Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

61. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State and Multiple Recipients¹

8860.

Tunis, September 27, 1985, 1216Z

SUBJECT

• Tunisia Breaks Relations With Libya.

Ref:

• Tunis 8845 (Notal).²

1. (Confidential—Entire text.)

2. Summary. GOT for the first time ever has broken relations with Libya, following nearly two months of steadily deteriorating relations. Blatant terrorist acts traced to the Libyan Embassy proved to be the catalyst. Expected mediation efforts may succeed in reducing tensions, but relations between the two will not return to normal for the forseeable future. The GOT, breaking with its posture of recent weeks, has chosen to accentuate the support it enjoys from the U.S. in the latest stage. End summary.

3. The GOT announced evening of September 26 its decision to break relations with Libya. An item in the official news agency TAP cited “Libya’s policy of aggression and permanent hostility towards Tunisia which aims at threatening its accomplishments, its security and the stability of its institutions.” It [went] on to cite the crisis launched by Libya in August with the expulsion of Tunisian workers and the subsequent deterioration in relations due to Libyan acts including subversion, hostile press campaigns, explicit threats to employ force, and repeated violations of Tunisian airspace.³ It said the GOT had “irrefutable” proof of Libyan use of its diplomatic presence to foster terrorism, espionage and subversion.⁴ It noted the most recent incident involving the dispatch of letter bombs to Tunisian press figures by Libyan diplomats.

4. This is the first time relations between the two states, sporadically troubled since Qadhafi’s accession to power in 1969, have been formally cut. At this writing, Tripoli has yet to react, although it issued unconvincing denials of complicity in the letter bombs. The latest chapter in the deterioration of relations in fact began early this year and may well, as many Tunisians believe, have reflected a decision by Qadhafi to turn the pressure on after Bourguiba’s late 1984 illness. Whatever, pressures against the workers by way of limiting their remittances were instituted. In March a clandestine radio station began broadcasting encouragement to Tunisians (and to a lesser extent other Maghreb peoples) to kill people of the Jewish faith among their population. This promoted a scene in which a furious President Bourguiba dismissed Libyan Foreign Minister Turayki from his office, prompting further threats from Qadhafi. Meanwhile, Qadhafi’s media had been railing against Arab Chiefs of State (e.g. Mubarak, Hussein, Bendjedid) who were “humiliating” the Arab world by rendering homage in Washington. Subsequently, the Bourguiba visit was announced. The final phase in this downward trend in relations was, as the GOT statement noted, the expulsion of workers in early Aug the blatant actions of Qadhafi this week actually left the GOT little choice but to break relations.

5. Throughout the summer, but particularly since the expulsions began, Qadhafi has shown unusual sensitivity to perceived insults against him in the Tunisian press. Indeed, the Tunisian press has become more strident since early September, when major gestures of support by the Algerians and Iraqis seemed to mark a watershed in Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali’s traditional tendency to temporize with the Libyans. Mzali and the GOT rather effectively used the tensions to rally the country. In doing so they were not above pushing recalcitrant trade unions into submission. Meanwhile, there is no question that the Tunisian press became more personally insulting to Qadhafi, on one occasion in recent days terming him a “bloodstained madman.”

6. It is unclear where things go from here. We would expect any number of mediation efforts to be launched in coming days. The regional propensity to be able to kiss and make up is legend. But even if some sort of reconciliation is achieved steps have been taken which will not permit things to go back where they were anytime soon. There are probably only 15,000 or so Tunisians still in Libya. They are, to be sure, potential hostages, but most probably have deeper roots than those that have left, just as the 10,000 or so Libyan passport holders in Tunisia have deep roots here. Short of an unlikely all-out military move, Qadhafi has the Omdurman option or, more likely, the possibility of carrying out more terrorist incidents. Some gimmickry such as a repeat of his previous “green marches” on the Egyptian frontier area are also possible. Whatever hostile actions he takes will continue to have negative effect on the overwhelming majority of the Tunisian people already disenchanted with his acts to date. Even those who have criticized Mzali’s exploitation of the crisis are now silent. Thus, his hopes of creating internal problems for the regime have, at least for the short term, backfired.

7. The U.S. has for the moment been thrust into the prominent role as Tunisia’s supporter. Pictures of the Ambassador calling on President Bourguiba September 26, coupled with his reiteration of U.S. support to the local press and replays of the State Department spokesman’s September 26 remarks, were prominently featured on TV and the local Arabic and French press. This contrasts with desire to downplay U.S. in public demonstrated up to now, and GOT preference to be seen as relying in the first instance on Arab brothers. The Prime Minister’s trip to Algiers this weekend will take us out of the limelight somewhat, but the GOT appears to have decided that, at its lowest point to date in its relations with Libya, it wants its big friend seen up front.

Sebastian

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850689–0183. Confidential; Immediate. Sent Priority to the Arab League Collective, London, Paris, Rome, USUN, and USCINCEUR.
2. In telegram 8845 from Tunis, September 26, the Embassy reported that both AFP “and local Embassy sources confirm report of letter bomb explosion in down-town Tunis this morning,” the second such report in 2 days. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850686–0249)
3. See Document 58.
4. In a September 26 information memorandum to Shultz, Abramowitz wrote: “There are currently no new signs Libya intends to launch a conventional ground attack on Tunisia, and we continue to believe an outright invasion is unlikely. However, Libya could easily bomb targets throughout the country, or launch a variety of terrorist or unconventional operations, with little warning. Should Libya nonetheless stage a major ground attack, it would bog down after initial gains—because of Libyan deficiencies. Before Libya could do much Algeria, not Egypt, would likely act.” (Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Records of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, 1985: Lot 87D431, Memos, AFN, September 1985)