information available as of October 9 was used in its preparation.↩
- See Document 222.↩