Office of the Historian

222. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger) and the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology (Schneider) to Secretary of State Shultz1

Washington, January 24, 1984

SUBJECT

  • Additional Assistance for Morocco

We agree with NEA that more assistance to Morocco would be useful.2 We do not believe NEA has made a sufficient case for $40 million as compared with the $20 million we propose. The fact is that the FY 1983 level was artificially high because of the Congressional earmark on military assistance. Had the funds not been earmarked, the FY 1983 levels would have been $40–50 million lower to meet unmet, and higher priority needs elsewhere, e.g., in Pakistan.

The add-on we propose is substantial. It is multiples above the $5 million we allocated to Tunisia last week—in the face of very similar circumstances. To go higher now for Morocco will also have FY 1985 implications, since we would again face a perceived requirement to sustain Morocco’s upward aid trend. In the global framework, this privileged status for Morocco does not seem warranted.

If you believe we must provide additional funds to Morocco, there are essentially two options.

1)
Cut Zimbabwe ESF by $10 million and reduce the unallocated FMS pool by $10 million. To cut Zimbabwe further now would vitiate the impact of our action last month. You decided then to make the cuts and allow that action to speak for itself. It is too early to say how the message was received, but there is little doubt that a further cut would be read as a U.S. decision to write off Zimbabwe. There would also be Congressional costs. While the FMS was officially described as unallocated, we had notionally earmarked the entire sum for Lebanon. The pol-mil team that visited Lebanon last week indicated we would draw on the pool to pay for the tanks and artillery that the LAF now seeks. While we will in all likelihood seek a supplemental, we need all of the pool money as bridge financing.
2)
Shift $20 million ESF from Turkey to Morocco in FY 1985—We have proposed $175 million ESF for Turkey in FY 1985, an amount we may not be able to allocate when we actually see what we are getting from [Page 472] Congress. Nevertheless, the Turks already are miffed that we are not seeking a supplemental for the $36.5 million ESF shortfall in FY 1984. They are inevitably aware informally of the FY 1985 numbers and likely would see any cut now as a political signal on Cyprus. It may be that we choose to shift money next year, but this is a decision whose cost we cannot measure now. DOD (and EUR) would strongly object, and you likely would have to face off Weinberger on the decision.

Recommendation

A)
That you agree to our proposal to allocate an additional $20 million in PL–480, D.A., and/or ESF to Morocco for FY 1984.3
B)
In addition, if you agree with NEA that an additional $20 million is necessary above the amount we recommend:4

That you agree to cut Zimbabwe by $10 million and shift $10 million in FMS to Morocco from the funds identified for additional Lebanon requirements.

Alternately that you agree to shift $20 million in FY 1985 ESF from Turkey to Morocco.

  1. Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (01/21/1984–01/24/1984). Secret. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “GPS.” Covey initialed the memorandum in the top right corner and wrote: “1/24.”↩
  2. NEA’s recommendations are in an undated action memorandum from Murphy to Shultz sent through Eagleburger and Schneider. (Ibid.)↩
  3. Shultz initialed the “Agree” line of this recommendation.↩
  4. Shultz did not indicate agreement or disagreement with either of the following recommendations.↩